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Believing Mary Karr examines how belief, represented in the memoirs of Mary Karr,
works in our contemporary moment. This examination is supported by the argument that our
identities and the stories we tell about them are always constructions of belief, and that these
beliefs are ultimately relational, enacted in the intersubjective relationship between writers and
readers of autobiography. This dissertation provides the fields of both rhetoric and life writing
studies not only an awareness of how ideas about belief—how beliefs about belief—have already
shaped our scholarly imagination but also the possibilities a rhetoric of belief can offer to future
conversations about what it means to read and write autobiography in America today. Engaging
theorists such as Graham Ward, Paul Ricoeur, Jessica Benjamin, Michel Foucault, and Judith
Butler, this dissertation examines various beliefs, both sacred and secular, represented in Karr’s
The Liars’ Club, Cherry, Lit, and The Art of Memoir.
Believing Mary Karr suggests that stories of belief, epitomized by Mary Karr’s memoirs,
offer readers an embodied experience that operates through the expectant affects of desire and
hope and that also forms, re-forms, and transforms their own structures of believing. Thus, such
narratives reveal their power on at least two levels. Individually, they invite us to reconsider the
role of belief in our own lives. Collectively, they hold the potential to reinscribe pervading
cultural myths by acknowledging how beliefs help create shared worlds.
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CHAPTER I
SINGULAR STORIES IN A COLLECTIVE WORLD: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
NARRATIVE AND THE RHETORICS OF BELIEF
Understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore, seek not to understand that you may believe,
but believe that you may understand.
—St. Augustine of Hippo
To understand is to understand one’s life in front of the text.
—Paul Ricoeur
If philosophy is defined as inquiry into certain truth, then what I pursue here is not philosophy
but rhetoric: the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared
discourse.
—Wayne C. Booth

What Makes Stories Believable?
A few months ago, Bob the cat disappeared. After almost eighteen years of living a
relatively posh lifestyle with my parents, Bob, on an increasingly rare trip outside, simply never
returned home. It was only a couple of days before my parents gave up hope and put away his
food bowl and litter box. Considering Bob’s particular feline tendencies, absences—even up to
three days or so—were not uncommon. However, with his impending old age, they had grown
less and less frequent. He had learned to appreciate the comforts that came with aging, just like
my parents—a cozy chair, the remote control, heat, pillows. Once a vicious street fighter who
protected his realm with vigilance, Bob no longer cared as much when the occasional squirrel,
bunny, or even neighborhood cat roamed his yard. These days he preferred naps on my dad’s lap
to a nocturnal rumble. It hadn’t always been, and he had the battle scars to prove it. His tabby
coat was perpetually covered in dirt; he was missing half an ear and his entire tail. When my
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parents caught his tail in the garage door, an accident that required a complete amputation, we
joked that he was living up to his name.
Bob held an unusual place in our family’s history of pets, and an even more rare spot in
my dad’s heart, especially for a cat. Bob was my dad’s cat, and Dad was Bob’s human. Eighteen
years ago, my dad returned from a day of painting at our rental property with a little yellow
kitten who had climbed up the tall ladder after my dad, announcing his presence with an insistent
meow that only got louder the older he got and the larger his demands. When Dad first brought
Bob home, I was in a transition and briefly living with my parents. Dad informed Mom and me
that Bob was an outside cat and was not to be let in. My dad seemed convinced that Bob was
simply passing through on his way to bigger and better things (sort of like his oldest daughter?)
and didn’t want him to get too comfortable. Bob had other plans. Slowly and casually, so as not
to raise any suspicions, Bob made brief appearances in the house. Mom put out food for him, and
Dad gave him a name. Sometimes, when Dad would notice Bob walking through the living
room, he would remind us that Bob is an outside cat, a rule that we seemed to be forgetting. But
Bob had his own agenda, and his devotion to my father was undeniable. It seemed as if out of all
the humans in the world, Bob had chosen my dad as his companion, and to the utter shock of all
of us, my dad seemed to allow this grungy kitten to claim his heart. One day, while my dad was
otherwise occupied, Mom snuck Bob to the vet for a check up and shots. And the rest is history.
Bob was the last pet in my parents’ lives. Like the baby of the family, he was indulged in ways
that would make our previous kitties roll in their graves.
When Bob left, my parents were devastated. Immediately Mom assumed that he had gone
somewhere to die, but that seemed unlikely since he was in fine health, certainly not the spry
kitten he once was, but also not obviously ill. I assured them he would return; after all, he always
2

had. When a week passed, I could no longer offer any believable reasons to explain his absence.
My mom told me they worried that Bob had met a worse fate—had been hit by a car or perhaps
torn apart by another animal. But then they decided to believe a different story about Bob.
Possibly, wanting to spare my parents the sadness of his death (possibly he had a terminal illness
he didn’t want to reveal?), he left to simply fall asleep peacefully under a bush somewhere. Or
maybe, just maybe, some older couple—desperate for a cat of their own—found Bob prowling
through their bushes and brought him into their home to feed and love him. Bob, probably
renamed something like Mittens or Whiskers, would live out the remainder of his life as an
indoor cat, pampered by these benevolent caretakers who fed him canned tuna and actually
enjoyed ushering him in and out a thousand times a day.
Beginning a dissertation with the story of Bob the cat might seem a bit misguided or even
silly; however, I was really struck by how this simple narrative captured my interest in belief and
story and how they work together. There are so many possible stories behind Bob’s mysterious
disappearance. Whatever story each of us conjures up to explain Bob’s disappearance is colored
by a lifetime of other stories—other beliefs—about pets, relationships, death, the afterlife, nature,
and thousands of other narratives we’ve both learned and written to help us understand our
world. What makes certain stories believable? This is the question motivating this dissertation. It
is a question that has driven my academic, personal, and even spiritual life since as early as I can
remember when I was taught to believe a very specific story about the world and my place in it. I
wouldn’t have called it a “story” then, however, as that word conjures up make-believe tales of
children living in boxcars or hiding in wardrobes. No, the story I learned—complete with talking
snakes, floating arks, parted seas, resurrections, and virgin births—was true. And because of its
truth, I was taught to believe in it. This belief didn’t feel like a choice, like believing whether or
3

not Narnia existed or whether the Bears were a better football team than the Cowboys. As a
young child, I didn’t choose this story so much as it was chosen for me. Because of my parents,
their stories, their church, my small-town community, and thousands of other factors I can’t even
begin to recognize, I was destined to believe. Socionarratologist Arthur W. Frank calls our
personal collection of stories a “narrative habitus,” or the “embodied sense of attraction,
indifference, or repulsion people feel in response to stories; the intuitive, usually tacit sense that
some story is for us or not for us; that it expresses possibilities of which we are or can be a part,
or that it represents a world in which we have no stake” (53). In other words, we continue to
choose and be chosen by stories and this process both reflects and determines our beliefs.
The stories we believe can alter lives and justify deaths. On June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen
opened fire on a nightclub in Orlando, massacring 49 members of the LGTBQ community, in
one of the worst shootings our country has ever experienced. While most people agree the attack
was a horrific tragedy, they seem to have difficulty agreeing on some of the surrounding details,
specifically the motivations prompting the shooting. Was this an ISIS-motivated terrorist attack?
Was this a homophobic hate crime? Was this an inevitable outcome of lenient gun control laws?
Whatever story we believe about that terrible night has incredible consequences—politically,
socially, culturally, spiritually—and we continue to feel the reverberations in our communities,
government, schools, churches, and other institutions. The stories we tell ourselves and others
are based on what we believe to be true or what we want others to believe to be true. Frank
explains, “Stories always pose that question: what kind of truth is being told?” And yet, “Stories
never resolve that question; their work is to remind us that we have to live with complicated
truths,” as Orlando has taught us (5). The stories we tell about our lives—as autobiographical
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narratives—function in the same way, inviting writers and readers to engage in questions about
the meaning of truth and the consequences of belief.
One of the authors whose stories call for such consideration is Mary Karr. In her trilogy
of memoirs, The Liars’ Club, Cherry, and Lit, Karr portrays decades of experiences, revealing a
multitude of beliefs about her self, her past, her work, her relationships, and her God. I chose
Karr as the subject for my inquiry because of my own beliefs. I believe her. I believe her stories
to be true, not necessarily in an “accurate,” fact-checking, verifiable way—although Karr is a
vocal proponent of such examination—but in the way of fitting into my own narrative habitus, of
effecting belief in my own life.1 I am not alone. Karr’s notable popularity with readers and critics

For an extensive discussion of the role of truth in memoir, please see Karr’s interview in The
Paris Review (2009) and her recent book The Art of Memoir. Of a memoirist’s deliberate choice
to falsify experience, she writes, “Memoirists can make the mistake of treating readers as
enemies and trying to dupe them. I feel like the reader has given up twenty-plus dollars, and I
owe her a vivid experience without lying” (Fortini 81). However, she also acknowledges the
fallibility of memory, and the temptation to fill in details where none can be remembered. She
writes, “I don’t try to reconstruct empty spots. I’ve been vigorously encouraged by various
editors to fictionalize” (82). She explains, “In fiction, you manufacture events to fit a concept or
an idea. With memoir, you have the events and manufacture or hopefully deduce the concept.
You don’t remember something? Write fiction…If you see the memoir as constructing a false
self to sell to some chump audience, then you’ll never know the truth, because the truth is
derived from what actually happened. Using novelistic devices, like reconstructed dialogue or
telescoping time, isn’t the same as ginning up fake episodes” (82). Autobiography scholar Nancy
Miller lends another perspective in describing her strategy for writing about an event in her past:
“I could write down what I remembered; or I could craft a memoir. One might be the truth; the
other, a good story…As a writer, the question of what ‘really’ happened is literary—or at least
textual. I will know it when I write it. When I write it, the truth will lie in the writing. But the
writing may not be the truth, it may only look like it. To me” (Eakin, The Ethics 251). While the
issue of truth in memoir isn’t the focus of this dissertation, belief in memoir is. What does a
memoir need to do or be in order for us to believe it? How and why do certain memoirists inspire
belief? What happens when a memoirist isn’t believable? The answers to these questions are
located in our own beliefs about language, story, fiction, facts, as well as thousands of others.
However, the impact of autobiographical hoaxes continues to problematize those beliefs. What if
a memoirist is purposely trying to deceive readers? Can an inauthentic memoir reflect or inspire
“true” beliefs? The answers to these questions, while outside the work of my dissertation, are
suggestive of further exploration.
5
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alike suggests her stories resonate with others in similar ways. In this dissertation, I attempt to
answer my original question, “What makes certain stories believable?” by analyzing belief in the
work of Mary Karr.
I’ve chosen Mary Karr’s stories as the focus of this examination for a number of reasons.
First, her books continue to resonate culturally; she is even currently partnering with Showtime
on a new series adapted from her memoirs. Critics, too, appreciate her work. In the New York
Review of Books, Francine Prose explains, “It’s easy to understand why so many people were
drawn to Karr’s book. She is a gifted storyteller who can make horrific events seem grotesquely
funny without minimizing the pain and fear they caused.” And, some of the most esteemed
scholars in the field of life writing also recognize Karr’s contributions. In his recent book Living
Autobiographically: How We Create Identity in Narrative, Paul John Eakin devotes an entire
chapter to examining the identity of Pokey and her status as narrator in The Liars’ Club because
Karr, he explains, is one of the autobiographers who interests him most (64). However, I found
that although her work has been present in the public eye since 1995 with the publication of The
Liars’ Club, few lengthy examinations of her memoirs exist. In fact, the majority of scholarship
concerning Karr comes from religious sources, such as National Catholic Reporter and Christian
Century. While these articles focus on the spiritual themes in her memoirs and poetry, and
especially her Catholic conversion, none of them examines her beliefs from a broader and
secular perspective. Because Karr’s writing appeals to both religious and nonreligious readers
alike, and because a rhetoric of belief is not essentially bound to spirituality, her texts provide a
dynamic space for inquiry.
The work on this dissertation started four years ago when I took Life Writing with Dr.
Amy Robillard and wrote a paper on my dad’s conversion in his late 20s to the
6

evangelical/fundamentalist Christian faith that I was raised in. For that project I studied not only
the autobiographical genre of conversion narrative, but the phenomenon itself, particularly as a
rhetorical trope that shapes the lives of converts (and their daughters) in very particular ways. I
interviewed my dad for the project, and the final paper was a hybrid of scholarship applied to his
story juxtaposed with the story of my own conversion, or deconversion, that ultimately happened
when my faith was put into dialogue with critical theory, when my beliefs changed as
dramatically and permanently as his did. That study and the questions that it uncovered became
the foundation of my work in my doctoral program.
I’m interested in belief because from the time I was old enough to understand, I
understood myself as a “believer.” This designation, applied to those in my parents’ religion who
embraced a specific and prescriptive set of beliefs, distinguished us from “nonbelievers.” This
distinction was clear and certain; you either were or you weren’t. It wasn’t enough to simply
“believe” in God, either; the Catholics or Methodists or, God forbid, Mormons, that populated
my neighborhood and classroom and softball team did not make the cut. Unbelievers. While
other parts of my identity were obviously important—I was a young, white girl growing up in a
conservative, small, Midwestern town—they were completely overshadowed by my religious
self as it determined whether my future would be spent in a glorious Kingdom with streets of
gold or a fiery pit of eternal pain. In other words, belief, for me, has always been a matter of life
and death.
I attended a private, liberal Christian college for my undergraduate degree. At the center
of the campus stands a tall, spiraling tower that shoots off twin lights that cross each other’s
paths high in the night sky. One light symbolizes faith, the other learning—their reflection was
meant to remind us of the integration of faith and learning, a relationship that didn’t mean much
7

to me then but is the heart of my scholarship now. St. Augustine wrote of this relationship: “Seek
not to understand that you may believe, but believe that you may understand” (Tractates, tractate
XXIX). I confess that my own idea of faith, my own faith, is itself problematic at best, mostly
nonexistent when I need it most and always popping up when I certainly don’t. It’s not an easy
subject for me to write about—belief—but it is an essential one. In that first Life Writing class,
Dr. Robillard insisted that we write about something that we didn’t already know, something that
was worth figuring out, even if it made us feel a bit sick inside. Unlike the writing I did for my
other courses, my life writing revealed the connections between me and my scholarship, situating
my most meaningful personal experiences within a larger, academic context. The choice to do
this kind of work, the kind that not only admits but actually requires the exploration of the
personal, does sometimes make me feel sick inside. It carries me far beyond the narrow belief
system of my childhood while refusing to offer truths in its place. This dissertation, then, serves
a purpose beyond the fulfillment of a degree; it is my attempt to figure out how belief works
cognitively, affectively, and spiritually, but also personally.
The study of rhetoric, of the ways that language does things, is the only way I know how
I do that. Because at the end of the day, when my beliefs are inapplicable, inconsistent,
inaccessible, or invisible, language isn’t. It exists—it lives and breathes and creates the stories
that bring sense to our lives. It gives us something to believe in, even if that something, like
language itself, is elusive, contingent, and ephemeral. In her third memoir, Lit, Mary Karr quotes
Ernst Cassirer: “The same function which the image of God performs, the same tendency to
permanent existence, may be ascribed to the uttered sounds of language.” Karr explains, “He
meant that words shaped our realities, our perceptions, giving them an authority God had for
other generations…” and continues, “words would define me, govern me and determine me.
8

Words warranted my devotion…” (40). This is belief that I can understand, as I have found in
language, in stories, a kind of truth that mostly escaped me in the faith of my past. Rhetoric has
taught me of the possibilities of language to do things, to change things, including our beliefs.
The study of life writing has shown me the particular power of language when it’s used to
construct narratives—stories—that teach us interesting and new ways to think about what it
means to be human. My dissertation is my attempt to bring all of these (at times) disparate
interests, loves, experiences, and beliefs of my own into a conversation that I hope will be useful
to others.
In this introductory chapter, I provide a theoretical context for asking this question and
situate my inquiry in the fields of rhetoric and life writing. To do this, I highlight modern and
contemporary definitions of belief, rhetoric, and autobiography to show how they have shaped
and been shaped by our history and culture and to provide the framework for my argument that is
essential to an examination of belief in life writing is a rhetorical approach—a consideration of
what beliefs do in the stories we write. To position this approach in current rhetoric studies, I
highlight Sharon Crowley’s definition of a contemporary theory of rhetoric, inspired by ancient
rhetorical theorists, that recognizes the significance of belief to our desires and values. Essential
to a consideration of what beliefs do is how beliefs work; here, I turn to discourse, specifically
autobiographical narrative, as the means by which beliefs, as expressions of ideology, circulate
socially, culturally, and individually. Next, in a brief review of pertinent scholarship, I
acknowledge the roles that various rhetorics of belief have played in life writing studies,
particularly in the contemporary theorization of autobiographical identity and truth. After
establishing the motivation and context for my project, and in an attempt to interrogate what
beliefs do and how they work in my own scholarly narrative, I acknowledge some of my own
9

beliefs—about story, truth, discourse, and identity—that underpin this dissertation. And, finally,
I provide a short summary of each subsequent chapter as well as an explanation of how it
connects with my larger argument.
A Rhetoric of Belief
Sharon Crowley’s 2006 text Toward a Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism, in
which she examines the incompatibility in current political discourse between fundamental
Christianity and liberalism, is an important study of the possibilities of rhetoric as a means of
bridging impasses. At the heart of the problem that Crowley identifies are the varying roles belief
plays in both discourses. And while Crowley recognizes that her book leaves us with more
questions than answers, she challenges her readers to find other openings—or paths of
invention—that rhetorical inquiry might provide. This dissertation, a rhetorical examination of
belief in the stories we tell about ourselves, is one such opening. Although my interest in the
rhetorics of belief serves different purposes than Crowley’s, I use her work as an example of the
kind of potential rhetorical studies holds in this particular contemporary moment—a moment
explicitly shaped and continually negotiated by our personal and cultural beliefs. Now over a
decade after Crowley’s text was published, our public discourse reveals a culture that is arguably
even more polarized than it was then. At the same time, the popularity of autobiographical
writing is not only thriving but “booming” over the past two decades. Never before have we been
presented with so many life stories, and not only in the publication of autobiographies and
memoirs. The Internet has advanced hundreds of new platforms for the telling of our stories,
from personal blogs to Twitter, Facebook posts to podcasts. Julie Rak, in her book Boom!
Manufacturing Memoir for the Popular Market, argues that the growth in production of
nonfiction can help us understand how life writing has the “potential to change the imagined
10

relations…readers have with the lives of others” (4). This, Rak suggests, “is the source of [its]
power and fascination at the present time” (4). This connection between writer and reader—
between individual and community—is what implicates our singular stories in our collective
worlds. Thus, autobiography has the potential both to enforce and to disrupt the cultural norms
that circulate in our nation, prompting Megan Brown to observe, “Life writing has a considerable
role to play in US culture” (“Learning” 373). As a rhetorician concentrating in life writing
studies, I examine how these roles, including the potential our personal stories, and the beliefs
they represent, affect our cultural and historical narratives.
My examination of how belief—represented in autobiography—works in our
contemporary moment is rooted in the assumption that our identities and the stories we tell about
them (whether we identify as religious or not) are always constructions of belief. Furthermore,
these beliefs are ultimately relational, enacted in the relationship between writers and readers of
autobiography. My dissertation provides the fields of both rhetoric and life writing studies an
awareness of how our ideas about belief—how our beliefs about belief—have already shaped our
scholarly imagination, and it also gestures toward the possibilities that a rhetoric of belief can
offer to future conversations about what it means to read and write autobiography in America
today. A rhetorical theorization of belief, indeed a reimagination of rhetoric as a method of
belief, offers life writing studies an important critical perspective for engaging autobiographical
narrative by bringing rhetoric into conversation with life writing, a conversation that is long
overdue and rich in opportunities. Life writing scholars Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson argue
that crucial to autobiographical acts is a “persuasion to belief” (Reading 34). It is this concern
with belief, both constructed and represented in language, that is the business of rhetoric. The
study of rhetoric is, in many ways, the study of belief; in order to do our work, we must have
11

faith in language to change things.2 Smith and Watson, Brown, and Crowley are hailing us to
account for the way our own beliefs are enacted and shaped by language, particularly in the
stories of our lives, an inquiry with implications for both rhetoric and life writing studies.
My work engages life writing scholarship from an overtly rhetorical perspective. While
there certainly have been significant rhetorical contributions to the field from such noted scholars
as Megan Brown, Suzanne Diamond, and Laura Gray-Rosendale, a productive space exists for
further inquiry. As Julie Rak notes in her review of Diamond’s 2011 Compelling Confessions,
much of the previous work on life writing in rhetorical studies focuses on the pedagogical
implications of personal disclosure in academic writing. She recognizes the value of scholarship
addressing autobiography from a multitude of disciplinary perspectives and hopes for a future
emphasis in the field on rhetorical approaches, as life writing scholars who are interested in
personal narrative forms and the ethics of public identity production would find this approach
“compelling” and “useful.” This scholarship, she concludes, would “go a long way towards
telling the rest of us how important the study of rhetoric is to the development of criticism and
theory about life writing” (826). This dissertation is a contribution toward the scholarship Rak is
calling for.
One way my work contributes to this growing field is by acknowledging the ways we
think about belief historically and culturally in order to emphasize how it is currently working in

2

Again, the phenomenon of the autobiographical hoax complicates the relationship between
rhetoric and belief. If an author either consciously or unconsciously deceives us, manipulating
rhetoric as a means of purposely hiding his “true” beliefs, can such a relationship exist? Is it
possible to hide our beliefs in language or are they always already apparent? In other words, are
our stories always reflective of our beliefs? While these questions have significant implications
for my work, I am not attempting to address them in this dissertation. From a rhetorical
perspective, I am less interested in whether a belief is “true” or not than if and how the belief
works.
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the ways we write and read contemporary autobiography. 3 To do this, I examine the work of
Mary Karr, one of the most celebrated contemporary memoir writers often credited for starting
the recent memoir boom with the publication of The Liars’ Club (Fortini 56). Her confessional
stories, detailing a childhood of deprivation and violence, an adolescence of rebellion and sexual
awakening, and an adulthood of alcoholism and redemption, have been met with both popular
and critical acclaim. And while the Catholic belief that motivated her ultimate conversion might
be the most recognized by readers, her stories are rich with beliefs about art, language,
relationships, and other provocative issues that I explore.
What Belief Is: A Historical/Cultural Perspective
Defining belief is hardly a task for one dissertation; in fact, many of the most enlightened
minds in history have dedicated entire lives to this project. Plato, Descartes, Freud, Kant, Hume,
Žižek, Damasio—this limited sample of names reflect celebrated scholars who have struggled to
understand why and how we believe and whose work has significantly impacted our
contemporary belief systems. However, rather than focus extensively on any one philosophy or

3

The terms autobiography and memoir have various meanings, histories, and connotations
within the field of life writing studies and popular culture. “Autobiography,” a term that emerged
in the Enlightenment and continues to be definitive today, remains the most widely used and
understood name for self-referential texts. This term has been challenged as a result of
postmodern and postcolonial critiques of the Enlightenment, however, because of its historical
association as a story that privileges an autonomous individual and universal life story in
Western tradition (Smith and Watson 3). In contemporary popular and scholarly arenas, the term
memoir has been enjoying popularity and is often used to distinguish “autobiographical works
characterized by density of language and self-reflexivity about the writing process” (4). In
Bequest and Betrayal: Memoirs of a Parent’s Death, Nancy K. Miller uses the term “memoir” as
it captures a dynamic, postmodernism in its movement between “the private and the public,
subject and object” (2), leading Smith and Watson to conclude that it seems more “malleable”
than autobiography, “foregrounding historical shifts and intersecting cultural formations” (4).
This definition of memoir seems closer to the concerns of my project. Further, it is the term Karr
uses.
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theory, a more productive approach might be to examine how our historical and cultural
discourses about belief have impacted our contemporary ideas of what belief is and does—in
other words, to examine our beliefs about belief. In his text Unbelievable: Why We Believe and
Why We Don’t, Graham Ward explores the impact various developments in neuroscience have
had on our understandings of mind and consciousness over the past thirty years. Addressing this
“quantum shift” by exploring the biology of believing, Ward offers a dynamic definition of
belief as, “a mode of liminal processing, related to embodiment and affectivity, which ‘thinks’
more quickly and reacts more instinctively than our conscious rational deliberation. Beneath and
prior to interpretation and the conflicts of meaning lie sets of remembered associations and
assumptions woven tightly into the process of how we make sense” (12). His emphasis on
“make” is instructive; these associations and assumptions—and the “sense” of our beliefs—have
been taught and learned. Resembling Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus, or encultured dispositions,
socialized mindsets, and biases, beliefs are not “innate” or “genetic.” Sometimes, they aren’t
even articulated. Ward establishes this definition to contrast with a traditional philosophical view
of belief as decisions or attitudes and ideas that require judgment (12). This differentiation is
significant. If beliefs happen before judgment, as “dispositions toward judgments,” Ward
suggests that it’s possible to infer that beliefs inform perception, interpretation, and action prior
to rationalization—thus, how we make sense. If actions can precede consciousness and
interpretation, the process doesn’t follow a linear route from perception, belief, and thought to
interpretation and action. Instead, Ward imagines “not a linear process but a complex set of
feedback and feedforward loops in which believing is deeply implicated” (13). This architecture
of belief, with its spatial and temporal irregularities, offers interesting intersections with
narrative as a story of connected events.
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If belief can happen before cognition, as Ward argues, then it is not simply cognitive and
can inform why we explain things the way we do. And although our beliefs are intimately
connected to our affective states, belief is not an emotion. Ward explains, “…it is a mental
behavior: it is involved in certain neural and somatic processes, with effects on both cognitive
and emotional life; both intellectual and corporeal activities” (Unbelievable 13). He defines
belief, then, as a disposition, and argues that while belief can be conscious and rationally
justified through reflective critique, it is not “solely conscious” (29). He uses the term
“disposition” because belief is “disposed towards”; “it looks beyond the individual who believes
towards some object or person or condition in the world” (30). While the depth and range of
much of Ward’s work is outside the scope of this dissertation, his views on the politics of
belief—or what makes a belief believable—are essential to a consideration of the rhetorics of
belief.
However, before I consider further what makes beliefs believable, a limited historical and
cultural perspective of belief and the changing structures of belief in the West can provide
important context for that analysis. Ward traces the two competing models of knowledge and
understanding in the 19th century, “one based on empirical sensation, perception, thought and
judgment, the other based upon intuition, feeling, and imagination,” and argues that although we
recognize Enlightenment objectivity as “myths masking various levels of human interest and
cultural bias,” we still prioritize the objectivity of a standpoint over the subjectivity of opinion
(Unbelievable 121). The relationship between belief and knowledge or reason has been debated
as early as the allegory of Plato’s cave; however, the modern struggle between both concepts
probably best exemplifies how various hierarchal positions can dramatically impact our cultural
attitude toward belief. Crowley exposes this hierarchy with an examination of the etymology of
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doxa as beliefs, typically translated as “opinion” by 19th century translators. This
misinterpretation is problematic, as it can mislead contemporary readers who read within a
modern epistemological tradition that privileges reason, “theoretically available to all” over
opinion, which tends to take “the flavor of the particular” (47). Doxa, in the ancient Greek, is
frequently compared to episteme, highlighting the distinction between opinion as “an inferior
grade of cognition” and episteme as “true knowledge” (47). The relationship between the two,
since at least the meditations of René Descartes, continues to challenge scholars who have
focused their attention on consciousness and knowledge. Epistemology—as the investigation of
what distinguishes justified belief from knowledge—came from this work in an attempt to
explain human understanding and its relation to the senses of the material world. The
philosophies of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant followed, paving the way for the debates
between empiricism, idealism, and phenomenology (Ward 104). These debates shaped the
modern understanding of belief—an understanding that resists a postmodern rejection of
dualities and prevails today.
While a thorough exploration of these debates is outside the scope of my dissertation, a
brief look at John Locke’s theory is essential in order to recognize its lingering influence on a
contemporary conceptualization of belief as separate from knowledge. His goal, in his 1690
Essay Concerning Human Understanding is to “inquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of
human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent” (I. 1. 2).
Knowledge is defined as “the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas”; ideas
represent what can be perceived through the senses. Belief, on the other hand, involves “the
admitting or receiving of any proposition, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade
us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so” (XV. 15. 3). With this move, not
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only does Locke clearly separate belief from knowledge, but he also yokes it to persuasion,
placing it squarely within the realm of rhetoric. However, even more significant than Locke’s
characterization of belief is his definition of certain knowledge (Truth), a phenomenon that
extends beyond persuasion, or the rhetorical process of making someone believe (Ward,
Unbelievable 130). The cultural politics that followed from this theory are unmistakable:
knowledge is certain and transparent and untainted by belief or opinion. Ward posits that
Locke’s differentiation, based on the dualism of world and subject, lingers with us today, and can
be discovered
in a culture in which human beings are valued as being rational above being
emotional or imaginative; conceived as free individuals with a will to choose between
various options; recognized as moral agents to the degree that they discipline desire
for the sake of duty; respected for their abilities to consider any number of arguments
and arrive at a considered judgment of what is the case… (122)
This describes a culture where belief is viewed as a weaker form of knowledge, as mere opinion.
And while postmodernity has exposed the myth of objectivity, the lingering effects of this
hierarchy are all too apparent to scholars in the humanities and human sciences who struggle for
resources and support compared to the financial leverage of the “hard” sciences (122). As a
professor of divinity, theology, and literature, Ward’s overarching project is to change the way
we see believing—and for both those who are religious and not—to appreciate the role faith
plays in our lives. However, as a student of rhetoric, my interest is not specifically how we
believe but what and why. What makes a belief believable? We can begin to answer this question
by turning to Crowley’s argument for a postmodern theory of rhetoric, specifically as it functions
as a method of inquiry into life writing.
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What Belief Does: A Contemporary Rhetoric of Belief
In her text, Crowley points to the inability of “liberal rhetorical theory”—a rhetoric that is
based on appeals to reason and evidence—to address the increasingly polarized viewpoints
dominating today’s political and cultural climates. Instead, she offers a rhetoric appropriate for a
“postmodern setting” that she argues “will work better in the present climate than liberal
argumentation because it offers a more comprehensive range of appeals, many of which are
considered inappropriate in liberal thought” (4). This rhetoric calls back to an antiquity in which
rhetorical theorists understood the consequence of desires and values to the maintenance of
beliefs (4). Rather than ignore or reject belief as a valid element of argument, as modernism
might, Crowley acknowledges “that deeply held beliefs are so tightly bound up with the very
bodies of believers that liberals’ relatively bloodless and cerebral approach to argument is simply
not persuasive to people who do not accept liberalism or whose commitment to liberalism is less
important to them than are other sorts of convictions” (4). If modernism continues to haunt not
only our perception of belief, but also the ways we believe, could it also still impact our beliefs
about rhetoric? That concern seems to underpin Crowley’s work on the intimate relationship
between rhetoric and belief. She explains, “Despite its longstanding centrality to Western
culture…rhetorical theory suffered a series of insurmountable intellectual challenges with the
triumph of modernity, so much so that during the late nineteenth century rhetoric virtually ceased
to be studied in European and American schools and colleges” (34). The moment that rhetoric is
fixed to either persuasion or belief—and belief is seen as “lesser than” knowledge—rhetoric, as a
legitimate pursuit, generates suspicion as “the dangerous capacity for unduly influencing others”
(Marback 1). We are all too familiar with the pejorative “mere rhetoric” that suggests a speaker’s
intent to deceive as well as an audience’s tendency to be duped. “Mere rhetoric” is distasteful
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and manipulative, reserved for politicians and preachers: “Mere rhetoric is the kind of rhetoric
Plato disparaged as cookery, Augustine likened to cosmetics, and Bacon dismissed as trickery; it
is the kind of rhetoric Kant reviled as unworthy of respect” (1). Richard Marback argues that the
anxiety and distrust we feel toward “mere rhetoric” is a reaction to the vulnerability we feel
when we allow ourselves to be persuaded. The deception possible through rhetoric—a deception
that Plato, Augustine, and Kant argue is impossible for us to detect—can lead to shame and
regret, thus making us vulnerable to others. Rhetoric in this conceptualization, as separate from
and less than knowledge, operates like this: “the more we know for ourselves what persuades us
the better, for the more we know, the less likely we are to be unduly persuaded by someone else”
(2). If I’m persuaded, my beliefs might have to change, and this possibility makes me vulnerable
to others. In this way, we want to believe in an objective reality, even as we believe in its
impossibility. Crowley’s examination of the decreasing potential for “civil discourse” reveals a
similar impasse; people do not enter into argument because they don’t want to risk having their
minds changed (30).
Crowley’s study examines the impact of Locke as well as other noteworthy scholars—
George Campbell, I. A. Richards, and Wayne Booth—on liberal rhetorical theory, arguing that
such a view of rhetoric still hopes that “appeals to understanding can overcome beliefs stemming
from passionate commitment or life circumstances” (43). Crowley argues that modern
ideologies, particularly the formation of the modern subject, have constituted a dominant
contemporary liberal rhetorical theory that views rhetoric as working in this way: “a free,
knowing, and sovereign agent is moved by circumstances to survey the landscape; develop
appropriate arguments concerning it; clothe them in persuasive language; and repeat them to an
audience of equally free, knowing, and sovereign subjects who hear/read without impediment or
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distortion” (36). Liberal rhetoricians take the individual mind as a starting point. Because liberal
rhetorical theory hopes that reasoning can produce a consensus, Crowley argues the only way to
achieve this is to discount or eliminate dissent: “that is, to quiet or exclude different points of
view” (44). This approach to rhetoric both privileges understanding and considers it the primary
goal; thus, it avoids the possibility that audiences may understand the rhetor’s message but resist
it. Crowley also argues that liberal thought separates values from reason, locating them in human
preferences and emotional responses. When reason is considered the primary method of public
discussion and debate—because it allegedly works the same for everyone—then the distinction
between “disembodied, public reason and private, passionate evaluation” becomes even more
sharply defined (37). Crowley, like Wayne Booth before her, imagines a rhetoric that brings
ideas, and therefore people, closer together rather than drives them further apart. Booth writes:
The belief that the primary mental act of man is to assent to truth rather than to detect
error, “to take in” and even “to be taken in,” rather than “to resist being taken in,” is of
course not original with me. Notions of “in-spiration” have been found in every historical
period, and regardless of who or what provides the breath, they have always entailed the
mysterious process of two becoming one. When I assent to your thought…the line
between us grows dim; in the ideal case it in a sense disappears… (xvi)
Rhetoric, in this conceptualization, operates not separate from but because of belief. It requires
an act of faith before a spirit of doubt. While Booth’s “mysterious process of two becoming one”
could be interpreted by Crowley as an attempt to erase difference or “quiet” points of view, it
could also be read as a belief in the possibility of understanding another. To “resist being taken
in” doesn’t have to represent a passive acquiescence; it could reflect, as Booth suggests, an
acceptance rather than rejection of the possibility of shared “truths.”
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It is in this extension toward others that the most powerful intersections between rhetoric
and belief can be seen. Rhetoric requires a reaching outward and beyond to an audience. As
Ward explained, belief requires an object, something beyond or in addition to an individual. To
look beyond or toward requires the cognitive functions of both anticipation and projection. To
these he adds recognition, as a method of sharing meaning that is fundamental to belief. Ward
examines the term Anerkennung as used by G. W. F. Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit.
Erkennung, in German, means “knowledge,” but the prefix an- conveys incompleteness.
According to Ward, it is “almost” knowledge or “on the way to” knowledge and signals a
cognition that is outside the ego or the one perceiving. “It is as if from an external stimulus the
self provokes a knowledge that is not quite knowledge within itself: a déjà vu” (Unbelievable
53). The other (or external) offers a possibility for self-awareness or a consciousness that was
inaccessible or unknown before the encounter. In this way, recognition extends the idea of
projection: “from a consciousness of myself I come to an understanding of the other, myself and
the relation of meaning binding both other and self” (53). The process of communicating and
sharing belief—the knowing of belief—“is both emotional and relational before it is rational”
(55).
The quotation from Booth, and his imagination of a rhetoric that allows us to be “taken
in” by others and their beliefs rather than resisting such possibilities, parallels Marback’s
exploration of vulnerability and further troubles the modern myth of the individual. In a
pejorative view of rhetoric as “mere” or “weak rhetoric,” we keep ourselves from the shame and
regret of deception by increasing our mistrust of others and believing ourselves self-sufficient
and beyond the “reach of appeals” from anyone who could trick or manipulate us (3). However,
Marback argues that if each of us really were self-sufficient, then the threat of “mere rhetoric”
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would be empty. Instead, we cannot help but make appeals to others or be made by others’
appeals. He writes, “Recognizing our interdependence through our appeals to each other compels
us to accept that rhetoric leads us beyond ourselves to experiences, feelings, ideas, sensations,
and thoughts we can embrace as our own and that we could never have had alone” (3). A
recognition of our interdependence and the possibility of others to change us—what Marback
calls a “strong view of rhetoric”—does not make us less vulnerable or even lessen our anxiety
about that vulnerability. Rooted in the tradition of Cicero, Isocrates, and Quintilian, Marback’s
definition of a “strong rhetoric” views persuasive appeals not as tools of manipulation but as a
means of generating relationships of “meaning and purpose and value” (3). Based on the
acknowledgement that “rhetoric is a given,” that people cannot have relationships or
communicate without appealing to, inspiring, or persuading each other, a strong view of rhetoric
is nothing to fear. The rhetor, who has ideas, beliefs, and arguments to share, is equally
influenced by an audience who possesses their own expectations, awareness, and preferences.
Marback explains, “The nature and extent of the rhetor’s influence does not blind an audience.
Instead, both audience and rhetor are made aware of the contingencies of being and knowing
through their participation together in rhetorical activity” (3).
In contrast to liberal rhetorical theory’s emphasis on the individual mind, Crowley
suggests a contemporary rhetorical theory influenced by postmodernism and focused on the
significance of language to the construction of human subjectivity (44).4 Crowley, in her larger
project of bringing ancient rhetorical concepts into a contemporary rhetoric, explains that while
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For a brief yet nuanced overview of modern and postmodern rhetoric, see Patricia Bizzell and
Bruce Herzberg’s “Introduction” in The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to
the Present (1183-1205).
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modernity presented an interruption in the history of rhetoric, postmodernity signified not a
“turn” but a “return” to the idea that “discourse is an appropriate point of entry for theorizing
human inscription” (46). However, not only is this discourse temporal, local, and provisional, the
subjectivities it constructs are as well, and our impressions of reality itself are “mobile, various,
and contingent on circumstance” (48). Crowley warns us that even with these beliefs in
operation, we tend to treat language—and writing in particular—as though it does reflect a stable
reality, and, thus, the rhetoricity or performativity of discourse can easily be forgotten. This
tendency, even in the face of postmodernism, to approach language and the subjectivities it
constructs as “stable” offers significant complications to the study of identity in life writing texts.
It also helps us understand the considerable concern for autobiographical “authenticity” that
currently dominates both popular and academic discussions in life writing. If we are literally
“post-”modern, if we recognize the impossibility of a capital-T “Truth,” if we understand belief
and knowledge to be complementary rather than contrary, then why the obsession with veracity?
Autobiographical theorists Smith and Watson identify fundamental questions to the discipline:
“What is the truth status of autobiographical disclosure? How do we know whether and when a
narrator is telling the truth or lying? And what difference would that difference make?” (Reading
15). While the first two have recently preoccupied both cultural and academic discussions of
autobiography, the last question—what difference does it make?—is particularly productive for
rhetorical inquiry. Thus, a contemporary rhetoric, informed by a postmodern approach to truth,
subjectivity, and discourse, can provide life writing scholars with productive ways to think about
both the possibility and impossibility of self in story.
Another result of postmodern thinking with direct implications for rhetoric and belief is
the rejection of dualism or the turning of binaries into relationships rather than hierarchal
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dichotomies. For example, where a modern thinker might consider reason to be opposed to
emotion and probably superior, a postmodernist could conceive both as existing in a relationship
that is mutually dependent and constructive rather than defined by opposition (Crowley 48). For
a rhetorical study of belief this distinction is crucial. If we define belief as not only completely
separate from knowledge but also inferior to it, academic inquiry into belief—or a serious
consideration of how belief operates in our personal and cultural stories—would be irrelevant.
Our theoretical heritage, or belief systems, complicates contemporary definitions and attitudes
toward belief and rhetoric. As Ward’s works reveal, the effects of modernity continue to shape
both our beliefs and our beliefs about belief. Crowley argues that our liberal tradition, born from
modernist thinking, limits the potential of rhetoric. An awareness of how both have been affected
by modernism and postmodernism—and, how we have been affected—is essential to the work of
this dissertation. As contemporary writers of autobiography continue to be written by these
cultural and theoretical discourses, so, too, are readers.
The acknowledgement of how we are impacted today by previous cultural and historical
beliefs is an example of how ideology works as the circulation of beliefs and moves us from a
consideration of what belief is to a study of what beliefs do. Here, Crowley’s work from a
rhetorical perspective is particularly instructive. Crowley defines ideology as “any system within
which beliefs, symbols, and images are articulated in such a way that they assemble a more or
less coherent depiction of reality and/or establish a hierarchy of values” (65). She characterizes
belief as “moments of ideology” and ideology as the medium within which beliefs are
articulated. For Crowley, beliefs are conjectures or “views or attitudes about nature that serve the
interests of the believer and/or some other person, group, or institution” (69). Beliefs must serve
a purpose—they must be of use, and only need to be “true”—or at least appear consistent with
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“reality”—within situations where those consistencies are useful to the believer. Crowley argues
that the relationship of belief to empirical reality is undetermined (69). In other words, whether
or not a belief is verifiably “true” in some measured way is less important than if the belief
works. Crowley’s attention is to the social nature of belief; beliefs cannot be individual. Just as a
private language is impossible, so are private beliefs “because beliefs participate in the habitas;
doxa is always already in circulation” (74). Barbara Herrnstein Smith explains, “The reason our
beliefs cannot be formed or transformed independent of cultural practices and products is that
they are continuously formed and transformed in response to them” (47). While these beliefs are
primarily constructed and shared through discourse, they are also learned through our bodies,
through “adopting bodily positions, making gestures, and performing movements” (Crowley 69).
In fact, belief cannot be separated from our bodies, as our bodies are part of the very
environments that make up our culture.
Herrnstein Smith’s work in cultural theory is significant to a discussion of what makes
beliefs believable, particularly in its attention to how our beliefs change. Working against a
traditional view, wherein beliefs are defined as “sets of either discrete, true/false mental
propositions about the world or discrete, correct/incorrect interior representations of it,”
Herrnstein Smith suggests instead that “Beliefs may be reconceived…as configurations of linked
perceptual/behavioral tendencies of various degrees of strength, continuously formed,
transformed, and reconfigured through our ongoing interactions with our environments”(44).
Instead of a modernist rhetoric of objectivism, or “the invocation of self-evident truth and
objective fact, of intrinsic value and absolute right, of that which is universal, total, and
transcendent,” she argues for a constructivist theory of belief. This theory of belief, which
emulates the hermeneutic circle in literary studies, stresses the participation of prior belief in the
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perception of present evidence. She contrasts this theory with a “traditional (rationalist/realist)
epistemology” that insists on the possibility of a correction of prior belief by present evidence
(38). Herrnstein Smith bases her theory on a model of human structure as a product of two
histories: “the evolutionary history of that creature’s genetic makeup and its life-history in a
particular environment” (47). Neither of these histories, or the potential of their development, is
determined at birth. Instead, our interactions with our environments shape our identities, and we,
in turn, shape our environments. This circular process is what we might refer to as “cognition,”
“learning,” or “development.” However, the structural and behavioral modifications, when
relatively fixed and available to both observation and verbalization, are what we refer to as
“(acquired) knowledge or (changed) beliefs” (48). While these processes are in play culturally
and socially, they also operate individually, “for ‘we’ are also different from ourselves over the
course of our individual lifetimes, and each of us continues to play out and evaluate his or her
beliefs under conditions other than those in or from which they first emerged” (43). The
relationship, then, between our selves and our environments, reflected in our belief systems, is
one of perpetual transformation.
How Beliefs Spread: Narrative and Autobiography
Whether beliefs are shared prior to, because of, or in spite of language, through
discourse—as an expression of various ideologies—they circulate culturally, socially, and
individually. The believability of belief is inseparable from the discourses that persuade us to
imagine an object in a certain way (Ward, Unbelievable 118). Wesley Kort argues that narrative
discourse, like life itself, is grounded in and shaped by beliefs (50). He provides a number of
reasons to support this assumption: first, characters in narratives are distillations or embodiments
of our beliefs about other people, and our evaluations of other people are based less on evidence
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than on belief. Next, our conception of how temporal processes affects our lives—naturally,
personally, and socially—is based on our belief about whether such processes are positive or
negative: can we make changes to certain courses of events or are we determined by these
processes? The answers to these questions are rooted in our belief system. Finally, the language
of the teller is also affected by beliefs, including the rhetorical tasks of selecting, depicting, and
evaluating material. Our beliefs determine what is worthy of mention or what makes something
either “admirable or deplorable” (51). Thus, Kort explains, “Narratives, then, are really webs of
beliefs” (51). Who I am, the world in which I find myself, and the beliefs I hold are inevitably
entangled, and while identity and beliefs are not the same, they are also inseparable. However,
narratives as webs of belief are involved in shaping not only individual beliefs but cultural ones
as well. Thus, narratives are culturally and often religiously important because they incorporate
beliefs that challenge/confirm the beliefs of the culture and of readers. Autobiographical
narratives, then, can simultaneously propagate and resist ideology, can—as Megan Brown
argues—speak to and back to the cultural norms that are currently circulating in our nation.
Narratives situate autobiographical acts in story, locating identities and experiences in
time and place. This situatedness is crucial according to Smith and Watson, “since life narratives
are always symbolic interactions in the world. They are culturally and historically specific. They
are rhetorical in the broadest sense of the word” (63). They are addressed to an audience, and
they are involved in an argument about identity. At their most basic level, autobiographical
stories ask readers to believe that something happened in a certain way. Autobiographical
subjects know themselves—and their experiences—through language. Smith and Watson
observe that our experiences are discursive and embedded “in the languages of everyday life and
the knowledge produced at everyday sites” (32). Michel Foucault’s analysis of discursive
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regimes reveals that the ways we know ourselves and our experiences have been negotiated
through multiple domains of discourse, domains that establish what counts as experience and
who counts as an experiencing subject. However, since discourses change over time and in
response to broader historical and cultural transformations, what “counts” changes, too (Smith
and Watson 32). These shifts in discursive subjectivity and experience are clearly reflected in the
autobiographical stories we tell and read.
While discourse is essential to our understanding of our selves and lives, human
experiences do occur outside of discursive frames, including embodiment, spirituality, and
sensory memories (Smith and Watson 32). We are affected all the time by the material world—
“Bodies bleed. They manifest illnesses. They hurt. They feel hunger, thirst, and desire” (32). In
making sense of these events, we make the meaning or “experience” of them discursively, and
not just in language but as narrative. We understand our experiences and express it to others
through storytelling; those stories, in turn, are both motivated and shaped by discursive patterns
that are available to us (32). Our stories and experiences, as well as the discourses available to
share them, are populated by our beliefs.
Belief and Life Writing Studies
A concise overview of primary texts, scholars, and theories in the field of life writing,
focusing specifically on contemporary perspectives of truth and subjectivity in autobiography,
reveals some the field’s most significant beliefs. First, however, a brief look at the history of the
genre as it developed within a modern paradigm is essential to understanding how our stories act
as webs of belief—connecting us to our culture and to each other. The history of Western
autobiography, or memoir, typically traced back to either St. Augustine’s or Rousseau’s
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Confessions, is rich with relevant experiences that have shaped the field.5 While I will engage St.
Augustine’s contributions to the genre in Chapter Three, for my purposes here, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s autobiography, as a reflection of Enlightenment principles, is a productive point of
origin. Though heavily influenced by Augustine’s story, Rousseau’s autobiography is a direct
disputation of its predecessor. The Confessions quickly became a classic example of the genre
and altered our understanding of the autobiographical act. According to Ben Yagoda, at least
four key “beliefs” of contemporary memoir are embedded in Rousseau’s text, and while we now
consider them essential to the genre, they were revolutionary at the time of publication. They
include: “a belief in total frankness and honesty; an emphasis on the inner life of the mind and
emotions rather than on the external one of action; a significant attention to childhood and youth;
and a recognition that mundane matters…could be…earthshaking” (62). The Enlightenment,
with its focus on rationality, objectivity, and universal knowledge, shaped modern
autobiographical subjects motivated by these cultural beliefs. Rousseau’s claim to identity as an
“exceptional subject” celebrates the individual self as contained and solitary, a “natural man, in
solitary quest of lost innocence in a corrupted society” (Smith and Watson 115). Smith and
Watson argue that Rousseau’s project of memoir as “self-absorbed individualism” continues to
be an influential and controversial model today (115).
The other text with perhaps the most influence on our contemporary understanding of life
writing is Benjamin Franklin’s autobiography, which he began to write in 1771, coincidentally
the same year Rousseau finished his. However, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin,
referred to as a foundational text of American republicanism, deviates sharply from the French
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For an excellent overview of the history of the memoir, see Ben Yagoda’s Memoir: A History.
29

philosophy underpinning Rousseau’s self-examination. Franklin’s text portrays the Rousseauian
individualist as “corrupt and unproductive” in the new republic. Franklin, instead, celebrates a
“flexible, pragmatic subject, adaptive to the needs and possibilities of the new republic and
critical of the old world privileges of inherited status and legacy” (Smith and Watson 116).
Attributed to secularizing the Puritan religious narrative, Franklin’s story emphasizes selfinvention as an ethical rather than spiritual quest. His autobiography serves as “the prototypical
narrative for America’s myth of the self-made man and the entrepreneurial republican subject,
specifically marked as male, white, propertied, and socially and politically enfranchised” (116).
This narrative perpetuates a “boot-strap pedagogy” that rewards “self-made men” and celebrates
the lessons learned by a public figure rather than the confessions of a private one (DeVinne 2223).
The genre of autobiography, rooted in the self-shaping narratives of Rousseau and
Franklin, is historically populated with similar, epic tales of individual perseverance and
ingenuity and, thus, is widely and justly critiqued by contemporary scholars, such as Lauren
Berlant, in her examination of the relationship between the mutual purposes of life narrative and
public building (Jolly viii). According to Berlant, such “intimate publics…flourish as a porous,
affective scene of identification among strangers that promises a certain experience of belonging
and provides a complex of consolation, confirmation, discipline and discussion about how to
live” (viii). While Berlant seems to suggest that one achievement of intimate publics is the
promise to non-dominant and marginalized people to share and acknowledge the experience of
belonging, she’s skeptical of the possibility of the autobiography as capable of transcending the
normalization that the genre threatens. To engage Berlant’s conceptualization of “intimate
publics” asks readers of life writing texts to reconsider the public/private binary and to consider
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the political/personal implications of doing so. Berlant’s concern with the “presumed self-evident
value of bionarrative” is one concern that requires the field of “life writing to carefully
interrogate how the story of having a ‘life’ itself relies on logics of normativity” (Prosser and
Berlant 181). Berlant’s work challenges both writers and scholars of autobiography to think
about what and how stories get lived and written (and cited and recited) within a historical
moment that is “as transnational as the circulation of capital, state liberalism, and the
heterofamilial, upwardly mobile good-life fantasy have become” (Berlant, Cruel 11).
Megan Brown offers further critique of the genre; a recent article in Biography reframes
contemporary addiction memoir as “biopolitical self-care guide.” Drawing on Foucault’s
biopolitical technologies as methods for defining and classifying norms, Brown argues that
“personal narrative is a central way to circulate discourse about ‘private’ life and to perpetuate
and even police norms of subjectivity” (372). Autobiography continually threatens to participate
in a neoliberal ideology interested in “optimizing individual conduct in a capitalist, competitive
sphere” by perpetuating norms of individual conduct that focus on self-actualization and selffulfillment (361). At the same time, autobiography has never been more popular. Yagoda argues
that memoir has become “the central form of the culture: not only in the way stories are told, but
the way arguments are put forth, products and properties marketed, ideas floated, acts justified,
reputations constructed or salvaged” (28). Inherent in contemporary autobiography is this tension
between the private and public—between the individual and the social—that continues to
multiply in ways we cannot anticipate or control (Jolly x). In a 2011 special issue of Biography
that addresses this tension, editor Margaretta Jolly advises us to be careful not to condemn or
idealize the work that autobiography does (despite our “irrational attachments to life
storytelling”) (x). Brown agrees. In her reading of memoir as biopolitical technology, she argues
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that such texts “cannot be categorized as either beneficial or harmful because their effects are
multiple; the norms themselves (productivity, a well-managed life, and so forth) also resist easy
categorization” (372). Autobiography, then, as a genre that continues to flourish within our
culture, demands a rhetorical scholarship that recognizes how our stories not only reflect but also
shape our individual experiences but also shape our collective realities.
Although the autobiographical tradition itself extends back to 397 C.E. with St.
Augustine, and some argue even further, life writing studies as a discipline has a relatively short
history. And yet, as Susanna Egan observes, since its beginning in the late 1950s with the work
of Georges Gusdorf (1956) and continuing with the work of Roy Pascal (1960), Philippe Lejeune
(1971), James Olney (1972), and Elizabeth Bruss (1976), the field has become a robust area of
both production and scholarship (12). Egan attributes this accelerated growth to the
developments in theory that “undermined and overruled the humanist self” (Burdens 12).
Certainly, any shifts in the ways we think about the self—or identity—have an immediate impact
on the ways we tell stories about those selves. Thus, the study of subjectivity in life writing is
directly impacted by our belief systems. At the core of our beliefs is who we are—a
conceptualization that is incredibly complex. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson in Reading
Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives (2010) remind us that our identities or
“selves,” are not “essential—born, inherited, or natural—though much in social organization
leads us to regard identity as given and fixed” (39). Instead, they are located in language,
constructed, and discursive, echoing M. M. Bakhtin’s claim that consciousness, as a category of
identity, is dialogic. Thus, autobiographical narrators construct their textual identities in response
to the discourses that surround them.

32

A significant text on identity in autobiography, Paul John Eakin’s Living
Autobiographically: How We Create Identity in Narrative (2008), explores the connections
between identity and narrative, between selves and stories. Following the recent work in
cognition from neurologists such as Oliver Sacks and Antonio Damasio, Eakin suggests that
narrative is at identity’s core, that autobiography not only structures our lives but actually
constructs them (4). Stuart Hall describes identity as “a ‘production,’ which is never complete,
always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation” (222). Beliefs
operate in a similar and reciprocal way; they work to both reflect and construct selves and in
response to the discourses within which they operate. Similarly, Dana Anderson offers a
rhetorical conceptualization of autobiographical identity that is particularly relevant to this
dissertation. Identity, according to Anderson, is “a persuasive strategy, as a means of moving
audiences toward certain beliefs or actions” thus, “identity matters less as something that one ‘is’
and more as something that one does in language…or as something that one does to an audience
through the expression of who or what one is” (4). An attempt to ascertain identity is
challenging, Anderson acknowledges, as the “word smacks of a certain naïve modernism, or
enlightened, unified, atomistic individuals,” and threatens an “essentialist” conception of a
person outside the forces of language, culture, and history (5). Instead, he suggests we think of
identity not in ontological terms but in experiential ones, “as a word not for what a person or self
‘really’ is but rather for a person’s ability to articulate a sense of self or self-understanding” (6).
Identity, then, is our understanding of who we are—an understanding mediated by the beliefs
that our culture holds as foundational and essentially related to selves, such as gender, race,
ethnicity, and sexuality, and that dramatically shape our ongoing process of self-identification
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(9). Subjectivity, as constructed in and by autobiography—as constructed by belief—continues to
suggest provocative inquires to the field of life writing.
Another rich subject of discussion in the field particularly relevant to a rhetorical study of
belief is autobiographical “truth.” Recently, the field has been consumed by discussions of
authenticity perhaps in a response to the dominant public discourse about autobiography, a
discourse that has “boomed” along with the genre. Much of this discussion is centered on the
autobiographical fraud demonstrated most vividly in the controversy surrounding James Frey’s A
Million Little Pieces. Julie Rak, in “Memoir, Truthiness, and the Power of Oprah: The James
Frey Controversy Reconsidered” (2014) traces the connections between memoir and the
“development of American ideas about individualism and citizenship” (224). She argues that our
responses to Frey’s revelation that many of the facts in his story were purposely falsified were
directly connected to our cultural assumptions about the meaning of truth and were directly
related to a larger, public debate concerning the “idea of weapons of mass destruction, the
relationship between publishing and television…and the value of personal experience in the
public realm” (224). Regarding this recent cultural obsession of fact-checking and truthverifying, Sarah Smarsh ironically observes that it is the “most democratic of nonfiction genres,
memoir—in which any citizen might be the ultimate authority on her own experience—is the one
most scrutinized for veracity.” In 2014, Leigh Gilmore presented another important examination
of truth-telling in autobiography in her article “Boom|lash: Fact-Checking, Suicide, and the
Lifespan of a Genre.” In this piece, Gilmore identifies a new term “boom|lash” as a merging of
the simultaneous popularity and backlash against the memoir genre. Through her analysis of
John D’Agata’s Lifespan of a Fact, Gilmore interrogates “the relations among genre, evidence,
and ethics” in the debates about what counts as autobiographical “truth” (211). A recent special
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issue of a/b: Auto/Biography Studies (January 2016) was dedicated to “biofiction” with a focus
on truth, subjectivity, and genre and includes articles from Joanna Scott, Jay Parini, and Barbara
Mujica. These scholars join many others, including practitioners of autobiography, to theorize
the infinitely complicated issue of truth in memoir (Miller, Shields, Murdock, Lejeune, Karr,
Sacks, D’Agata, to name a few).
Although my work isn’t focused specifically on issues of autobiographical fraud,
authorship, or “what counts” as truth in nonfiction, I am concerned with how our individual and
cultural ideas of truth impact what and how we believe.6 As a focal point of this examination, I
am specifically interested in the relationship between the life writer and reader, a space Smith
and Watson argue reveals “how complex questions of the authenticity of experience and the
integrity of identity can become” (37). This complicated relationship, defined by Phillipe

6 Karr

theorizes at length the memoirist’s fraught relationship with truth and has been
instrumental in my own conception of how belief and truth work together. On one hand, she
defends a definite, knowable truth, arguing “it’s the busted liars who talk most volubly about the
fuzzy line between nonfiction and fiction.” And yet, she also acknowledges the slippery nature of
memory, and explains how, when remembering, she “often barely believe(s) (her)self.” Karr uses
the example of Greg Mortenson’s Three Cups of Tea, revealed as fraudulent in 2009, to explain,
“The people that have lied—and lied the most—it’s not just that they’ve lied, it’s that they talk
about failures of memory and intention to deceive as though they’re the same thing, and they’re
really not. [Greg] Mortenson [author of Three Cups of Tea] didn’t think he had been kidnapped
by the Taliban. He didn’t misremember and think that he had been in jail when he hadn’t.
Rather: he set out to deceive people” (E. Wood). When asked why memoir provokes readers and
critics alike to be obsessed with truth, Karr answers, “If I had found out that Helen Keller wasn’t
blind or only nearsighted, or that Maya Angelou was light skinned and passing, their stories
would “mean” differently. I know I can sound like that guy at the titty bar who thinks the women
really like him—I do know these people are selling me a book, their story, that is, it’s an
artificial relationship—but I get hope knowing they survived their travails and if it turns out they
didn’t have any, I feel deceived” (E. Wood). In this quote Karr seems to recognize the
relationship between truth, belief, and the rhetorical impact of how both work in a story. The
word “hope” suggests an affective response to belief—because this response is affective, when a
reader discovers their beliefs have been unwarranted, unfounded, or undeserved, the result is a
feeling of deceit.
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Lejeune as a “contract” between writer and reader that verifies the truth of the “signature” on the
cover and title page, is predicated on belief. And yet this relationship, and the “autobiographical
truth” it yields, is mutually constructive, or, as Egan defines “an intersubjective exchange
between narrator and reader aimed at producing a shared understanding of the meaning of a life”
(Mirror 16). It is in this examination of the reader/writer relationship, critical to life writing
studies, that rhetorical analysis can be especially insightful with its attention to audience. Thus,
one contribution my dissertation offers the field is an explicit rhetorical analysis of how our
beliefs both instigate and negotiate the stories we tell about our lives. Additionally, through my
analysis of the relationship between writers and readers of autobiography, I argue that our beliefs
are rhetorically constructed through our stories.
As Crowley’s work contends, rhetoric can no longer afford to reject or ignore the role of
belief in contemporary discourse. Increasingly described as “post-factual” or “post-truth,” our
culture, perhaps now more than ever, demands our attention to the complex and contested
definitions of truth, knowledge, reason, and fact—all of which are intimately related to our
beliefs. If we are truly “post-truth,” wherein the “complexity of modern problems has led to the
proliferation of radically different conceptions, such that people can now essentially find experts
to deliver facts that confirm their preconceived notions—almost no matter what,” we cannot
afford to discount the role of belief in this phenomenon. Psychologist Gregg Henriques echoes
Crowley in his identification of a “wicked polarization” impacting our society, where the two
political parties compete to define current issues and are increasingly defined in opposition to
each other. While he, like Crowley, acknowledges there are no simple solutions, he does
recognize the role of our belief systems both in determining the problem and proposing a
solution. He explains:
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We can all own the fact that we are justifiers, that our belief-value systems
emerge and evolve as function of our interests, demographics, early and important
experiences, friends, feelings and intuitions, and that such justification systems
play a defining role (if not the defining role) in how we look at particular complex
social issues and that once we become entrenched in particular views, we are
extremely resistant to changing our view. From this starting point we can then
work to be more explicit about owning our justification systems, be reflective
about where our systems of justification come from and what drives them, be
clear about our ultimate values and visions for the good life, and have the
appropriate degree of humility regarding…problems.
While a rhetorical inquiry into belief in memoir might not spark the kind of revolution that can
address such a wide-sweeping, cultural phenomenon, it can suggest a path. Crowley reminds us
that while such paths may be “well worn and others choked with rabbit brush,” they are the
concern of rhetoricians, whose professional affiliation commits us “to finding the available
means of persuasion in any given case” (x). Crowley suggests that story might be the most
effective place to begin an “in(ter)vention” as “story is, perhaps, the most efficient means of
garnering attention” and of tying believers to their belief systems. “I think we overlook how
often all of us use stories as means of persuasion,” Crowley remarks. I agree. A rhetorical
examination of belief as demonstrated in this dissertation offers the field of life writing a
productive and timely method of thinking about the significant cultural work our stories can do.
My Own Beliefs: A Brief Acknowledgment
Before I turn to the work of Mary Karr and the rest of this dissertation, I want to
acknowledge my own beliefs and the ways they have motivated and complicated this project. I
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believe our scholarship is an explicit justification of our beliefs—to assume any kind of tidy
objectivity would undermine my argument. This observation is obviously not mine alone.
Wesley Kort argues that the question of belief, particularly its role and legitimacy in our
scholarship, might currently be experiencing a heightened awareness based on our acceptance of
the premise that our work is not as free from beliefs and values and previously imagined. He
explains, “Scholars are often more forthright about their locations, how they have arrived at what
they’re putting forward, and what view of it they hold. Belief, then, has become part of academic
culture” (221). While I might not be as optimistic as Kort, I do see concepts such as “belief,”
“faith,” and “doubt” revealing themselves in conversations throughout the academy. I see, too,
an increased presence of “life writing” or personal narratives making appearances within
scholarly discourse. The simultaneity of these happenings further establishes the connections
among belief, identity, and narrative and provides exigency for my dissertation.
Let me return here to the story I alluded to in my introduction—not the story of Bob the
cat but the story that would define my life. The story, the hundreds of stories, found in the
Christian Bible. Long before I would become an English major and devote my academic career
to writing, reading, and teaching stories, I was inspired by a text. While my relationship to this
particular text is always complex and shifting, I have never stopped looking to language, and
specifically stories, for meaning in my life. In other words, I believe in the primacy of texts. Our
worlds are primarily textual, and when we are studying those worlds, we are doing so from ways
that are conditioned by texts (Kort 225). Because of this position, which might seem obvious for
a student of rhetoric, I have been consistently drawn to and inspired by the work of Paul Ricoeur,
a French philosopher who believed “being human is also to be immersed in language” (Ward,
Believable 7) and whose work is responsible for a “hermeneutical turn” in academic discourse.
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According to Ricoeur, “life is the bearer of meaning;” understanding, as a mode of being, allows
us to relate to the world, make sense of the world and our exchanges with it, and give shape to
that world. Ricoeur believed that whatever is intelligible is accessible to us in and through
language and all uses of language call for interpretation. This is where a hermeneutical approach
becomes essential, but, as I argue, one with an explicit rhetorical awareness. Ricoeur argues,
“There is no self-understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols, and texts; in the final
analysis self-understanding coincides with the interpretation given to these mediating terms”
(“On Interpretation” 151). Arthur Frank explains, “Hermeneutics begins with the premise that
any understanding of a text, which I…restrict to stories, is enabled and also limited by
understandings that have already been set in place by knowing previous stories” (94). Selfunderstanding, revealed and created in stories we tell about ourselves, is impossible without
interpretation. The stories of our lives call for interpretation even if they resist it. This kind of
interpretation, according to Frank, following both a hermeneutical and dialogical tradition, is
“less a matter of decoding stories than of seeing all the variations and possibilities inherent in the
story…Interpretation seeks not to stand over the story, speaking about it. Interpretation aspires to
be an ongoing dialogue with the story” (104). Life writing—as interpretation of a life—allows
readers and writers such an opportunity.
This process of textual interpretation and self-understanding is fundamental to a practice
of reading and writing autobiographical narrative. It is also the primary concern of the growing
field of narrative psychology, influenced by scholars such as Jerome Bruner, that views human
experience as a form of text construction and relies on the assumption that humans create their
lives through autobiographical processes. Because meanings of past events change over lifespans
as the beginnings of the story are reconstructed to lead to endings that are “mutable and in
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process,” people create life stories in an “interpretative and constructive way” (Josselson 2).
Thus, scholarship in this field relies on hermeneutics as a method of moving from text to
meaning.
However, even as I acknowledge the primacy of text in my own world, even as I
constantly look to texts for inspiration, clarification, self-understanding, and meaning, I am also
aware of the impossibility of language to convey both experience and identity. Rhetorician
Kenneth Burke explains, “Language, to be used properly, must be ‘discounted.’ We must remind
ourselves that whatever correspondence there is between a word and the thing it names, the word
is not the thing” (18). For autobiographical scholars, an awareness of the impossibility of
language to refer, or to reproduce history as “evidence,” is crucial. This awareness pushes
against our cultural prioritization of testimony as “truth”: after all, what could be truer than a
subject’s own story of what she lived through? This perspective threatens to imagine subjects as
“fixed and autonomous, and who are considered reliable sources of a knowledge that comes from
access to the real by means of their experience” (Scott 28). Joan W. Scott clarifies:
Subjects are constituted discursively, experience is a linguistic event (it doesn’t
happen outside established meanings), but neither is confined to a fixed order of
meaning. Since discourse is by definition shared, experience is collective as well
as individual. Experience is a subject’s history. Language is the site of history’s
enactment. (34)
Scott asks us to vigilantly resist the commonplace belief in an unmediated relationship between
words and things and to instead “embrace an approach that assumes all categories of analysis as
contextual, contested, and contingent” (36). For life writing scholars, whose work is inevitably
bound to matters of identity, truth, and experience, this distinction is critical. Identity,
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experience—these are always already interpretations and simultaneously in need of interpretation
(37).
While interpretation is typically situated clearly in the field of hermeneutics, it also is the
business of rhetoric. Hayden White argues that since interpretation accommodates various ways
of explaining or describing an object or experience, the method of articulation is more
tropological than logical. He explains, “And this is why rhetoric, considered less as a theory of
persuasive speech than as the theory of the tropological bases of speech, discourse and textuality
provides one promising way of comprehending what goes on in interpretative discourse in
general” (254). White’s observation confirms what I already believe; the interpretation of lives—
as the purview of autobiographical writers and readers—is ultimately a rhetorical pursuit. Even
as rhetoric functions to reveal the inherent instability of text, it also reminds me of what language
can do. As a rhetorician, I am compelled to believe that language is capable of doing things.
And, lastly, I must recognize that this dissertation is perhaps most impacted not by any
specific belief as much as my inescapable propensity to believe. As a result, my scholarship is
heavily influenced by the life and work of St. Augustine, whose own autobiography reveals the
intractable, inevitable, and yet dynamic tension between faith and learning. To address this
tension, Augustine brought a distinctly hermeneutical approach to his rhetorical practice—
specifically a reconceptualization of rhetoric and hermeneutics as a mutual and co-constructive
approach. Without hermeneutics, Augustine couldn’t understand his God, his world, or his place
in it. Without rhetoric, he couldn’t share his understanding with that world.
I hold a personal stake in Augustine’s work—and, at the same time, recognize what
sometimes feels to be a strange connection between a medieval rhetorician born in 354 in a
Roman colony in Africa, and a community college professor born in 1969 in Peoria, Illinois.
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However unlikely, I identify with the existential struggle he felt when attempting to negotiate
what must have felt like two completely different versions of his life—scholar, then bishop—
motivated by completely different beliefs, different truths. This struggle was mine, too, as I
found myself unable to navigate the fundamental Christianity I had been raised to believe and the
literary and rhetorical theory I met in college. Both Augustine and I could not, it seemed initially,
accommodate rhetoric and “hermeneutics” at once, particularly a worldview based on literal and
singular interpretations of text. The Christianity I was raised with used a “hermeneutical”
approach to reading Scripture not only as a means for sussing out “Truth,” but a means of
excluding others. It was used as a powerful tool of oppression, and, gradually, with very little
effort, I found myself reorganized into the category of “other” and I experienced, firsthand, what
a very different relationship to a text feels like. I didn’t like it. The truth no longer felt true. I
turned from my faith to a scholarship that showed me what happens when a text opens up rather
than closes down possibilities. This is why Augustine’s methodology—a “rhetorical
hermeneutic”—engages me in such profound ways, the result of which can be seen throughout
this dissertation. While St. Augustine’s work is certainly problematic on many important levels,
it attempts to bring his knowledge and his beliefs into a dialogue that directly informs and
reflects his relationship to language—what it means and what it does. And it extends that
relationship, through the concept of caritas, as a hand to others.
While my research has taught me that this tendency toward belief is not mine alone but
actually a result of evolutionary biology, less about specific choices I’ve made and more about
the experience of being human, I understand that my fundamentalist upbringing conditioned me
toward belief in ways I can only begin to know. Although I rejected the fundamental Christianity
of my childhood years ago, I can still feel its effects lingering in my personal and academic lives,
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drawing me simultaneously toward belief and doubt. Christian fundamentalism, as a religious
worldview, is in many ways structured by desire as an affective consequence of belief. This
desire is characterized by the deferral of the temporal world by the promise of an infinite future.
In this way, to live as a fundamental Christian is to live in expectation, continually looking ahead
in anticipation of something more. This life, thus, is defined by lack, by a desire to be fulfilled by
something outside and ahead of us. While I could write another dissertation on the destructive
impact of this belief, I am also aware of how it has oriented me toward possibility. Kort
describes this experience as “the desire or anticipation of something new or more ahead or above
me that calls of a releasing of my hold on what is or its hold on me, in order to be open to
something new” (231). For Kort, this sense of expectancy and desire of something “new or
more” reflects what some people could equate with a belief in God. This is why Ward’s
conceptualization of belief as a “disposition,” as “disposed towards” and looking “beyond the
individual who believes towards some object or person or condition in the world,” resonates so
deeply with me (30). When applied to the study of discourse, this approach becomes a
“hermeneutics of ‘as if’” or “a hermeneutics of looking toward and hoping for something more,
something new” (234). This hermeneutics directs our attention “to something more that looks
ahead and above” or, in my practice, toward possibility or “openings.” However, as Kort reminds
us, a critical task of the hermeneutics of “as if” is to “counter or dismantle the assumption, one
that…I also retain and am attached to, that there are people, texts, and occurrences in my world
that cannot be, or do not deserve to be, read in that expectant way” (234). This belief is the
closest I can get, most days, to the divine.
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Chapter Overview
Thus far in this chapter, I’ve explored the various exigencies for my research by situating
my topic historically, culturally, and within the field of life writing studies. In my second
chapter, I examine the role that both reading and writing played in Mary Karr’s life, primarily as
a structure for her early beliefs and as a foundation for her later religious conversion. To do this,
I look closely at Amy Hungerford’s definition of “postmodern belief” that she explores in her
recent text Postmodern Belief: American Literature and Religion since 1960. Religion and
literary studies have shared an intimate past in our American historical tradition as two
disciplines fundamentally concerned with text. In her book, Hungerford traces the similarities
between a postmodern secular “belief” in both religion and literature, and ultimately argues that
to live such belief—especially through the practice of reading and writing—is “undoubtedly to
live religiously” (xv). Hungerford argues that writing, for those invested in particular beliefs, is
both an articulation of belief and a form of religious practice (108). Building on Hungerford’s
work, I argue that Karr’s autobiographical writing, and her positioning of literature as sacred, is
itself a form of religious practice as essential to her belief system as her Catholicism.
The third chapter of my dissertation, “(Re)turning to Her Same Self: Mary Karr’s
Conversion and Foucault’s Askesis” explores the phenomenon of conversion as it impacts belief.
Since St. Augustine’s famous moment in the garden in his Confessions, autobiography has been
shaped by conversion both as a trope for identities and as a structure for narratives. Conversion,
then, has been used to mark moments of change in narratives when writers have experienced
some kind of epiphanic awareness that has led to new beliefs. After a brief examination of
conversion from a number of disciplinary perspectives, I use the work of Michel Foucault to
compare two dichotomous models of conversion—a traditional Christian model and Hellenistic44

Roman model—that have historically been diametrically opposed. In his analysis, Foucault
problematizes both models with a discussion of “truth” and its relationship to subjectivity,
conversations that are essential to a contemporary study of autobiography. Using Mary Karr’s
conversion as represented in Lit, I analyze how both models offer distinct approaches when
thinking about autobiography, particularly how Foucault’s definition of conversion—as a
method of self-care—expands our traditional conceptualization of conversion beyond religious
practice.
Chapter Four, “Memoir as Poiesis: Belief, Desire, and Relationship in the Work of Mary
Karr,” analyzes the relationship between the writer and reader of Karr’s memoirs as a site of
poiesis or creation of something new. Poiesis is the name Aristotle gave to the verb “making” or
“creating” and is historically associated with creative action. For Aristotle, poiesis was intimately
connected to affective responses, especially desire, a response that is closely related to belief and
structures our reading of autobiographical accounts. Affect theory, particularly Teresa Brennan’s
conceptualization of affective transfer, is a crucial component of this chapter, as well as Judith
Butler’s work on the Other in self-accounts. In this chapter, I argue that reading memoir is itself
a poiesis, a transformative and creative act that both actualizes and demands belief (Ward,
Believable 147).
Finally, in Chapter Five, I examine Karr’s newest text, The Art of Memoir—a “how-to”
book for people interested in writing memoir—for further answers to my primary question: What
makes Mary Karr believable? Through my examination, I argue that our pedagogies are
inextricably bound to our beliefs, and, as such, deeply and affectively connected to who we are,
not only as writers but also as teachers of memoir. I contend that what Karr teaches us about
writing memoir is ultimately about how to be believed. Memoir, as Karr imagines it and teaches
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us to us—as a practice of belief—becomes a pedagogical tool for possibility and change, both
individually and socially.
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CHAPTER II
WORDS CAN SAVE YOU: LANGUAGE, STORY, AND BELIEF IN THE LIARS’ CLUB
You hope to find the writer who can dramatize belief the way it feels in your experience, at once
a fact on the ground and a sponsor of the uncanny, an account of our predicament that still and
all has the old power to persuade. You look for a story or a novel where the writer puts it all
together. That would be enough.
That would be something. That would be unbelievable.
—Paul Elie
The American religion—so far as there is one anymore—seems to be doubt.
Whoever believes the least wins, because he’ll never be found wrong.
—Mary Karr

Like many children, especially those who grow up to be English teachers, I vividly
remember the stories that made me fall in love with reading. From my earliest Golden Book (The
Three Little Pigs!) to Ramona Quimby, The Boxcar Children, and eventually Lucy and her
beloved lion, the places and people I met in my books occupied long summer afternoons and
ushered in my nightly bedtime. The older I got and the more complicated life became, so, too,
did the stories I read. S. E. Hinton’s tales of troubled adolescence, Judy Blume’s coming-of-age
novels—these books, as all good books do—reassured me that the loneliness, longing,
frustration, confusion, terror, beauty, and exhilaration that consumed me were normal. Of course,
this history is not unusual for someone who “grows up” to teach literature and composition and
who devotes years of her life to studying the effects of both on herself and her students.
Certainly, some version of the same story is echoed in the collective experiences of many of us,
children who found in the pages of their books something different—something bigger—than the
worlds we inhabited. Stories carry with them at the very least distraction from the “real” lives
we’re living.
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Mary Karr goes so far as to say that stories do something much more than distract us. In
an article aptly titled “A Life Saved by Stories,” Karr explains, “Poetry saved my life. I was
mesmerized by the sheer beauty of the language, and the fact that this work of art is made out of
the same materials [words] that everybody uses to get the butter passed or get on the bus” (W.
Smith 52). Salvation means “to deliver from some danger; rescue from peril, bring to safety,”
and even "to prevent the death of;” it also has an obvious theological meaning: "to deliver from
sin or its consequences; admit to eternal life; gain salvation.” The root save comes from Old
French sauver "keep (safe), protect, redeem," and from Late Latin salvare "make safe, secure”
(“Save”). Protection, redemption, safety—these are words not often associated with stories.
Thus, when Mary Karr says her life was saved by stories, she ascribes to them a power that is
beyond what most of us imagine.
In this chapter, I examine this particular belief of Karr’s, of the possibility of stories to
save us, and argue that it is this belief that precedes or perhaps even prefigures her eventual
belief in God. Before I turn to Karr’s specific beliefs, however, I continue my discussion of
contemporary belief as both (and neither) sacred and secular and argue that our modern
conceptualization has been determined by a Western, and specifically Christian, framework.
Next, I briefly highlight the rich tradition shared by the studies of literature and religion, noting
how the two have collided, intersected, eclipsed, and informed each other as the result of both
modernism and structuralism, particularly focusing on the assumptions both make about
textuality, language, and meaning. This context helps me establish Karr’s theoretical and cultural
influences, in her role as both a reader and writer, and identify the similarities between her
literary and religious beliefs, particularly in the power of both to save her. Using a framework of
Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical theory on Logos and Amy Hungerford’s post-secular theory on belief
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and meaninglessness, I suggest that one provocative way to read Karr’s beliefs about both
literature and religion is to consider them not as inspired by specific, dogmatic beliefs but instead
as defined by the practice of believing itself. To illustrate the possibilities of this approach, I
identify and analyze key moments in The Liars’ Club when Karr’s beliefs—about God, about
literature, and about salvation—are interrogated. Finally, I offer another reading of Karr’s
memoir, based on a typological hermeneutic, that positions her identity and experiences in The
Liars’ Club within a larger narrative, bringing her beliefs about religion and literature into
additional conversation.
First, however, let me return for a moment to that younger version of myself from the
opening of this chapter. While reading served an incomparable role in my leisure time, easily
topping my list of favorite things to do, stories played a more essential role in our house. I was
introduced to the stories in the Bible right along with Dr. Seuss, the iconic tales of David and
Goliath, Jonah and the whale, or Noah’s ark permanently etched in my narrative consciousness.
The Christian Bible, beginning with the story of an idyllic garden and ending with a fiery pit,
contains hundreds of smaller tales, the most important featuring a God/man born of a virgin, who
lives an extraordinary life performing miracles and discipling skeptics, and dies as a martyr on a
cross to save humankind. This story is the one that dictates all others—the Most Important
Story—and it would come to structure the belief system that determined the first twenty-five
years of my life and continues to resonate personally and culturally in ways I can only begin to
imagine, ways I’m attempting to understand in this dissertation.
Like the novels that lined my bedroom bookshelves, the story behind the Christian faith,
behind most faiths, lives between the pages of a book. In other words, it is textual. When I was
learning to read, I was simultaneously learning to believe; in other words, I read what to believe
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and believed what I read. And while I understood that a world of difference existed between the
story of Margaret getting her period and the story of sinners seeking eternal life, I couldn’t help
but see the obvious parallels between the ways that text drives religious and literary or rhetorical
inquiry. The text is where I began to believe.
Before I made it my actual job to understand how and why narrative shapes our lives and
our cultures so significantly, I was already a “cradle believer” in the power of text to not only
enrich but to ultimately determine our lives. While my personal beliefs—about text, about
God—have progressed through multiple revisions as a result of education and experience, and in
many ways barely resemble the simple and uncomplicated assumptions of my youth, they are
ultimately and fundamentally grounded in language. And as a student trained in postmodern and
post-structural theory, I understand the complications—even impossibilities—of such beliefs.
The possibilities of language, as a system of words and signs without essential connections to the
world or our experiences, can challenge even the most ardent believer.
Although language cannot ultimately represent the world or experience, it can illuminate
it as scholar Robert Lundin notes, “for it can lift the veil and expose those habits of mind and
relationships of power that have arbitrarily tethered words to the realities we claim they signify”
(49). Discourse is always about something, according to Paul Ricoeur, and only a “few
sophisticated texts” meet the ideal of a “text without reference” in which the “play of the
signifier” breaks entirely free from any reality of the signified. Thus, written works always speak
in one way or another about the world (“The Model” 96). “For me,” explains Ricoeur, “the
referent of all literature is the world (Welt) that language creates out of the environment
(Umwelt) of human experience” (96). According to Ricoeur, the texts “we have read, understood,
and loved” manage to “light up our own situation” by taking our experiences in the world and
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casting them in a narrative framework. Therefore, the references of literature “open up the
world” for us by pointing not only to what we are, but to what and whom we might become. “In
this sense,” Ricoeur writes, “Heidegger rightly says…that what we understand first in a
discourse is not another person, but a project, that is, the outline of a new being-in-the-world.”
Writing reveals “the destination of discourse as projecting a world” (97). It is this sense of
anticipation that characterizes religion and literature as possibility, as an expectation of
something new. I recognize this similarity in my own experiences as a child raised to believe in
the power of a text to save me from my sins and Mary Karr’s life as a child raised to believe in
the power of literature to save her from her life. Interestingly, my own beliefs led me away from
religion and to the study of language, while Karr’s moved in the opposite direction; her belief in
literature in many ways anticipated her eventual belief in God. This chapter focuses on the ways
those beliefs both inform and complicate each other, and emphasizes how the formal practice of
belief itself—as separate from or in spite of content—remains both personally and culturally
significant.
Logology and Divine Logos
I start with the work of rhetorician Kenneth Burke, whose The Rhetoric of Religion
marries theology and literary criticism while remaining utterly secular, to frame my argument in
this chapter. In his text, Burke argues that “words about God” are essentially “words about
words” and coins the term “logology” to refer to the study of language from this perspective.
Burke seeks to understand how words about God, in texts such as St. Augustine’s Confessions,
allow us to learn something about language itself when they return to the secular world with
new, religious meanings. Burke explains, “For regardless of whether the entity named ‘God’
exists outside his nature sheerly as a key term in a system of terms, words ‘about him’ must
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reveal their nature as words” (2). Although logology seeks to replace a sacred understanding of
the divine Logos with a secular understanding of transcendent language, it still endows literature
with “supernatural” qualities typically attributed to religion (Hungerford 9). Although logos is
commonly associated with the Aristotelian modes of persuasion meaning “logic” or argument,
the divine Logos, or doctrine of Logos, is a Christian reference to the Word of God as incarnated
in Jesus Christ as described in the first few verses of the book of John:
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God…All things came into being through him, and without him, not one thing
came into being…And the Word became flesh and lived among us, and we have
seen his glory, the glory as of a father’s only son, full of grace and truth. (John
1:1, 3, 14)
However, before John imbued Logos with a divine purpose, the word logos, simply
translated as “word,” held important meaning in the Greek world. The philosopher Heraclitus is
associated with the first usage of the word as a reference to a divine rational intelligence, a
universal rule that animates the universe and is associated with fire. The ancient Greeks were
interested in answering the ultimate questions of reality and in seeking truth; logos described this
reality, as the force that gave life and meaning to the universe. In Greek philosophy, this
phenomenon was understood to be an impersonal force, not a personal being. When the apostle
John imagines a divine Logos, he imbues the word with aspects unimagined by Greek
philosophers. Rather than an impersonal force, logos becomes a personal being who can be
rejected or received by individual people. Thus, the Christian church extended the Stoic idea of
the universal community by claiming the universal nature of salvation and the potential for all
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humans to participate in it (Lebreton). In this new definition, where “words become flesh” and
live among us, Christianity endows language with the power to save.
From Burke’s secular perspective, however, he argues that our “logological” concern
should be with the analogy between “words” (lower case) and The Word. While “words” have
“wholly naturalistic, empirical reference, they might also be used analogically, “to designate a
further dimension, the ‘supernatural’” (7). Indeed, whether or not the “supernatural” exists,
words for it do. Burke notes the linguistic paradox here; “For whereas the words for the
‘supernatural’ realm are necessarily borrowed from the realm of our everyday experiences, out of
which our familiarity with language arises, once a terminology has been developed for special
theological purposes the order can be reversed” (7). In other words, we can “borrow back” the
terms from the borrower, “again secularizing to varying degrees the originally secular terms that
had been given ‘supernatural’ connotations” (7).
Burke uses examples of words such as “grace” and “spirit,” which, in their original Latin
forms, had purely secular meanings; however, once borrowed into theological language—
“translated from the realm of social relationships into the supernaturally tinged realm of
relationships between ‘God’ and man”—the etymological conditions were set for a reverse
process where the theological term becomes “aestheticized” (8). This movement, from the
secular to the sacred and back again, gives us a sense that language is not just “natural,” but is
actually capable of adding a “new dimension” to the things of nature; in other words, words have
the capability to “transcend” non-verbal nature (8). This capability is “to be treated not literally,
but as a sheerly technical kind of ‘transcendence,’” where the secular, empirical terms are
“infused by the spirit” of the “transcendent” terms (10, 37). Burke continues that words
themselves are material with a “dimension of sheer physicality by which a word is uttered,
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transmitted, heard, read, etc.”; however, “the word’s ‘meaning’ is not identical with its sheer
materiality. There is a qualitative difference between the symbol and the symbolized” (16).
Burke reminds us that “Language, to be used properly, must be ‘discounted.’ We must remind
ourselves that, whatever correspondence there is between a word and the thing it names, the
word is not the thing” (18).
Burke argues that the relationship between theology and logology cannot be simply
interpreted as moving in one direction; in fact, a “logological” approach complicates not only the
movement of words, but of historical development, from the “sacred” to the “profane” or from
the “spiritual” to the “secular” (35). In this chapter, I suggest that a similar “logological” model
of belief offers interesting ways of looking at Karr’s autobiographical narration of her childhood
beliefs, precisely because it considers the capacity for the multidirectional movement of belief,
momentarily occupying both secular and sacred and the spaces in between. My inquiry focuses
specifically on her beliefs about literature and about God, how those beliefs develop mutually
and simultaneously, and how they complicate and complement each other.
Belief and Religion
Although Burke’s work is motivated by and invested in secularity, logology is a concept
that resists a similar categorization. Instead, Burke contends, “Logology systematically
admonishes us against so simple a dialectic” as spiritual/secular (35). For a rhetorical
consideration of belief, as demonstrated in this dissertation, a similar resistance is crucial.
Scholars such as Graham Ward and Mark C. Taylor insist that rather than belief being absent
from the secular movement, it is at its very heart. Ward explains that the "unbelief" frequently
associated with secularity is itself a belief because religious faith is only one of the many forms

54

believing takes (125).7 Belief is not solely the province of religion, and religion isn’t the only
purveyor of beliefs. Thus, central to the work of this dissertation, particularly to this chapter, is
the acknowledgement of the complex and historically-varied relationship between belief and
religion. And while I have oriented my own beliefs as first a result of and later a reaction against
a very particular religious system, I argue that a contemporary rhetoric of belief must understand
belief as an experience that attends to but also extends beyond the sacred. Generally, the
definition of belief as “belonging to” religion, or as synonymous with religious belief, is based
on the commonly unchallenged assumption that the “adherents of a given religion…understand
that adherence in terms of belief” (Lopez 21). Donald S. Lopez, Jr. explains that belief has been
the axis around which Christians have told their own history; further, scholars of religion and
anthropologists have defined religion in terms of belief or practice as deeds motivated by belief
(21). Robert Orsi argues that belief is “the wrong question”—the question asked by the naïve, the
old-fashioned, the child, the student, the Fundamentalist. The scholarly question of belief
threatens to be an “unwitting masquerade for the evangelical Protestant question—Do you

Secularism—what it means and when/whether we’ve achieved it—was a primary concern in
many of the texts that influenced this chapter. While these concerns are outside of the scope of
my work, I found Mark Taylor’s perspective to be particularly instructive for my understanding
of belief. In After God (2007), Taylor argues that religion and secularity are not opposites, but
rather Western secularity is a religious phenomenon. He observes, “Religionists and secularists
are mirror images of each other who share more than they are willing to admit; each reverses but
does not displace the other. Although it is not immediately obvious, both perspectives rest on the
same error. Bound by the exclusive logic of either/or, each side in this conflict sees religion and
secularity as irreconcilable opposites. While choosing opposing sides, they are fighting the same
battle” (132). According to this perspective, religion and secularity are both “co-emergent and
codependent” (132). In my attempt to distinguish belief from religion, I use Taylor’s work to
suggest the same possibility for belief and secularity. In other words, just as religion doesn’t
“mean” belief, neither does secularity “mean” nonbelief. In Religious Experience and the
Modernist Novel, Pericles Lewis asserts, “Regardless of whether we call the changes in religious
life ‘secularization,’ they do not necessarily imply a rejection of all religion, but rather a transfer
of authority in religious belief from public to private hands” (30).
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believe in Jesus?” (Hungerford 109). Thus, a focus on belief sneaks into any discussion of
religion an implicitly Christian assumption about what religion is and what its relationship to
belief must be.
Orsi claims that to say that one “‘believes in’ a religion means that one has deliberated
over and then assented to its propositional truths, has chosen this religion over other available
options, as a personal choice unfettered by authority, tradition, or society,” and argues that “this
account of religion carries real normative force” (18). And Lopez explains that the connection of
belief to Christianity specifically, as allied with political power, has “made it possible to
transport its belief to all corners of the globe (if not the universe), making belief the measure of
what religion is understood to be” (33). When belief is inextricably yoked to religion it threatens
to take on a particular flavor and become the province of some and not others. Further, the
conflation of religion with belief suggests that they are a “package deal,” so to speak. In other
words, if I am religious, then I am a believer; if I’m not religious, then belief has no purpose for
me. A contemporary rhetoric of belief, while certainly able to accommodate a religious
orientation, cannot be reliant upon it. Another essential component to my argument is the
recognition that Mary Karr’s autobiographical narratives, as provocative sites to examine
contemporary rhetorics of belief, are meaningful for both secular and spiritual readers. Indeed,
critical to Karr’s ability to not only believe herself but to inspire belief in her readers, is her
ability to freely negotiate the boundary between the sacred and profane, while still believing in
something. This ability underscores Taylor’s critique of contemporary culture, that although “we
may no longer believe in God, we still believe in belief” (34).
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Belief in Belief
In her compelling text, Postmodern Belief: American Literature and Religion since 1960,
Amy Hungerford questions whether the fundamentally Protestant way of understanding religious
belief, as limited to specific, particularly Christian doctrine, is still relevant to the study of
contemporary religion and literature. A post-secular critic, Hungerford argues that belief without
meaning—or specific religious content—“becomes both a way to maintain religious belief rather
than critique its institutions and a way to buttress the authority of the literature that imagines
such belief” (xiii). And, finally, that to live a belief in meaninglessness—to live it specifically
through the practice of writing and reading—is “undoubtedly to live religiously” (xv).
Meaninglessness, as situated within literary and religious discourse, Hungerford defines as
“belief for its own sake, or belief without content, or belief where content is the least important
aspect of religious thought and practice” (xiv). With her thesis, Hungerford directly challenges
the narrative of secularization by demonstrating the enduring energy of religious experience in
contemporary literature and life. Positioning those who believe in God and those who believe in
literature as natural allies, Hungerford demonstrates how our ways of speaking about both
literature and religion have “become elliptical—have come continually to orbit the dual foci of
belief and meaninglessness” (xxi). This “line of orbit” is what she calls “belief in literature”
(xxi). Hungerford’s focus on the practice of believing, as distinct from specific content, seems
particularly suited to an examination of belief in The Liars’ Club as Karr’s youth is marked by a
distinct disbelief in religion juxtaposed with the near worship of literature. Karr remembers, “In
my godless household, poems were the only prayers that got said—the closest thing to sacred
speech at all” (“Facing Altars” 126). In this quote and in numerous others, she reassures us that
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while her family members might have lacked a particular set of traditional religious beliefs, they
were not without belief itself.
Belief and Modern Literature
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I argued that our contemporary definitions of
belief have been significantly impacted by modernity, particularly in the positioning of
knowledge as separate from and superior to belief. These paradigmatic shifts in cultural beliefs
about belief itself dramatically transformed the fields of religion and literary studies as
disciplines ultimately concerned with meaning, interpretation, and language. The modern period,
according to scholar Pericles Lewis, inherited a “call, and an anxiety,” perpetuated by Arnold’s
prediction that “Most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by
poetry” (“The Study”). Although consistently associated with the secularization of the
movement, modernist authors, particularly novelists, were “strikingly engaged with the spiritual
aspects of life” (Lewis 5) and heavily influenced by the social scientific study of religion. Lewis
explains, “The modernists’ spiritual concerns include borderline states of consciousness, forms
of the divided self, the process of conversion, the function of ritual, the magical potential
inherent in words, moments of sublime experience, and the relationship between social life and
sacred power” (5). While their texts might have been missing specific religious content, they
were never lacking spirituality.
Thus, preceding Hungerford’s postmodern “belief in meaninglessness” or belief without
specific doctrinal content, Lewis identifies a generation of social thinkers—such as William
James, Sigmund Freud, and Max Weber—who were more concerned with the structure of faith
than with its truth content (20). These social scientists in turn influenced the work of secular
novelists who “sought to make the structure of the novel more capable of transcendent
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experiences” (20). Lewis argues that for the modernists, “transcendence” was used to designate
experiences that originated in the natural world, rather than the supernatural, but that revealed a
kind of insight beyond the scope of the ordinary. To convey these experiences, modernists often
used religious language, such as the term “epiphany” (20). While consciously rejecting doctrine
or institutionalized theology, the modernists discovered methods to describe in literature what
William James called “religious experience” or the basic consciousness at the root of all religions
and yet unassociated with any specific church. In his text, Religious Experience and the
Modernist Novel, Lewis challenges the “secularization thesis,” characterized by the “emergence
of modernity as the result of increasingly rational modes of thought and a rejection of belief in
the supernatural” (23). This thesis assumes that earlier, religious narrative forms (primarily the
epic, but also spiritual autobiography), in which events unfold as a result of supernatural forces,
gave way to naturalistic techniques of description and subject matter from the “empirically
observable world” (23). Lewis traces this transformation through the work of Walter Benjamin,
Erich Auerbach, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Ian Watt, with a special emphasis on Georg Lukác’s
description of the novel as “the epic of a world that has been abandoned by God” (23).
However, Lewis problematizes the secularization thesis, arguing that “a sense of the
sacred persists even in the apparently godless modernist novel,” and that the modernists are not
the devout secularists that most critics portray; “rather, they sought, through formal experiment,
to offer new accounts of the sacred for an age of continued religious crisis” (24). According to
Lewis, while modernist novelists weren’t interested in seeking solutions for spiritual problems in
the occult or traditional Christianity, they did regard the challenges of modernity as essentially
spiritual. Lewis offers the term “secular sacred” as a modernist literary approach that sees words
like “sacred,” “reverence,” “sanctity,” “magic,” and “soul,” as not exactly orthodox but “more
59

than merely metaphorical” (30). Instead, “this was the language available to them for speaking
about ultimate truths, human truths for which supernatural explanations might no longer seem
adequate, but for which a sheer materialism or reductivism also seemed suspect” (30). Directly
challenging Clifford Geertz’s distinction between “religious perspective” and “aesthetic
attitude,” Lewis echoes Taylor’s perspective that rather than a rejection of all religion,
“secularization” implies a transfer of authority in religious belief from the public to the private
realm (30).
It is at the beginning of the sixties, squarely in the middle of the childhood Karr
remembers in The Liars’ Club, that Hungerford locates the burgeoning tension between “faith in
faith” and specific religious conviction. While many saw the retreat of religion from the public
sphere and into the private realm as evidence that strong and specific doctrinal faith was losing
out first to faith in faith itself and finally to secularism, others recognized the beginning of
dramatic growth in conservative Christianity, particularly fundamentalism. According to
Hungerford, writers, critics, and religious Americans during this time cultivated ways of thinking
that allowed for both faith in faith and specific conviction to be held simultaneously, the effects
of which can be felt in both the criticism and literature of the later twentieth century (8). Lionel
Trilling, in his essay “On the Teaching of Modern Literature,” contends that modern literature
(for him, contemporary) “asks us…if we are saved or damned—more than anything else, our
literature is concerned with salvation. No literature has ever been so intensely spiritual as ours”
(8-9). Trilling’s observation complicates some of the commonly held assumptions about the
relationship between secularity and modernization.
James Wood is another literary critic, like Lewis, who studies modern writers who
traverse boundaries between literary and religious belief. For Wood, it is during the modern
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period when the distinctions between “literary” and “religious” become blurred, and, he argues,
we have lived in the “shadow of their blurring ever since” (xv). This moment is when “the old
estate broke;” he uses the symbol of the “old estate” to represent the collapse of the belief that
religion represents a set of “divine truth-claims and that the Gospel narratives were supernatural
reports.” While fiction may be supernatural, it is always fictional—“it was not in the same order
of truth as the Gospel narratives” (xv). Wood argues that during the 19th century, these two
positions begin to “soften and merge,” and at the climax of the novel’s popularity, “the Gospels
began to be read, by writers and theologians, as a set of fictional tales—as a kind of novel” (xv).
At the same time, reading literature became “an almost religious activity (though not, of course,
with religion’s former truth-value for this was no longer believed in)” (xv).
Our beliefs—about literature and about religion—have obviously evolved significantly
since the 19th century, although Karr herself argues that we are still living under the “flapping
shadow” of the “flag of Modernism” (“How to Read”). However, the contemporary relationship
between religion and literature has made some critics, such as Paul Elie, ask if fiction has lost its
faith. In a 2012 editorial for the New York Times Sunday Book Review, Elie argues that “if any
patch of our culture can be said to be post-Christian, it is literature.” In a country whose
Christian faith has “something like 170 million adherents, a faith that for centuries seeped into
every nook and cranny of our society,” Elie contends that the “novel of belief” has gone where
belief itself has gone—out of our cultural imaginary. While some contemporary authors (such as
Raymond Carver, Jeffrey Eugenides, and Denis Johnson) suggest ways that moments of belief
can impact individual lives, Elie argues our stories are no longer “about” belief. He describes an
America where Christianity is “highly visible in public life” but of little consequence in the lives
of individuals. Thus, for the “first time in our history it is possible to speak of Christianity
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matter-of-factly as one religion among many” and possible, even, to leave it out of our dialogue
altogether. The United States might be a “vast Home Depot of ‘do-it-yourself’ religion,” but, as
Elie argues, “you wouldn’t know it from the stories we tell.”
Elie quotes Flannery O’Connor, who located the struggle to “make belief believable”
with the struggle to gain the attention of the “indifferent reader.” The religious aspect of a work
of fiction, according to O’Connor, is “a dimension added” not one taken away. Elie continues
with his discussion of the role belief plays in contemporary literature: “[The] refusal to grant
belief any explanatory power shows purity and toughness on the writer’s part, but it also calls to
mind what my Catholic ancestors called scrupulosity, an avoidance that comes at the cost of
fullness of life.” Perhaps Karr gets our attention as readers “indifferent” to belief (or religion, or
the sacred, the supernatural, the divine, etc.) by making belief believable. I suggest that one way
she does this—makes us believe in the believability of belief—is by asking readers to follow her
as she moves between literature and religion, infusing each with the power to transcend, and
ultimately, to save. In the next section of this chapter, I identify specific passages and scenes
from the text that most clearly reveal a number of Karr’s beliefs about literature and religion. I
position her literary beliefs first, and then her religious beliefs, to highlight a narrative “order,” a
pattern of believing where one set of beliefs follows another. However, while my organization
(like narrative) might suggest a distinct “before” and “after,” her beliefs are multidirectional,
developing simultaneously and in conversation with each other. Because Karr situates these
beliefs within her memoirs, the movement between genres is also significant. In other words,
Karr’s beliefs about the genre of literature are also filtered through the generic demands of
autobiography, a move that further complicates them. Autobiography asks us for a different type
of belief as it promises a special kind of truth.
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Of Poetry and Prayer
In language I found a way out of myself—to my mother, then to a wider community (the poets I
imagined for years), then to a poetry audience for which I wrote, then to the Lord…
—Mary Karr

The argument that Mary Karr found a spiritual significance in literature far earlier than,
but ultimately similar to, religion isn’t a particularly fresh line of scholarly inquiry. She develops
this connection herself in the article “Facing Altars: Poetry and Prayer,” appearing in Poetry in
2005 and reprinted in her 2006 poetry collection Sinners Welcome. In this essay, which she
describes as a confession to her “unlikely Catholicism” for a “journal founded in part on and for
the godless, twentieth-century disillusionaries of J. Alfred Prufrock and his pals,” Karr elucidates
the path through poetry that led her to conversion through prayer. Throughout the piece, Karr
moves between characterizations of “poetry” and “prayer” as simultaneously and essentially
opposite and the same—sort of a “poetry does this” while “prayer does that” approach. In this
positioning, she substitutes features of one for qualities of another, shoring up one’s effects with
the other’s. For example, she writes, “Like poetry, prayer often begins in torment, until the
intensity of language forges a shape worthy of both labels: ‘true’ and ‘beautiful’…But, if you’re
in a frame of mind dark enough to refuse prayer, nothing can ease the ache like a dark poem”
(127). Additionally, she frequently places poetry first in a chronological account of her
experience—first was poetry, then was religion. In this essay, she identifies her most profound
childhood experiences as a reaction or in relation to poetry or literature. She explains, “From a
very early age, when I read a poem, it was as if the poet’s burning taper touched some charred
filament in my rib cage to set me alight…poetry never failed me, even if the poet reaching me
was some poor wretch even more abject than myself” (126). And, of her earlier association
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between the two, Karr reflects, “Poetry never left me stranded, and as an atheist most of my life,
I presumed its mojo was a highbrow, intellectual version of what religion did for those more
gullible believers in my midst” (126).
Karr’s tumultuous childhood, the subject of her first memoir The Liars’ Club, recounts
her youth spent in a small, coastal Texan town (“Leechfield” is the pseudonym she uses) once
voted by Business Week as “one of the ten ugliest towns on the planet” (The Liars’ 34). Of
Leechfield, Karr writes, “the world smelled not unlike a wicked fart in a close room…In the
fields of gator grass, you could see the ghostly outline of oil rigs bucking in slow motion…giant
towers rose from each refinery, with flames that turned every night’s sky an odd, acid-green
color” (34). Later, Karr learned that during her childhood Leechfield had been a manufacturing
site for Agent Orange. Perhaps more oppressive than the physical environment, however, was the
community itself. Karr frequently describes her family as outsiders, and although she enjoyed the
benefits of her father’s reputation as a no-nonsense, steady union member and refinery worker,
she experienced the less than ideal effects of her mother’s reputation as an overeducated,
atheistic, Yankee who suffered from being Nervous. Because of her parent’s turbulent
relationship illustrated with violent domestic scenes where Karr and her older sister Lecia would
“hear a crash or the sound of a body hitting the linoleum, and then we’d go streaking in there in
our pajamas to see who’d thrown what or who’d passed out” (39), the family was generally
ostracized by their churchgoing neighbors. Karr remembers, “I noticed that when somebody’s
mom went knocking on doors for company, she never knocked on ours. The more devout
families wouldn’t even let their kids come into our yard” (39). Karr’s describes poetry
(alternatively, reading and literature) as the thread that linked her to the world: “Poetry…was
most crucially the first source of awe for me, because it eased a nagging isolation: it was a line
64

thrown to my dreary-minded self from seemingly glorious Others” (“Facing Altars” 126).
Although Karr felt no viable connection between herself and her immediate surroundings, she
felt in poetry a link to world beyond Leechfield.
Not only was Karr isolated within her community but also within her own home. While
her father worked long shifts at the refinery, her mother, Charlie, pursued her own interests—
studying Russian philosophy and art history, painting in her studio, and reading, always reading.
Described by Karr as “seductive and mercurial and given to deep doldrums and mysterious
vanishings,” Charlie would spend days in bed, drunk on vodka, and depressed while Mary and
Lecia opened up cans of tamales for breakfast and lounged in the midday heat in nothing but
their underwear (The Liars’ 126). The sense of loneliness Karr felt, in the world, in her town, and
in her home, in many ways founded her earliest beliefs about the power of language—first
poetry, then prayer—to transcend or “snatch” her “from the fire” (O’Reilly). To be “snatched
from the fire” is a reference to Jude 1:22-23 in which readers are persuaded to show mercy to
those who doubt and to save others by “pulling them out of the fire.” Language, first of literary
classics and eventually of prayer and sacrament, pulled Karr from the fire to safety, from doubt
to belief.
Belief in Literature
Mary Karr is not only a poet and memoirist, but also an accomplished literary scholar and
critic. At Syracuse, she wants her students to learn what she refers to as “The English line: Keats,
Wordsworth, Byron, Coleridge,” and notes she’s a big fan of Milton and Dickinson.
Additionally, she teaches the criticism of modern writers such as Eliot, Stevens, and Plath and
has taught a class called “Dead White Guys” focusing on the poetry of Pound, Eliot, Stevens,
and Yeats (B. O’Donnell). She penned the introduction to “The Waste Land” for The Modern
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Library, an essay titled “How to Read ‘The Waste Land’ so It Alters Your Soul,” and in her
controversial essay “Against Decoration,” Karr argues that the primary function of poetry is to
“move the reader” (3). These critiques join others to create a rich collection of relevant and
contemporary literary scholarship and also locate some of Karr’s academic interests in the
writing of the modern period. While this scholarship is certainly pertinent to my study and has
informed the work of this chapter, the focus of my inquiry is on Karr’s earliest interactions with
literature as recounted in The Liars’ Club—those that shaped her beliefs, and surely paved the
way for her future as a writer, professor, and practicing Catholic.
In a 2016 interview with Krista Tippett for the podcast On Being, Karr says, “the place I
had contact with both my mother and my father is around language, in a way — my father’s
stories and my mother’s love of literature.” The Liars’ Club tells the story of Karr’s childhood as
shaped by these earliest relationships between her, her parents, and language and is told in the
best example of this language, in its rich diction and vibrant storytelling, which is attributed with
heralding our contemporary memoir explosion. This voice in The Liars’ Club Karr describes as
drawn “from a lifetime of reading, which my mother had fostered. An artist and history maven,
she kept a wobbly tower of books by her bed” (The Art 140). From her earliest memories, Karr
associates her mother with books; not only was her mother immersed in her own literary
pursuits, but her rare attentions to Mary were often motivated by texts. Karr remembers, “mother
bringing me Eliot’s poems from the library, and she not only swooned over them, she swooned
over my swooning over them, which felt as close as she came to swooning over me” (“Facing”
126). A reader by the age of three, Karr recounts a memory of her mother taking her to the
principal’s office, a “handsome ex-football coach named Frank Doleman” the girls referred to as
Uncle Frank, to “dutifully read the front page of the day’s paper out loud to him, so he could be
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sure it wasn’t…memorized” (The Liars’ 62). Karr’s interest in literature and her identity as a
reader bonded her to her mother in an intimate and singular way.
Likewise, language connected her with her daddy, and this relationship would also prove
to have permanent and inimitable consequences. Unlike her mother who “was smart and witty—
the master of the one-liner—but not much of a storyteller” (The Art 140), Pete Karr was a
seasoned raconteur, whose cohort of pals, christened the Liars’ Club by “somebody’s pissed-off
wife” (The Liars’ 14), provided the title for Karr’s memoir. Karr notes that the Liars’ Club—a
group of local men who met at the American Legion or “in the back room of Fisher’s Bait Shop
at times when their wives thought they were paying bills or down at the union hall”—was an apt
name since “Certainly not much of the truth in any technical sense got told there” (14). The
stories that were told here highlighted her father’s colloquial voice, rich with Texas diction, that
would ultimately “unlock” The Liars’ Club for Karr. She explains, “Daddy, the in-house exile in
our household of book-reading females, would solve my biggest literary problem…his manner of
talk was so singular…The stories hummed through my fibers” (The Art 141). Central to Pete’s
stories were the sharp “carnal” details that Karr suggests lead readers to believe in the veracity of
the experience, a critical function of autobiographical narrative. She argues, “A great detail feels
particular in a way that argues for its truth. A reader can take it in” (72). Karr locates her own
signature language, rich with idiomatic slang and attentive to sensual details, in her father’s
linguistic tradition.
However, perhaps even more essential to Karr’s work is the early relationship between
truth and language that she perceives while visiting the Liars’ Club. After her dad tells a
particularly fictitious story of his father’s death to his gullible friends, Karr writes, “I’ve plumb
forgot where I am for an instant, which is how a good lie should take you. At the same time, I’m
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more where I was inside myself than before Daddy started talking, which is how lies can tell you
the truth” (The Liars’ 124). A vocal proponent for the centrality of truth in any autobiographical
enterprise, Karr argues that the quality she’s admired most consistently in the life writers she’s
read and taught is that “Truth is not their enemy. It’s the bannister they grab for when feeling
around on the dark cellar stairs. It’s the solution” (The Art xviii). As her reaction to her father’s
stories suggests, the truth she’s after—the truth possible in autobiography—isn’t an
“authoritative, third-person, I-am-camera view” masquerading as fact, but instead a transcription
of the mind “so its edges show,” a writing constantly reminding the reader that he’s not
“watching crisp external events played from a digital archive” (16). This truth, Karr argues, is the
speaker’s truth alone, and in this way, the genre is constantly disavowing the “rigors of objective
truth” (16). This is the truth Karr realizes from her father’s stories, obviously crafted around
outrageous lies, a truth that reveals something about her.
Karr locates her interest in truth, and its complicated relationship to language particularly
in the stories we tell ourselves, in her earliest exposure to lies. In her On Being interview, she
clarifies, “We’re all lied to, either intentionally or not intentionally…in an alcoholic family…
you start with that big lie —‘I’m not drunk.’ I mean, you’re just told that so many times. Or,
‘Everything’s OK’” (Tippett). Motivating the writing of The Liars’ Club was Karr’s need to find
the “truth” about her family’s dysfunctional history. She explains, “… In an age when even to
use the word ‘truth’ or even to say the word ‘truth,’ it always comes now with finger squiggles
around it, comes with quotes around it, as though, ‘How dare one presume to know the truth?’”
Karr believed she could. She says that she had to believe “there was such a thing as truth and that
it could possibly in any way be knowable by a person through self-reflection, and therapy, and
talking to people, and fasting, and prayer, and eventually talking to Jesus.” Karr clarifies, “I
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believed that that the truth would set me free. I believe that…” (Tippett). Her earliest beliefs,
richly complicated by a difficult upbringing as the child of alcoholic parents, embrace the
possibility of language to reflect truth, to “set her free,” to save her.
Not only did literature and storytelling connect her with her depressed, distracted mother
and often absent father, they serve as a control to the chaos in her childhood. For example, after
Lecia nearly dies from a man-of-war attack, young Mary “broke out the Encyclopedia Britannica
and read aloud to her about squids the length of battleships and massive shark attacks on
shipwrecked sailors during World War II” (The Liars’ 118). After her mother moves Karr and
her sister to Colorado, separates from her daddy, and starts “keeping company with a cowboy
from the stable, a fellow named Ray who had the small and peg-like teeth of a rabbit,” Mary
holes up in the local Christian Science Reading Room to read e. e. cummings and write poetry
(196). And after one of the most terrifying scenes in The Liars’ Club, when her mother draws a
pistol on her then-husband Hector while the girls are alternately begging for his life and running
to get assistance from their neighbors, Karr remembers Hector sitting in the parlor chair with
Lecia wedged in next to him, “a Nancy Drew mystery on her lap” (256). In some of the most
dramatic memories of her memoir, Karr focuses her memories and the readers’ attention to them
on a text. Literature is always present in ways her parents can never be.
Literature becomes Karr’s way to transcend experience. In the same way that her mother
subscribed to the New Yorker to be “exposed to the literary Ivy League, even in [her] little armpit
of the universe,” Karr believes literature is a means to save her from her current life by
connecting her to the world (Fortini 69). She explains, “There was nothing else to do in that
suckhole of a town…But reading is socially accepted disassociation. You flip a switch and
you’re not there anymore. It’s better than heroin. More effective and cheaper and legal” (60). Her
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personality as a reader, crafted from grade school when she memorized Frost and cummings and
dressed up in a sheet to recite Shakespeare, to the age of twelve when she memorized Eliot’s
“Prufrock,” positions her outside and beyond her small, conservative town (61). Her beliefs in
literature provide comfort, stability, community, and identity, the same qualities that she would
ultimately associate with her beliefs in religion.
A specialist in reading theory, J. A. Appleyard, draws connections between the
developmental trajectory in young adult readers, as moving from simple and familiar forms to
novel and challenging texts, and the changes that young adults go through in their religious lives
(31). He argues that reading engages with the same phenomena that are the territory of spiritual
growth: identity, relationships with others, what it means to love, the nature and limits of truth
and knowing, manners and morals, mortality, evil, death, what we hope for beyond our lives”
(31). Based on an interactional or transactional view of reading from theorists such as Wolfgang
Iser, Louise Rosenblatt, and Norman Holland, centered on the historically-situated encounter
between a reader and a text, Appleyard argues that the text is a “system of response-inviting
structures that the author has organized by reference to a repertory of social and literary codes
shared by author and reader” (33).
While the relationship between the author and reader will be further explored in Chapter
Four, I mention Appleyard’s work here as a bridge between Karr’s literary and religious beliefs,
particularly as connected to her identity as a reader. In the transactional model of reading, the
reader brings to bear on the text expectations derived from past literary and life experience; the
text then “feeds back” these expectations or challenges them. The reader, then, filters this
feedback through “characteristic defenses, imbues these data with fantasies, tests them against
his or her canons of value and belief, and transforms the event into a coherent experience.” Thus,
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the process of reading is a dialectic of reader/text/world, with the reader’s developing self at the
center of the process (33). This process explains how and why reading became so essential to
Karr, as a child working out her beliefs about the world around her. In a constant loop of
“feeding back,” Karr’s experiences are both filtered through and developed by not only the texts
she reads but the process of reading itself. Reading and believing are mutually productive,
identity-shaping activities that define how we understand selves, texts, and worlds.
Belief in Religion
While Mary Karr locates her conversion to Catholicism in 1996, she had started the
prayer practice that defined her recovery process a few years before, during the same period The
Liars’ Club was published. The Liars’ Club offers a vivid portrayal of Karr’s earliest beliefs
about religion and God, beliefs that ultimately change and are the subject of the next chapter of
this dissertation. In this chapter, however, I focus on what her childhood beliefs about religion
suggest about belief itself. Like her first beliefs about language, Karr’s relationship to religion is
a reflection of her parents’. She describes her religious training as consisting of “sporadic visits
to Christian Science Sunday School alternating with the exercises from a book Mother had on
yoga postures” (The Liars’ 43). When Karr suggests in the wake of Hurricane Carla that the
family pray “just in case,” she remembers her mother “lifted her middle finger to the ceiling and
said Oh, fuck that God” (85). Jesus, according to her mother is a “mewling dipshit” (105) and
according to her father, “a trick on poor people” (Fortini 81).
The poor people of Leechfield indeed seem to be “tricked,” as Karr directly associates
religion with the Leechfield Baptists, the same neighbors who instruct their children to avoid the
Karr’s house and whose doctrine is usually filtered through the character of Carol Sharp. Carol
has fundamentalist beliefs like: “God thought Leechfield Baptists somehow better Christians
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than folk over in Louisiana” (The Liars’ 105); “There are some mysteries in life the Lord doesn’t
want us to understand” (106); and “…how the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse would coming
riding down out of the clouds with their black caps behind them and how the burning pit would
open up in the earth for sinners” (85). Karr openly resists the dogmatic religion of her classmates
and their families, and, instead, associates their beliefs with a life very unlike her own. She
writes, “When Baptist girls standing next to me on the choir risers got all misty-eyed singing
about the purple mountains’ majesty, I would often elbow or jostle them out of spite” (106), and
also “I hated them…hated their broad heavy bottoms slung low in those stripy garden chairs. I
hated their church suppers, their lumpy tuna casseroles, their Jell-O molds with perfect cubes of
pear and peach hanging suspended” (267). Their world, closely prescribed by their religion, is
not only unappealing—but perhaps even more telling—unavailable to Karr.
We first meet Karr’s God on page eight of The Liars’ Club on the night the sheriff comes
to her house and “mother was adjudged more or less permanently Nervous” (7). Karr, age seven,
is anticipating where she’ll be sent overnight; as her habit at the time is to “bargain with God,”
she imagines she “started some haggling prayer about who might take us home” (8). She writes,
“I proposed to whatever God I worshiped”—a God she perceives as distant, controlling—or,
“large and invisible” (63). This God seems removed from the daily reality of Karr’s life,
although in times of trauma, such as the hurricane or the death of her grandmother, her thoughts
drift toward the divine, perhaps as much as anything to “hedge her bets.” Mostly, however, Karr
defines her beliefs in opposition to others. To Carol Sharp’s theological propositions, she replies,
“I was spiteful enough to tell her that I didn’t want to sign up with any god who sent tidal waves
crashing down on trailer parks” (85). In Karr’s memory, the other kids “still saw the world as
some playground smiled over by God” (105), a belief impossible for her to understand based on
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the world she actually occupied. When Carol tells her that God had made them from dirt, Karr
replies, “I wasn’t dirt, and I wasn’t God’s Barbie doll either. And why would God set Death
loose among us like some wind-up robot destroyer if he loved us so much” (106). Prompted by
the gruesome and prolonged death of her grandmother, whom she both despised and feared, Karr
“keenly felt the loss of…trust in the world’s order” (106). The world, whether governed by a
judgmental deity or her neglectful parents, is anything but ordered.
In a traumatic scene that further illustrates Karr’s view of God, her sister is stung by a
man-of-war while their parents are drinking at a local hotel bar. Karr runs to get her parents, who
perform a number of small ministrations to Lecia’s injury before rushing her to the closest
hospital. Desperate for her sister to live, Karr turns to prayer, and it is at this moment that we see
her beliefs about God clearly. She writes of Lecia, “I had wished her dead a thousand times, even
prayed for it, no less fiercely than I had prayed for grandma to die. Now God, who had done me
the kindness of killing Grandma, was taking payment for that kindness by killing Lecia too” (The
Liars’ 117). Although Karr is certainly suspicious about God’s presence in our lives or even
existence in the world, she is still driven to pray. In this scene, she suggests that while God might
be capable of taking and sparing lives, He is a fierce and exacting negotiator, unwilling to give
mercy without getting something in return. She continues, “I was a child—three feet tall, flat
broke, unemployed, barely literate, yet already accountable for two deaths” (117). Thus, not only
is God culpable for the tragedy of human death, so is the seven year-old Karr. While the Karr of
The Liars’ Club retains her disbelief in God, she frequently turns to prayer as a means of
reaching outside her troubled world to something potentially bigger and more powerful, even if
she simultaneously doubts the possibility of such an existence. Prayer, as an act of language, is
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her path to the divine. Even at the age of seven, Karr believes that language—of poetry and
prayer—holds the power to transcend.
A final scene that perhaps best illustrates the ways in which her beliefs in both literature
and God operate in tandem occurs in 1963 when Karr is eight. At this point in the narrative, her
family has moved to Colorado, her parents have divorced, and her mother has married Hector,
the bartender at the local cowboy “joint.” Charlie and Hector alternate between drunken benders
and extended road trips, leaving the sisters unattended or under the supervision of strangers. On
one such afternoon, Karr, home with a fever from school, is left in the care of a “grown man”
who is “allegedly” tasked with babysitting her (The Liars’ 239). In an excruciating nine-page
passage, Karr details the sexual assault she suffers under his care. In this scene, we see a clear
juxtaposition of her beliefs about literature and about God and their respective places in her life.
The scene opens with Karr “sitting in a shaft of sunlight on the Oriental rug in [her] room
reading Charlotte’s Web for the hundredth time” (240). Moving between the sad part of the
story, when Charlotte dies, and the end, when her three baby spiders decide to stay with Wilbur,
Karr remembers, “I cry a little, then cheer myself up” (241). Stirred by E. B. White’s famous tale
of the cycle of life, Karr realizes, “…people talking about the cycles of nature get to feeling
better; the way Baptists talking about the Lord’s Mysterious Plan feel better” (240). Used to
discussing literature with her mother (who had previously explained to Mary that Charlotte’s
actions made her “Noble, according to Mr. Camus”), Karr calls her sitter up to her room to share
her enthusiasm (240).
Karr writes, “When he stands next to me in that circle of sun, I tell him about it with my
whole heart. About Charlotte and the babies and Wilbur. My sitter nods all slow and serious. At
the end, he says how being special friends with somebody keeps you ever from being lonesome.
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And do I want to be his special friend” (The Liars’ 241). Karr, in her eight-year-old naiveté,
assumes this means her new “friend” wants to be part of her vampire club and begins to explain
the required initiations to join. Instead, she’s greeted by “the zipper of his chinos” and “inside
that zipper his pecker is making that bulge, the bad words for which zoom through my head—
Hard-on, Boner, Stiffie” (241). Slowly and with painstaking detail, Karr describes forced oral
sex to us. She recalls, “He reaches his big hand out to place it on my head, cupping my skull. It’s
like the gesture Jesus makes in my Bible picture, when they’ve written Suffer the little
children…in the caption” (244). The comparison between this man and Jesus ends there,
however; “But I won’t raise my eyes to see if this man is Jesus, because all the while he’s patting
my head, that pecker of his is staring right at me with its slitted eye” (240). Karr considers
running, but acknowledges the certain futility of such an attempt as, like all kids, she is “smaller
than, less than, weaker than” (240). Instead, in this moment of acute trauma, she turns her
thoughts to God and the (im)possibility of escape. This quote seems to encapsulate Karr’s
earliest beliefs about God and His ability to intervene in our lives:
I wonder why somebody doesn’t appear in the doorway to lift me out of range of
that big, one-eyed dick staring me down. If God made the world…then why
doesn’t He send some Christian soldier rushing in with a sword unclanging from
its scabbard to stab this man, or lop this pecker off at the root? And I know Carol
Sharp would say this right here is God’s plan for me. Or it’s punishment for some
badness I did…. (245)
Of course, God doesn’t send anyone to rescue Karr, not a Christian soldier, not her
inattentive mother. Instead, Karr suffers the sexual abuse that will perhaps eventually contribute
to her depression and alcoholism and qualify her religious beliefs for years to come. This scene
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opens with the most detailed description of literature in the memoir; we see Karr engaging
Charlotte’s Web as a reader who believes that stories—and her beliefs about stories—matter.
However, Karr’s enthusiasm is met not with her mother’s rare attention, but with the sexual
advances of her caretaker. This narrative moment directly challenges and then actually perverts
her beliefs about the social interaction literature affords. No longer does literature have the
singular power to garner her mother’s approval; it also holds the potential to hurt her. When Karr
reaches out to convert a new believer, she is betrayed. Her realizations about literature—as
something that people talk about to feel better (like the Baptists talking about God’s “plan”)—
immediately merge into her beliefs about God.
Although it will be thirty-five years before the Karr of The Liars’ Club will convert to
Catholicism, her belief in literature and language anticipates her belief in religion. In many ways,
the content of her beliefs is less important than her belief itself, her belief in the power of
language—of poetry, of prayer—to carry her beyond her current circumstances. Like Burke’s
theory of logology or Lewis’s “secular sacred,” words about God can be read as words about
words; in this move, Karr’s beliefs resist the dialectic of secular/sacred and thus expands our
concept of belief beyond a practice limited to spiritual concerns. One example of her troubling
the secular/sacred dichotomy is in her analogy of poetry as “Eucharistic,” a term traditionally
associated with the sacrament of communion in the Catholic Church.8 She explains, “In

In her essay “How to Read ‘The Waste Land’ So It Alters Your Soul” published as the
introduction to the newest Modern Library edition, Karr ends with this paragraph that beautifully
illustrates this analogy. She writes, “In this way, [“The Waste Land”] can work like the miracle
of communion—you take the Eucharist of the writer’s words into the rough meat of your body in
order to be transformed by someone else’s mysterious passion. It brings you into a community of
like sufferers…There’s healing in that…Reading the poem gives me the conviction to live my
life, not with the despair and angst rendered, but with the alertness the poem demands. People
spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in therapy for the same sense of presence in one’s life,
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memorizing the poems I loved, I ‘ate’ them in a way. I breathed as the poet breathed to recite the
words: someone else’s suffering enters your body to transform you…” (“Facing” 133); and
continues in an interview for Image journal: “That’s what I mean by eucharistic: somebody
else’s passion, suffering, comes into your body and changes you” (B. O’Donnell). Although she
distinguishes poetry from religious liturgy or prayer, “What was different from liturgy was that it
wasn’t sacred. It wasn’t sanctified by the Holy Spirit. It wasn’t Jesus” (B. O’Donnell), the
language of each is capable of the same effects. While it isn’t until many years later, after her
conversion, that Karr will position her beliefs about literature and God in direct dialogue with
each other, in her earliest autobiographical writing the relationship between the two beliefs are
revelatory. I argue that, resembling the modern authors she studies and teaches, these beliefs are
neither sacred or secular, spiritual or natural, religious or literary, but capable of existing in the
spaces in between.
While The Liars’ Club documents Karr’s childhood decades before her conversion, the
memoir is rich with religious words and images that, when viewed logologically, infuse the
narrative with a spirituality quite different from the conservative and fundamental beliefs of the
other Leechfield residents. When opening the door to her mother’s studio, the young Karr felt
like a “thief in church” (The Liars’ 59); after her family nearly escapes the hurricane, can
remembers, “I felt no grace” (93); she describes her grandfather as “seemingly older than Jesus”
(93); and, after a particularly irreverent story told by her father to his friends, Karr notices “they
take this death as gospel” (95). These examples join many others to signify that religious
language, wielded by a “nonbeliever,” still carries with it “supernatural” meaning—despite the

the same fusion of inner self and outer experience. The mere exercise of attention—eyes wide,
ears pricked, heart open—is not a bad way to move through the world.”
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belief system of Karr or her reader. Burke’s logology is used as a method of studying how
“words about God” essentially are “words about words”—as such, words imbued with religious
meaning and significance can still dwell in the “supernatural” whether or not we believe “the
entity named ‘God’ exists” (2). For Karr, and for her reader, words such as “church,” “grace,”
and “gospel” that are borrowed from a religious tradition, resonate with spiritual meaning even
though she (or, perhaps her reader) doesn’t yet “believe” in God. When situated within a secular
context and analogically connected to objects that aren’t immediately religious, such as a “thief,”
a “grandfather,” or “death,” the spiritual words are “aestheticized” (secularized) while still
retaining their sacred associations.
I’m interested not only in the logological nature of words about the religious and the
literary but in our beliefs about them. In Mary Karr’s first memoir, her beliefs about both are
simultaneously developing and overlapping. Sometimes nebulous and often contradictory, these
beliefs—about literature and about God—are shaped in reaction to her childhood experiences
and will ultimately lead to a conversion that surprised her as much as her friends and readers.
Perhaps because Karr is so adept at moving her beliefs between secular and sacred spaces and
back again, her stories speak to readers who are religious and to those who are not. Indeed, one
of the most compelling elements of Karr’s stories is the way she values belief in her life—in our
lives—whether we believe in poetry, prayer, or a “Creator/Rain God/Fertility Queen” (“Facing
Altars” 128).
The Old and the New
Here, I’d like to return to James Wood’s thesis of the blurring between the “religious”
and “literary” as the result of ways we began to think about the role of truth in narrative,
particularly the relationship between fiction and the “Gospel.” While Wood’s emphasis is on
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modern fiction, I argue his work can be productive to a consideration of all narrative, including
autobiography.
Wood reflects on the connection between narrative and “reality," asking if it was “not just
science but perhaps the novel itself which helped to kill Jesus’s divinity, when it gave us
a new sense of the real, a new sense of how the real disposes itself in a narrative—and
then in turn a new skepticism toward the real as we encounter it in narrative” (xvi). The
movement between life and narrative, like Burke’s logology, carries meaning back and
forth, infusing both with both belief and doubt. Wood explains:
There is something about narrative that puts the world in doubt. Narrative
corrugates belief, puts bends and twists in it. I don’t mean that it relativizes belief,
only that it makes belief more difficult. A story is a formal filibuster; it slows
down belief until belief falls asleep and begins to dream its opposite, its negative.
(xvi)
Karr’s childhood, as represented in The Liars’ Club, offers readers a compelling consideration
and complication of belief and/in narrative.
Wood’s observations of the changed relationship between truth, narrative, and fiction as
the result of the modern reinterpretation of the Bible parallels the work of theologian Hans Frei
who devoted his life to the study of 18th and 19th century methods of interpreting narrative in
Scripture and who gradually grew convinced of the improbability and inaccuracy of the entire
modern Christian theology. For centuries before the modern era, Christian theologians read the
Bible as a realistic narrative, as containing an overarching story of the world beginning with
creation and ending with the Last Judgment. This type of reading facilitated a “figural” or
typological approach where events in the stories and in the world “prefigured” or reflected the
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larger narrative. This interpretation encouraged Christians to locate their own personal
experiences within the Biblical story. However, around the 18th century, readers began to reverse
this process; as their daily experiences began to define for them what was “real,” they attempted
to understand the meaning of the Bible by locating it within their world (Placher). Frei argues
that both approaches fundamentally distort the meaning of the text as they lose sight of the
function of Biblical stories as realistic narratives. Instead, a theology that respects the meaning of
Biblical narrative must start by simply retelling the stories, without an attempt at apologetics and
without any attempt to begin with generalizations based on our own experiences. William C.
Placher explains:
The stories portray a person—a God who acts in the history of Israel and engages
in self-revelation in Jesus of Nazareth. They help us learn about that person in the
way that a great novelist describes a character or that a telling anecdote captures
someone's personality. They provide insights that we lose if we try to summarize
the narrative in a nonnarrative form. No abstract account of God's faithfulness
adequately summarizes Exodus. The Gospels surpass any abstract account of
God's love.
Frei suggests that the meaning of Biblical text comes from an “internal literary world pictured in
its stories not from the external historical world referred to by these stories” (Wallace 91).
Frei recognizes, however, that the Bible isn’t simply a realistic novel, offering particular
challenges to interpreters attending to its unique characteristics. Instead, he echoes the
perspective of Erich Auerbach, a literary critic he greatly admires, in a description of Biblical
narrative as “Far from seeking…merely to make us forget our own reality for a few hours, it
seeks to overcome our reality: we are to fit our own life into its world, feel ourselves to be
80

elements in its structure of universal history” (Mimesis 14-15). Whether readers locate narrative
before or as a result of their experiences, theorists such as Frei and Auerbach agree that Biblical
narrative has structured the way we read not only the Bible, but stories in general. This
perspective views narrative as offering something greater than the “socially acceptable
disassociation” that reading provides Karr. A model of reading based on Biblical narrative, rather
than disassociating us from reality, seeks to actually overcome it by revising and repositioning
our experiences to fit within a larger, universal story.
While a thorough comparison of various interpretative approaches to the Bible and
narrative are far outside of the scope of this dissertation, I think a brief reconsideration of
typological hermeneutics is relevant to my argument that belief—as separate from specific
content—is capable of moving between the sacred and secular, between the religious and the
literary. I say “re”-consideration because typology as a method of interpreting Scripture is less
applicable to contemporary liberal and postmodern theologies that don’t assume a causal
connection between the Old and New Testaments and, instead, consider Scripture as the account
of disparate religious experiences rather than a unified historical record or “grand narrative”
(“Biblical Typology”). Typology, then, is a method of Biblical interpretation in which an
element (person, story, symbol, or event) found in the Old Testament is understood to
“prefigure” one found in the New Testament. The initial element is called the “type” and the
subsequent one the “antitype”; often the type is messianic and frequently associated with
salvation. A typological hermeneutic is contingent on a fundamental theological unity between
the testaments, the Old “shadows” the New, where what is interpreted in the Old is not foreign,
obscure, or hidden but arises “naturally” out of the text due to the relationship between the two
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(“Biblical Typology”). The most recognizable typological relationship is revealed in the type of
Adam in the Old Testament as prefiguring Christ (antitype) in the New Testament.
According to Lynne Walhout Hinjosa, such a hermeneutic has “epistemological,
ontological, and ethical ramifications for the reading self: the text simultaneously identifies,
reforms, and instructs the self who is reading” (642). As Frei noted, a typological Bible reading
encourages readers to see their selves and stories as participating in a larger historical narrative;
thus, typology is not only a way of relating Hebrew (Old Testament) to Christian (New
Testament) history, but it is also a way of reading one’s own life as following a narrative pattern
revealed in the Bible—moving from Old Testament “type” to New Testament “antitype”—and in
this new self, constantly moving toward the afterlife (646). Therefore, as we read the Biblical
narrative, we can recognize a pattern in which types point to our “future perfected by spiritual
fulfillment in Jesus who literally enters history and transforms it” (645). The act of reading is
obviously central to typological hermeneutics. Hinjosa explains, “Both the text and the reader’s
life contain prefigurative literal and spiritual meaning, and these connections are elucidated
through the experience of reading” (646). Applying a typological hermeneutic to
autobiographical narrative can yield a fascinating dimension to what and how we believe about
literature and about religion and about the selves of both.
Hinjosa uses the example of Augustine’s Confessions to illustrate how autobiographers
can apply types to “read the self” or place the self within a narrative. One of the earliest
practitioners of typology, Augustine explains, “Wherefore, in the Old Testament there is a
veiling of the New, and in the New Testament there is a revealing of the Old" (Salmond 4.8) and
uses this hermeneutic to read his own life. According to Hinjosa, Augustine narrates and
interprets his life according to Biblical types, and while a more thorough discussion of
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Augustine’s contribution to the field of autobiography and rhetorical studies will occur in the
next chapter, a brief mention of his Confessions is useful here. In the Confessions, Augustine
details his sinful youth, characterized by a seemingly unyielding resistance to God and religion
that ultimately results in one of history’s most notable conversion stories. One of the infamous
tales he recounts in Book Two describes a scene where he needlessly steals pears from a
neighbor’s tree and then mercilessly chides himself for his crime, ultimately connecting his
behavior to a dark and malevolent sinful nature originating from Adam. This episode (anti-type),
read typologically, reminds the reader of the Biblical account of Adam and Eve’s fall (as type).
In this move, Augustine not only classifies himself as a type within the Confessions, but also
prefigures the subsequent narrative in which his conversion to Christ will occur (Hinjosa 646).
Typological readings, such as Augustine’s, employ a mode of interpretation that is
simultaneously literal and spiritual, relying on the assumption that “real” historical events hold
spiritual significance as they prefigure future historical events that fulfill more completely
spiritual realities (Hinjosa 647). In typology, both interpretations—literal (historical) and
allegorical—are real; and spiritual reality does not detract from literal reality. According to
Hinjosa, the word “spiritual” is used here instead of “allegorical” in order to highlight the
difference between the terms. Typology “retains with equal emphasis both the reality of the
literal-historical and the reality of the spiritual truths that the literal-historical prefigures” (648).
Allegory tends to emphasize the abstract concepts to which a fictional or “not real” symbolic
narrative points. Frei, in his study of the Reformers (Luther, Calvin, and the English Puritans),
discovered that while a broad disparity exists in their various theologies, they mostly agreed that
the Bible should be interpreted typologically. Thus, the Biblical narrative is not only historically
true—literally—but also spiritually prefigurative, with the Old Testament prefiguring the New,
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revealing Christ as the center of the narrative. Hinjosa explains, “God creates history,
participates in history, uses real things to signify other real things in time, and provides spiritual
instruction at the literal level of the text. To leave behind the literal level would be to deny this
universal historical narrative and to deny one’s own position as a reader within that narrative”
(650).
Applied to Augustine’s Confessions, then, the individual self and its particular story are
constantly sacrificed not only to God but also to the larger (Biblical) narrative. “The individual
life is never the final end or reason for interpreting scripture, and indeed, reading scripture
should teach one that the self’s identity exists beyond one’s own story” (654). From a typological
perspective, it is the future that exists beyond our stories, and in this future, we can be saved.
Hinjosa argues that the purpose of reading for Augustine, then, is not to gain certain knowledge
of his spiritual status, but rather to become one with the text, both literally and spiritually. In the
Confessions, Augustine shows how the literal—the life one lives/the story one reads—is always
situated within universal, spiritual meanings that give it ultimate meaning (656). For Augustine,
conversion is the experience that carries us out of our individual stories; once we are converted,
we are no longer merely readers of narrative but real people within that narrative. We have
literally become the “living Word” or divine Logos.
While I certainly recognize, like Frei, the theological limitations of a typological
hermeneutic, particularly the assumptions such interpretation holds about the correlation between
truth, narrative, and experience, I offer it here as a provocative approach to understanding how
our beliefs about religion and literature have developed historically, culturally, personally, and
ultimately mutually. In this chapter, I have focused on how these beliefs—about religion, about
literature, about language—shaped many of Mary Karr’s childhood experiences. I would like to
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conclude with some suggestions of how such a reading might enhance our understanding of
Karr’s beliefs, particularly as they are both bound and circulated by narrative.
The textual theory of Paul Ricoeur is relevant to a typological understanding of Karr’s
autobiographical narrative. As Ricoeur notes, the texts that we have not just read, but understood
and loved, have taken our experiences in the world and placed them within a narrative
framework. In this way, literature “opens up the world” for us by not only solidifying who we
are but imagining who we might become. Thus, what we “understand first in a discourse is not
another person,” but a new person, “the outline of a new being-in-the-world” (“The Model” 202).
Typological readings, such as Augustine’s, are meant to foster self-knowledge as the reader
places herself into the narrative while reading. However, just as the Biblical narrative moves
from Old Testament to New, typology reveals a new “true self” constantly moving toward the
afterlife. Thus, typological reader not only acquires self-knowledge, she also receives a new life,
transformed from “false” to “true” (Hinjosa 646). David Jeffrey explains: “it is less the
explication of texts that matters than the Text itself; the authentic reader is one in whom that text
has entered to become a living Presence” (51).
Of course, a typological hermeneutic is completely reliant on narrative or texts bound by
time and space. Typology begins with the “Old” and moves to the “New,” a chronological
forward looking movement that continually directs our focus to the future while simultaneously
looking backward for signs (people, events, places, things) that illuminate that future. However,
both movements, forward and backward, are linear and temporal, grounded in narrative structure.
As Augustine models, typology can yield stimulating readings of autobiographical narrative, as
texts specifically concerned with understanding a self in the world, and as texts that require
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writers to look to the past in order to make sense of the future. Consequently, when reading The
Liars’ Club typologically, some interesting observations come to light.
Karr published The Liars’ Club in 1995, at age 40. Her memoir focuses on her childhood,
the bulk of which details her life between the ages of seven and nine. (Part Three, the last two
chapters of the book, takes place in 1980, “seventeen years later.”) Autobiography, of course,
requires its authors to rely on the past, primarily through memory as the source of narrative, and
in a sense looking to the “Old” for hints to where they belong in the “New.” Karr has commented
extensively on the challenges of recreating her distant past and has been frequently recognized
for her success in doing so. She writes, “…a single image can split open the hard seed of the
past, and soon memory pours forth from every direction, sprouting its vines and flowers up
around you till the old garden’s taken shape in all its fragrant glory. Almost unbelievable how
much can rush forward to fill an absolute blankness” (The Art 2). One of Karr’s notable qualities
as an autobiographer is her ability to recreate her experiences in detail and language that feels
believable to the reader. Another, is her ability to make sense of these experiences in the context
of the rest of her life, to situate the “old” or past self within the narrative of the “new.” Scholar
Paul John Eakin explains of autobiography’s identity work: “the memory work involved when
we look back on our pasts is driven not only by our present circumstances but also by our plans
for the future” (Living 151). 9 The “self” of The Liars’ Club, is both bound to her historical past
while simultaneously conceived by the Karr of the future.

9

Eakin explains that seeing memories as neurological events helps to answer the question of why
we believe in “autobiography’s retrospective illusion, the ‘you-are-there’ narratives…that mask
the autobiographical act unfolding in the present” (Living 157). First, it is because we are
“steadily moving away from the past into the future, and we want to bridge that gap.” Also, he
argues, “…the present it not a story yet. We can know it only indirectly, and we are conditioned
socially…and neurologically…to absorb our journey across time in narrative terms” (157).
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While the publication of The Liars’ Club predates Karr’s “official” conversion by a year,
she is engaged in the recovery process, and the daily prayer it requires, during the writing of the
memoir. While her “new” (converted) self is not yet revealed, perhaps the construction of her
childhood persona (“old”) is cast in the shadow of what is to come. In The Liars’ Club, Karr uses
present (or future, to her childhood self) literary references to recast previous experiences
through a new lens. In this move, the shadow of the “new” is cast over the “old,” revealing a
reinterpretation of her past self. In one scene when Charlie gives Mary one of the many
spankings encouraged by her dying grandmother, Karr remembers, “In school when I stumbled
on the famous Yeats poem about things falling apart, it was the spin of those spankings I thought
back to” (The Liars’ 72). After her grandmother’s death, Karr imagines her mother driving the
body across the Texas desert. Karr’s writes, “I guess it wasn’t till I read William Faulkner’s As I
Lay Dying, where the kids are dragging their dead mother across Mississippi…that I began to
figure that some ambulance has probably carted the body back” (102). And, in another
memorable scene when Charlie burns all of the family’s possessions in the front yard, Karr
writes, “Epicetus has a great line about the division between body and soul—‘Thou are a little
spirit bearing up a corpse.’ When I read that line years later, I automatically pictured those
dresses emptied of their occupants and sailing into the fire in graceful arcs” (152). These scenes
mark rare moments in the text when the present Karr explicitly uses her “future” self to
understand her “old” self. Tellingly, literature is the vehicle by which she both accesses and
understands her childhood identity.
Another observation revealed in reading Karr’s memoirs typologically involves the
connections between them, specifically between her first book The Liars’ Club as “Old” and her
third Lit as “New,” in the same way that Biblical narrative is read as the Old Testament
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prefiguring the New Testament. Read this way, the Karr of The Liars’ Club, and all of her
formative experiences, including her emerging beliefs about literature and about God, serve as
the original “type” and prefigure her new self, post-conversion, that Lit portrays as “anti-type.”
As I’ve previously mentioned, her position as pre- or post-converted is relevant here: while
writing The Liars’ Club, she was beginning her recovery process, which included a daily prayer
regimen. And while Lit details her resistance to this practice, as I will note in the following
chapter, she is more “open” to spiritual concerns than at previous points in her life. When Karr
writes Lit, over a period of years beginning around 2005, she is already ten years into her “new”
life as a converted Catholic. Thus, the writer of both memoirs stands in different relationships to
her spirituality. Typology involves reading the Old Testament as prefigurative to the New;
Adam, then, is a type that prefigures the antitype Christ. The latter becomes the “perfect”
fulfillment of what was previously imperfect. Just as we can read the Biblical narrative to
determine a pattern in which types point to their future perfect selves, spiritually fulfilled, so can
we read the autobiographical narratives of Mary Karr. The childhood Karr, like Augustine, is a
pre-figuration of her future self, and, as such, is in need of the salvation a “new self” offers.
Reading Karr’s experience typologically, as following a narrative pattern revealed in the Bible,
provides another understanding of how her earlier experiences and beliefs predict her eventual
transformation—her “true” self that is constantly moving forward and toward the afterlife.
Reading The Liars’ Club in isolation, and not as the first in a trilogy of memoirs as Karr
always imagined she’d write (W. Smith 53), offers plenty of rich context in which to consider
her early religious and literary beliefs. However, to read the memoir as a beginning, as the “Old,”
wherein her identity, experiences, and beliefs represent a “type” and then to follow her life’s
trajectory through Lit, as the “New” and antitype, reveals “new” possibilities. As such, Karr’s
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earliest beliefs in literature and in its potential to lift her out of her environment prefigures her
later beliefs in religion—hinted at in The Liars’ Club but fully explored in Lit—as able to realize
“from the Almighty” an “experience of joy…come in middle age on the rent and tattered wings
of disbelief” (“Facing Altars” 135). Karr explains, “Having devoted the first half of my life to the
dark, I feel obliged to revere any pinpoint of light now...” (136). According to the logic of
typology, the “new” Karr, like Augustine, is no longer simply a reader of her narrative, but a
“real” person within the Biblical narrative, one who has become the “living Word”—a move that
extends beyond the individual life and reading for self-identification into a wider, literal
interpretation of the self as part of the “living Word” which seeks to imitate Christ, indeed, to be
Christ, as the divine Logos.
As I’ve noted, the act of reading is essential to self-identification, self-transformation,
and ultimately salvation. Indeed, in the moments leading up to Augustine’s final conversion,
while “weeping in the bitter agony” of his heart, he heard a child’s voice from a nearby house
saying Tolle lege, tolle lege—“Take up and read. Take up and read” (Confessions, Book IIX,
XII: 29). Augustine interprets this mysterious command as a spiritual sign; he opens his
Scripture randomly and reads the passage before him from Matthew 19:21. Augustine notes that
this passage “converted” St. Antony. Thus, he’s moved to “return to the place where Alypius was
sitting” where he had put down the “Apostle’s book.” He “snatched it up, opened it and in
silence read the passage upon which (his) eyes first fell,” Romans 13:13-14. After reading the
texts that he directly associates with his own experience, he writes, “I had no wish to read
further, and no need. For in that instant, with the very ending of the sentence, it was as though a
light of utter confidence shone in all my heart, and all the darkness of uncertainty vanished
away” (Confessions, Book IIX, XII: 29). After eight long chapters of struggling against this
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moment, he finally “takes up and reads”—and the result, his conversion, is a significant moment
in both literary and religious history. In similar ways, the act of reading, in many ways separate
from the content of specific literary texts, paves or “prefigures” Karr’s path to religion. The
reverence she reserves for the literature so prevalent in her mother’s world can only be described
as sacred. When she reads, she is not the child of neglect, stranded in a dead-end town and
surrounded by a community that neither supports nor understands her. Instead, through her
poems and stories, she is able to transcend the misery of her early years and the isolation that
characterized her home life into communion with readers and writers outside and beyond her
experience.
Certainly, a typological hermeneutic can threaten, as Frei noted, to isolate experiences
from the Biblical narrative and from our lives, and thus imbue both with spiritual meaning
beyond their functions within a story. When this happens, we are encouraged as Auerbach
observes, to “fit” our lives within the Biblical narrative, to “feel ourselves to be elements in its
structure of universal history.” This interpretation of lives, as individual selves operating within a
grand, divine narrative, can be particularly devastating when read from various political and
social perspectives. That is not what I’m advocating in this application of typology to Karr’s
work. I offer it instead to argue that secular typological readings, as separate from any particular
doctrinal orientation, indeed distinct from religion at all, can be a provocative approach to
thinking about autobiographical narrative as texts rooted in the reading of lives and the
transformation of selves—from Old to New. Like Burke’s logology, typology can be a secular
hermeneutic, one that also considers the relationship between words and The Word or between
narrative and the Biblical narrative. When we read typologically, we “fit” our story, or move it,
to a new position within a larger whole. Whether that bigger narrative is secular or sacred—
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whether or not we are—we can see new meanings when our stories travel to distant places and
when they return. The spiritual significance given our narratives when situated within the
Biblical model, just like the supernatural meaning attached to words when they are pulled from
their secular past into a sacred context, offers the “dimension added” that Flannery O’Connor
describes.
Karr notes, “Writing spiritual stuff for a secular audience is like doing card tricks on the
radio” (Fortini 76). However, she is clearly able to do so as she notes the positive reaction to her
third memoir, Lit, which details her burgeoning spiritual beliefs: “I think what surprised me the
most were friends of mine who were atheists who really liked how I wrote about my faith, or
could understand. My friend Richard Ford—who, when I first got baptized, sent me a postcard
saying, ‘Not you on the pope's team! Say it ain't so!’—wrote me a fan letter about it, and it was
very gratifying to me (Jansen 92). Although The Liars’ Club is generally not considered a
“spiritual autobiography,” it certainly reveals a narrative that is rich with beliefs that speak to
readers in powerful ways because these beliefs are invested in language and in the practices of
reading and writing. Poetry, according to Karr, is meant to move us. While one meaning of the
verb “move” is “to affect with emotion,” as Karr is certainly referring to in this case, its AngloFrench and Latin etymological history includes “to introduce,” “to set in motion,” or “to prompt
or impel toward some action” (“Move”). Thus, when language moves us, we are set in motion
toward something. As humans bound by time, that something is generally before us, as a point in
our narrative future, as something beyond who and where we are now. Religion moves Karr,
too—but that movement she generally describes as upward rather than forward; she prays to be
“lifted” from her life, and she explains she was “snatched out” of the fire. However, regardless of
the trajectory of her experience, literature and religion are capable of taking Karr somewhere she
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hasn’t been before—in her words, “That’s why I pray and poetize: to be able to see my brothers
and sisters despite my own (often petty) agonies, to partake of the majesty that’s every Judas’s
birthright” (“Facing Altars” 136).
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CHAPTER III
(RE)TURNING TO HER SAME SELF: MARY KARR’S CONVERSION
AND FOUCAULT’S ASKESIS

It was in my inmost heart, where I had grown angry with myself, where I had been stung with
remorse, where I had slain my old self and offered it in sacrifice.
—St. Augustine of Hippo
I believe in God. But even if you don’t, you can believe in a self, the person who is
innately who you are. Once you fully become that person then everything you do will be blessed.
—Mary Karr
Checking into the hospital, I surrendered to a sobbing that I’d always held back, thinking
if I started in on it it would never, ever, ever stop. Then it stops after a week or two, as if a
lifetime’s portion of grief has boiled out of me. The ferocious internal motion I’ve been praying
would end finally—almost in a nanosecond—stops. It’s a pivot point around which my entire
future will ultimately swivel. That first night, kneeling before the toilet, I let go, as they say. Or
call it the moment my innately serotonin-challenged brain reached level X.
—Mary Karr

After a lifetime of struggling with neglect, abuse, and addiction, this poignant and longcoming moment marks Mary Karr’s conversion to Catholicism as narrated in her third memoir,
Lit. While reflecting only a few brief minutes in a recovery process that ultimately spanned
years, this particular moment forever defines Karr’s life and situates her text within the
historically rich genre of conversion narrative, or “spiritual autobiography.” Since St.
Augustine’s famous moment in the garden—when, after years of resisting the God and religion
of his mother and various mentors, he experiences a profound and life-altering transformation—
autobiography has been shaped by conversion both as a trope for identities and as a structure for
narratives. Susan Jacoby defines conversion as “any shift of belief that significantly alters the
course of a life” (xxii). Conversion, then, isn’t limited to religious experiences. Instead,
conversion as a trope has been used to mark moments of change in narratives when writers have
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experienced some kind of epiphanic awareness that has led to new beliefs whether sacred or
secular.
While the genre of conversion narrative has been theorized extensively from a number of
disciplines including literary studies, religious studies, sociology, and cognitive psychology, the
phenomenon continues to raise provocative questions for the field of life writing, whose very
origins are often traced to one of the most famous conversion narratives in history—Augustine’s
Confessions. Written between 397 – 400 C.E, the Confessions of St. Augustine of Hippo, the
autobiographical story of a sinful youth ultimately converted to Christianity, is a seminal text
occupying a privileged historical position as the origin of Western self-representation (Riley 24).
One of the first narratives of the self through time, the Confessions continues to challenge and
inspire religious and secular readers alike. Of recurring interest to scholars of life writing is
Augustine’s representation of the converted identity, a “bipartite notion of the self or, rather, the
back-to-back representation of two distinct, conflicting selves that are cleaved into separate
entities by the conversional moment” (25). Occurring in Book 8, the conversion splits the
narrative into the autobiographical focus of the first part of the text and the metaphysical
consideration of memory, temporality, language, and biblical exegesis found in the remaining
chapters. The moment that serves to “cleave” the narrative is Augustine’s conversion. Thus,
according to the logic of the Confessions, Augustine’s conversion requires more than a
characteristic Christian negation of self; it also requires an abandonment of narrative. A rich
paradox occurs here; at the moment Augustine recognizes, for the first time, the “truth of the
self,” he must deny his autonomy by demonstrating, through the transformation of conversion
that this self can be realized only in God (25). Patrick Riley observes, “Conversion enacts a
dynamic in which an autobiographical narrative is generated only to be silenced, but that
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superseded narrative remains to remind us that autobiography is something Augustine will
finally devalue; it is a discourse through which he has to pass in order to arrive at God” (25).
Augustinian scholar James O’Donnell suggests it is this binding of conversion to self-narrative
that inspires many to consider the Confessions an autobiographical urtext (83). Yet, O’Donnell’s
biography of Augustine, published in 2006, challenges our reading of Confessions as
autobiography only. In his newest study, O’Donnell argues that the Confessions is less a story
about Augustine and more a story about his God. Thus, reading the text autobiographically
without reading it theologically is to understand the book only partially (63). According to
O’Donnell, “the fault line that separates the Confessions-about-god and the Confessions-aboutAugustine runs right through the most vividly remembered scene of the book, the one in the
garden in Milan…” (64)—or, Augustine’s conversion. Although the conversion is at the heart of
the text, serving as the climax to Augustine’s life story, O’Donnell suggests that to his story, the
autobiographical is secondary to the rhetorical. The Confessions, then, is “a work of brilliant
artifice and power, a virtuoso act of self-invention and self-justification” (Frediksen 90).
Regardless of the lens through which we choose to read the stories of our lives, our earliest
examples of autobiography demonstrate, and St. Augustine’s Confessions exemplifies, that selfnarratives evolve from and revolve around moments of fundamental change.
Many scholars argue the impossibility of thinking about autobiography without a
consideration of conversion as an almost unavoidable construct in life writing. In an essay titled
“Conversion and the Language of Autobiography,” Geoffrey Galt Harpham suggests that
conversion serves as a device for defining autobiography itself. According to Harpham, “One is
converted when one discovers that life can be made to conform to certain culturally validated
narrative forms; spiritual conversion might simply be a strong form of reading” (5). This
95

approach suggests that what motivates a conversion is the discovery that there is a discourse
through which to tell a story. For Harpham, conversion isn’t as much the language that an
autobiographer uses to write a life story as the “inevitable moment that occurs when one sees
one’s life as a text” (5). Not only is conversion a psychological phenomenon, Harpham argues
that it is equally (or perhaps more so) a linguistic or rhetorical one. So, in effect, we are
converted when we are able to think about our lives as stories.
Another theorist interested in how conversion shapes our life stories is Peter Dorsey, who
describes the purpose of conversion narratives as capturing the relationship between self and
larger social and ideological systems. This theory is one that dominates the field today as most of
the more recent work on conversion is interested in where the “self” is situated in this process of
becoming. According to Dorsey, one of the most distinguishing characteristics of the genre is the
communal and sociological aspect of it (39). In fact, many times the act of conversion is actually
triggered by hearing other stories within the community, an occurrence that motivates the
communal telling of these narratives or “testimonies.” And while a conversion signifies a
movement of the individual into a larger collective of “believers”—or other converts—at the
same time it could mark a removal from mainstream cultures, an estrangement of sorts. This
impulse is motivated by believers to not be “of this world”—a space that is viewed as not able to
accommodate the ostensibly contradictory priorities of those who do and don’t believe. Tensions
such as this, the seeming incompatibilities between the effects of our beliefs and the interests of
our selves, are the topic of this chapter. While an interdisciplinary examination of prominent
conversion theories could certainly yield a broad context for my project, such work is outside the
scope of my dissertation. Instead, after a brief historical look at the development of conversion
narratives in the Western autobiographical tradition, I narrow my focus to Michel Foucault’s
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technologies of the self in order to compare two dichotomous models of conversion—a
traditional Christian model with a Hellenistic-Roman model—that have historically been
diametrically opposed. In his analysis, Foucault problematizes both models with a discussion of
“truth” and its relationship to subjectivity, conversations that are essential to a contemporary
study of autobiography. Using Mary Karr’s conversion as represented in Lit, I analyze how these
models offer differing approaches to thinking about autobiography and argue that Foucault’s
definition of conversion—as a method of self-care—expands our traditional conceptualization of
conversion beyond religious practice.
The Converted Self of Autobiography
Conversion, as a literary construct, provides the text a point on which to change
directions, specifically as it operates in the story of a life. Patrick Riley explains, “The logic of
conversion, as it creates a reference point for the literary construction of identity, is one of the
most compelling rhetorical and psychological structures available to the autobiographer trying to
understand and communicate the shape of his or her life” (2). Riley suggests we imagine
conversion as a fulcrum which suggests not only a prop or anchor, but also a center of motion, “a
pivot on which…the momentum of a life shifts, a turning point, a knife-edge bisecting an
identity and its story” (6). In the opening paragraph describing her own conversion, Karr
identifies this moment as “a pivot point around which my entire future will ultimately swivel”
(Lit 281). This moment joins other notable turning points in Lit to serve as a “knife-edge,”
bisecting her identity into “selves” and her story into “befores” and “afters.”
However, before we move to Karr’s story, a brief historical consideration of the
relationship of conversion narratives to identity construction is important. While St. Augustine
(397 CE), and St. Paul hundreds of years before him, are often credited with authoring the first
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conversion narratives, the Western version of the genre we recognize today developed as a
method of constituting self, experience, and community for early American evangelicals.
Following the classical Protestant theology of Martin Luther, John Calvin, and the Reformers,
evangelicalism emphasized a personal and affective experience over sacramental activity as the
key to Christian life (Payne 7). At the heart of this theology was the requirement that individuals
obtain a personal experience of divine forgiveness and salvation, an experience that evangelicals
recognized was an “act of language” or a way of saying something meaningful about themselves.
According to Rodger Payne, conversion thus emerged as a “discursive object,” functioning as a
discourse that eventually shaped the modern consciousness (2). Using Foucault’s understanding
of discourse as not only as a way of speaking (or writing) meaningfully, but as offering an
explanatory model of perceived reality, Payne argues that conversion discourse became a basis
for analyzing and explaining the human condition, and thus establishing itself as “truth” (5). This
discourse developed into an essential means of confronting the particular cultural challenges
facing Protestants in the eighteenth century and beyond. Payne explains:
Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, changes in the theoretical and practical
structures of economic, scientific, technological, and political life transformed Western
culture, creating a correlative sense of confusion and disorder. Faced with these
numerous transformations that delineated the rise of “modernity,” many Protestants in
Europe and America reconceived traditional religious and ecclesiastical forms as a means
of interpreting and making sense of the new cultural phenomena they were forced to
confront. For many of these Protestants, conversion became the principal metaphor
through which they could incorporate these changes into their worldviews. (7)

98

Certainly one of most troublesome challenges of modernity to traditional forms of
Christianity was in the development of the concept of “self” as an independent and autonomous
site of sensation, intellect, and consciousness. According to evangelical theology, conversion
required a denial or even negation of self, a demand that was in almost complete opposition with
modern conceptualizations of identity. Traditional Christian theology regarded human identity as
essentially a combination of corporeal body and incorporeal soul, a position directly challenged
since the seventeenth century, beginning with Descartes and continuing through the modern era.
This reconceptualization of self had crucial implications for autobiography, a genre
whose motivation, according to Stephen Shapiro, is “identity formation,” or the process of
integrating the present self with earlier versions of the self (445). Spiritual autobiography was
particularly implicated, as despite authorial intentions otherwise, the central character in any
conversion narrative was always the convert, not God. Payne describes this tension: “The issue
of the self, particularly the creation of self and the structuring of personal identity, formed the
very center of this genre of religious literature, but at the heart of the evangelical conversion
experience was a profound ambivalence of the self” (33). The more the convert attempted to
speak of self-negation, the more self-focused and self-defining the narrative became. In this way,
the discourse of conversion—the language available to identify transformative experiences—
both limited and shaped the self of autobiographical narrative.
This tension can be identified in autobiography from its very conception in the
Confessions of St. Augustine who describes the self as the source of pride, egotism, and conceit,
ultimately in opposition to the surrender required by the call of God: “Let the proud of heart
deride me now and all who have never been brought low and broken by Thee unto salvation…”
(IV.I.3). Augustine’s struggle haunted the conversion stories of the Puritans, forcing the
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autobiographer into a “Self Civil War” wherein he was “driven by self-loathing to Christ and
forced back to himself by the recognition that his labors are an assertion of what he loathes”
(Bercovitch qtd. in Payne 41). However, the premodern self of the Augustinian model eventually
shifted into the modern self of secular conversion, a result of post-Enlightenment subjectivity.
According to Riley, this view of selfhood, a direct result of Cartesian philosophy, was
appropriated by the autobiographical genre and reimagined conversion as “secular inwardness”
(73). Whether we locate conversion as a religious experience of self-denial or a secular
experience of self-awareness, the experience is irrevocably concerned with self-identification.
The conversion narrative, as a genre that both facilitates and complicates identity, has significant
implications for the ways we understand not only character in autobiography, but the very act of
autobiography itself (Riley 3).
Identity continues to be critical to conversion narratives, whether the transformation
involves religion, gender, politics, or any other belief system, secular or sacred. As Lewis Rambo
explains, conversions play a “significant role in the construction of identity, pointing a life in a
particular direction, giving it aim…provid[ing] a coherent center from which to conduct one’s
life” (31-36). The change perpetuated by conversion, as it functions to transform a person’s
actual identity, is both distinct and comprehensive—to use St. Paul’s words, the convert is one
who is changed so completely, she is actually a “new creature” (2 Corinthians 5:17). John E.
Smith describes a convert who “is in some sense changed, but the change seems not to be a
difference in this or that feature of the person’s life, but a change of person as if a new being now
dwelt where another had lived before…The change is so radical and so completely alters the
being of the person that we are inclined to speak of a ‘new’ person being involved” (55). In a
narrative, conversion divides the text and thus the convert into discrete parts, different selves.
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Such a phenomenon suggests provocative possibilities to think about the concept of identity in
life writing, which will be the focus of the second part of this chapter as I look closely at the
different “selves” of Mary Karr before, during, and after her conversion.
Foucault on Conversion: Self Care vs. Self Denial
First, however, I want to turn my attention to Michel Foucault’s theories on conversion,
confession, and subjectivity as a place to situate my inquiry. I choose Foucault not only because
of his obvious impact on the way we think about power relations in discourses such as
confession, but also because of his less theorized engagement with conversion and
autobiography. Throughout his career, Foucault focused much of his scholarship on the
genealogy of the subject and the construction of subjectivities (Nielsen 188). While Foucault’s
earlier work on the self is more often related to its relationship to social constructions and
domination as illustrated in Discipline and Punish, his later work reflects an “aesthetic turn” that
reimagines subjectivity as a result of a turn “inward” to practices of self care (Yates 79).
Characterized by some as a “spiritual turn” or conversion, Foucault’s attention to the self in his
later writing reconstructs subjectivity on a three-fold axis with truth and the world (83). Paired
with his lifelong inquiry into the practice of confession, Foucault’s theories are particularly
relevant to life writing scholarship. In order to fully understand Foucault’s idea of conversion,
it’s important to recognize his belief that the subject is a process, not a substance (Dankel 52).
According to scholar Edward McGushin, Foucault believes a subject does not pre- (or post-)
exist. Instead, “…for Foucault subjectivity is not something we are, it is an activity that we do.
Subjectivity is relational, dynamic, and restless, potentially unruly and unpredictable” (134-135).
In her dissertation on subjectivity in the work of Foucault, Tara Dankel suggests that his work on
conversion was not only academic; rather, “conversion to the self is what he is seeking in his
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own life” (52). In an interview in 1980, Foucault explains that like the classic philosophers he
admires who incorporate the truth of their projects into their own lives, “my books are for me
experiences…an experience is something in which one seeks to transform oneself…I only write
because I do not know exactly what to think about this thing I would very much like to think
about”(Dits et écrits 860). Thus, conversion is the goal of both his scholarship and his everyday
life as he believes “one cannot be ethical, cannot see the truth, without undergoing a
transformation in her subjectivity” (Dankel 53). This transformation is characterized by a
subjectivity that is anything but passive; in Foucault’s words, “[t]aking care of oneself will be to
take care of the self so far as it is the subject of a certain number of things: the subject of
instrumental action, subject of relationships with others, subject of behaviors and attitudes in
general, and the subject also of relationships to oneself” (History 57).
The transformation Foucault imagines is possible only through a new understanding of
the relationship between knowledge and selfhood, where the self is “the subject of true
knowledge, not yet a subject for acquiring knowledge of truth” (Yates 83). Truth, in this
paradigm, is both a goal and an experience rooted in self-exercises, not a problem to be
confronted with intellectual inquiry. McGushin explains that the truth Foucault is after is “not the
truth in the sense of the quality of correctness of a judgment; it is not a particular truth about
some object to be known” but rather a conception of truth as “a fullness of being which offers
itself only to those individuals who have performed the proper work on themselves” (Foucault’s
39). This work is achieved through Foucault’s techniques of the self: “techniques which permit
individuals to affect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies,
soul, thoughts—to transform themselves, to attain a certain state of perfection, purity, power,
happiness” (“About” 203). Foucault argues that the path to truth must be uncovered and
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recovered from the historical practices that overtook it; his objective is to unveil the methods by
which the relationship between “subject” and “truth” have been shaped in the West (Yates 82).
However, to see the relationship in other ways is complicated and perhaps even impossible as we
are deeply invested in a modern conceptualization of the self, one that is completely
disassociated from the ancient Hellenistic-Roman view embraced in the first two centuries C.E.
In Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault examines the two principles of gnothi seauton (know
yourself) and epimeleia heauton (the care of the self). He attempts to understand why “know
yourself” continues to consume contemporary philosophical thought, while the idea of caring for
the self has been lost. Foucault situates this loss as a consequence of Cartesian thought, which,
he argues, divided philosophy (knowing) from spirituality (caring), ultimately eliminating the
need for spirituality by arguing that an individual “is capable of recognizing the truth and having
access to it in himself and merely through his acts of knowing, without anything else being
demanded of him and without him having to change or alter his being as a subject” (19). The
Cartesian subject is exactly what Foucault is working against; instead, for Foucault, truth is only
possible through a transformation in the being of the subject:
…in the truth and in access to the truth, there is something that fulfills the subject
himself, which fulfills or transfigures his very being. In short, I think we can say
that in and of itself an act of knowledge could never give access to the truth unless
it was prepared, accompanied, doubled, and completed by a certain
transformation of the subject…in his being as subject. (16)
Transformation, as work of the self on the self, reflects the ancient practice of askesis or “the
practice of a certain way of living and speaking, a certain way of being with oneself and others”
(McGushin xiv). Askesis, however, appears within the larger experience of conversion,
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particularly in the Cynic, Epicurean, and Stoic traditions between the first century B.C.E. and
first century C.E., framed by an exercise of salvation focused on a “conversion to oneself” (Yates
84). This model of self-conversion Foucault clearly differentiates from the historical narrative of
Christian conversion, a phenomenon that he consistently portrays as self-renunciation rather than
“self-return.”10 Foucault explains, “A fundamental element of Christian conversion is
renunciation of oneself, dying to oneself, and being reborn in a different self and a new form
which, as it were, no longer has anything to do with the earlier self in its being, its mode of
being, in its habits or its ethos” (The Hermeneutics 248). Thus, by juxtaposing the HellenisticRoman with the early and medieval Christian—the conversion to self with the sacrifice of self—
Foucault reestablishes the historical practice of self-care into a “spiritualized relationship
between subjectivity and truth and unties itself not only from the fabric of modern epistemology
and hermeneutics, but, perhaps more importantly, from an alternative spirituality that grants truth
to the self by way of eliminating the self” (Yates 85).
With this work, Foucault promotes a discourse of resistance. Conversion that focuses on
self-renunciation (what he identifies as Christian salvation) contains beliefs that must be resisted:
first, that this kind of salvation is constituted according to a binary system that “pits life against
death, morality against immorality, world against other” (Yates 85). Because of this positioning,
salvation amounts to a “crossing over” from one self to another and is located historically in a
system of chronological and causal events (transgression/sin/Fall) that necessitates the corrective
act of redemption. Finally, Foucault argues, conversion is a “complex operation” that requires
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According to Christopher Yates, the Christianity Foucault is describing is specifically
Thomistic in nature. Thomistic theology, specifically as it applies to the Catholic faith, follows
the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, who believed that both faith and reason discover truth, a
conflict between them being impossible since they both originate in God (Magee).
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not only the efforts of the devoted subject but also an external other, another characteristic that
reinforces a Christian model of self-renunciation. In contrast to a salvation embedded in selfrenunciation, salvation in the ancient Hellenistic-Roman tradition allowed “an access to the self
that is inseparable from the work one carries out on oneself within the time of one’s life and in
life itself” (The Hermeneutics 184-185). When juxtaposed, then, these contrasting views of
salvation delineate two distinct concepts of conversion: a Christian conversion from the self and
a pagan conversion to the self. Foucault’s recovery of the ancient Hellenistic-Roman conversion
then focuses on the tension between self-return and self-renunciation, between selfsubjectivation and self-objectivation.
The spirituality of self-return is characterized by the image of “turning,” like the verb “to
convert” from the Old French convertir, meaning “to turn” (“Convert”). Foucault explains, “We
must turn away from everything that turns us away from our self, so as to turn ourselves toward
our self” (The Hermeneutics 206). This turn is actualized in the direction and movement of the
“gaze,” a practice of subjectivation described by McGushin: “one is not only that which appears
before one’s gaze when one looks, but also the activity of looking into oneself” (36). However,
Foucault argues that this gaze is not simply reduced to isolated self-knowledge. Instead, the
conversion to self, like the Christian model, requires an “other.” This other, unlike the Christian
version, is not a text or dogmatic revelation of a Truth. It is, rather, found in the natural order, or
the world. The gaze in the ancient practice of conversion moves through the self and into the
world; additionally, it provides the self with a program of exercise—or askesis (Yates 91). The
concept of askesis differs greatly between the Hellenistic-Roman and Christian practices as
Foucault explores in his study of confession as a technique of the self.
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At the center of the Christian askesis is confession: an exercise of truth-telling in which the
subject objectifies herself in “true discourse” (The Hermeneutics 333). At first glance, similarities
exist between the Christian confession and ancient askesis; primarily, both practices support the
subjective desire to “say the truth about oneself” (362). Both models understand truth as an exercise
in community, as “one must respond to the words of truth that teach me the truth and consequently
help me in my salvation” with a “discourse of truth by which I open the truth of my own soul to the
other, to others” (391). The crucial difference was that in the Hellenistic-Roman practice the goal
was to become the subject of truth, not subject to truth. In the Hellenistic-Roman tradition,
confession was an individual task wherein the subject divides itself into two roles—the confessant
and confessor. However, unlike in the Christian practice, the confessor-self took on the persona of an
administrator rather than a judge. In the process of Hellenistic-Roman “confession,” the confessant
is invested in looking for mistakes, not sins. Truth, as the object of confession, is not something that
is hidden behind or under the consciousness in the deepest recesses of the soul; “it is something
which is before the individual as a point of attraction, a kind of magnetic force which attracts him
toward a goal” (209). And, perhaps most significantly, confession in the ancient tradition is not
oriented toward the individualization of the self through an identification of personal characteristics
but toward a constitution of self. The self is not something to be discovered but something to be
constructed.
Christian confession, however, is motivated by a completely different view of truth and
its relationship to self. In Christian technologies of the self, the problem is to discover a truth that
already exists and is hidden, thus the development of a “hermeneutics of the self” where the self
is a text that we have to decipher and interpret rather than something that has to be constructed.
Foucault argues that Christianity is itself a confession, as “Christianity belongs to a very special
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type of religion, the religions which impose on those who practice them an obligation of truth”
(“About” 211). These truths include the obligation to believe a set of propositions or dogma, to
hold certain texts as a permanent source of truth, and to accept decisions of certain authorities in
matters of truth. However, the most important truth obligation for the Christian is the duty to
know who he is and what is happening in him. And, not only must he know who he is: he is
obligated to confess this truth to someone else, and, thus, “bear witness against himself” (211).
This process is necessary—this making of truth within oneself—in order for the soul to be
purified and salvation possible.
Foucault identifies the incompatibility between a Christian conceptualization of the self and a
hermeneutic of the self, based in Hellenistic-Roman philosophy as one of “the great problems of
Western culture” (“About” 222). This problem, defined by a conceptualization of a sinful self that
must be sacrificed before it can be absolved, continues to challenge autobiographers today as it did
early American life writers who share a literary tradition shaped by Christianity. Whether we see
conversion as the defining experience in all autobiography, as theorists such as Harpham suggest, or
as a powerful narrative trope available to life writers, the genre continues to compel and shape
Western autobiographical accounts. Foucault’s recovery of an ancient model of conversion, and a
resulting spirituality focused on self-mastery rather than self-denial, offers us alternative ways of
reading stories of personal transformation in addition to (or in spite of) the Christian, and specifically
evangelical Protestant rhetoric, that has shaped the genre. It allows us to think differently about what
happens to the self of the story before, during, and after conversion. Rather than a self that has been
rejected or replaced, the self becomes a site of return. Like Herrnstein Smith’s constructivist theory
of belief as outlined in Chapter One, the ancient model of conversion parallels a hermeneutical
circle, emphasizing the participation—rather than a correction—of a prior self in the formation of
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present identity. Further illuminating conversion as a recursive and continual process is Herrnstein
Smith’s general dynamic of belief as the ongoing process of “stabilization, destabilization,
restabilization, and transformation” (xiii). The transformation possible through conversion is part of
active and recurring processes of identification and negotiation of our selves and our beliefs.
The Conversion of Mary Karr
Every now and then we enter into the presence of the numinous and deduce for an instant how we’re
formed, in what detail the force that infuses every petal might specifically run through us, wishing
only to lure us into our full potential. Usually the closest we get is when we love, or when some
beloved beams back, which can galvanize you like steel and make resilient what had heretofore only
been soft flesh. It can start you singing as the lion pads over to you, its jaws hanging open, its hot
breath on you. Even unto death.
—Mary Karr
In 1996, Mary Karr converted to what she calls an “unlikely Catholicism” after a “lifetime of
undiluted agnosticism” in a move that shocked her friends and readers alike. Readers of her first two
memoirs The Liars’ Club and Cherry, would have been unable to predict this specific turn in Karr’s
life as in those memoirs she writes that her father taught her that “Jesus was a trick on poor people”
and she often refers to Marx’s description of religion as the opiate of the masses. Raised in a
“godless household” where “poems were the only prayers that got said,” Karr details a conversion
from a life marked by a troubled marriage, depression, and alcohol abuse to something quite
different. Self- identified as a “black-belt sinner,” Karr describes her transformation as one from
“black cynicism into awe” (Fortini 80). Of the unlikeliness of her “whispering my sins in the
confessional or on my knees saying the rosary,” Karr herself admits that a more likely pastime might
have been a “Pole dancer. International spy. Drug mule. Assassin” (Lit 330) It seems that Karr’s
conversion surprised her as much as the rest of us.
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Reading Lit as Christian Conversion: Salvation of a ‘Sinner’
In the second part of this chapter, I examine how Karr’s conversion changed her beliefs,
particularly the way she constructs the beliefs about her identity—her selves—in relation and
reaction to this change. Initially, I use a traditional Christian perspective through which to read her
conversion as an example of the ways such a framework continues to structure contemporary
memoir. Then, following Foucault’s dichotomy of conversion, I analyze her conversion as care of
the self, as a practice of self-mastery rather than the self-renunciation associated with the Christian
experience. While both readings can yield fruitful discoveries, a reconceptualization of conversion
more closely resembling the Greco-Roman practice askesis illuminates the rhetorical nature of
autobiographical identity. Additionally, untethering conversion from a specific religious tradition, as
such recovering it from its previous “sinful” association and reimagining it as a provocative focus in
life writing scholarship, can provide rich possibilities for future exploration.
In an interview for The Paris Review in 2001, Karr explains the necessity of selftransformation in a memoir: “The memoir’s antagonist has to be some part of the self, and the self
has to be different at the end of the book than at the beginning” (Fortini 88). Interestingly, she
doesn’t limit this observation to conversion narratives or spiritual autobiographies; instead, she
proposes a theory of the subject in memoir as a self in process. While Karr’s first two memoirs could
certainly offer rich opportunities for an analysis of identity, my focus will be on her religious
conversion in Lit, her third memoir that begins with her at “age seventeen, stringy-haired and haltertopped, weighing in the high double digits and unhindered by a high school diploma” (Lit 13) and
ends with her current post as a professor at Syracuse University. Before a consideration of Lit,
however, a look at the last page of Cherry, Karr’s second memoir detailing her troubled adolescence
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and sexual awakening, reveals the beginning of her sense of self—what it is and who she is—at least
as she’s able to define it on the page:
For years you’ve felt only half-done inside, cobbled together by paper clips, held
intact by gum wads and school paste. But something solid is starting to assemble
inside you. You say, I am my Same Self. That’s not nothing, is it? …Like I’m
chocolate through to the center. Same self. That oddball catchphrase will serve as
a touchstone in years to come, an instant you’ll return to after traveling the far
roads. …As for the actual validity of the notion, an immoveable self ever firm,
you’re there only by half at best. But half’s good measure more than some people
ever get. You’ll spend decades trying to will Same Self into being. But you’ll
keep shape-shifting. Probably everyone must, so long as a body’s treading sod or
drawing breath. (276)
After Cherry closes on Mary’s Same Self, the reader follows this emerging identity to the
subsequent memoir Lit, written nine years later, where this self will be the subject of a conversion no
less tumultuous and surprising than St. Augustine’s. In fact, in many ways, Karr’s conversion story
parallels Augustine’s—the writer whose Confessions she credits as the real start to the memoir boom
and her favorite autobiographer (Garner). Like Augustine’s, her conversion consists of many false
starts and partial commitments; her inner struggle with God might best be summed up in one of her
favorite of St. Augustine’s quotes: “Give me chastity, Lord, but not yet!” Of course, these
similarities are not surprising since Karr locates her own theory of autobiography directly in this
historical Christian tradition. If Augustine’s text serves as the “sui generis” of the conversion
narrative as James O’Donnell argues, then Mary Karr’s Lit can be read as a model of the genre. In
his text Character and Conversion in Autobiography: Augustine, Montaigne, Descartes, Rousseau,
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and Sartre, Patrick Riley traces the evolution of the Christian conversion narrative typified in
Augustine’s Confessions through the tradition of philosophical autobiography, where conversion
becomes a secular trope featuring the central drama of the writer’s experience in relation not to God
but to writing and intellectual life (9). Riley’s work is focused specifically on the formation of the
subject in autobiography. He explains:
Conversion is the moment that motivates autobiographical production and provides a
structure for a narrative of the self. Yet it also implies the self’s dissolution into alterity.
If conversion legitimates narrative retrospection by offering a unitary, even teleological,
framework in which to cast the subject’s history, it also threatens to expel the self from
its textual edifice. It creates the conditions under which I may tell my story, but since it
has made me “other,” there is no guarantee that “I” am the subject of representation in
any other than a nominal way. (9)
The structure of a conversion story, often following a linear temporality of “before” and “after,”
offers an autobiographer the possibility to view the self in relationship to a defining moment
or—in the case of both Augustine and Karr—a series of such moments. However, Riley argues
that this “totalizing structure” can immediately be deconstructed since it fashions a self that is
entirely different from what it had been (15). In the case of Augustine’s Confessions, the subject
that emerges is a split version of a self, a consecutive representation of two distinct and
conflicting selves that are divided into two separate “beings” by the conversion experience. To
read Karr’s Lit as a Christian conversion narrative offers a similar perspective of dual (or
multiple) identities separated by individual moments or epiphanies that illuminate their
irreconcilable differences.
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Because the Christian model of conversion is most fundamentally one of salvation, the
autobiographer must identify a self that requires redemption—self as sinner. This
characterization, according to Foucault, allows the convert to “cross over” from one self to
another—in Augustine’s case, from Manichean, thief, womanizer, and public intellectual to
Christian, theologian, dutiful son, and eventually bishop. Augustine creates an earlier self that is
fragmented, inauthentic, and unstable, ultimately defined by a separation from God. What
characterizes this version of self is his active and willful disposition to sin. As the father of not
only autobiography but also our predominant cultural definitions of original sin, Augustine
portrays sin as the foundation of subjectivity, selves characterized by a “greedy love of doing
wrong” (Confessions 4:2). Augustine’s definitive inner conflict with his sinful self has provided
the template for the authentic Western spiritual search and continues to inform contemporary
autobiography.
Karr’s conversion narrative clearly reflects this history as the story of a sinner struggling
to find a “god [she] can’t believe in” (Lit 215). Like Augustine’s, Karr’s conversion reflects a
crossing-over from one self to another; the promise of resurrection requires a Christ-like death.
She writes of this transition: “If you live in the dark a long time and the sun comes out, you do
not cross into it whistling. There’s an initial uprush of relief at first, then…a profound
dislocation. My old assumptions about how the world works are buried, yet my new ones aren’t
operational. There’s been a death of sorts, but without a few days in hell, no resurrection is
possible” (260). Throughout the memoir, she consistently describes separate selves—selves
characterized by a temporal before and after—particularly as she attempts to remember the
details of her relationship with her husband, Warren. The self that is writing the memoir, the
“after” self of conversion, reflects on the “before” self, “So while I trust the stories I recall in
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broad outline, their interpretation through my old self is suspect…When I read to grasp a solid
truth from that time, smoke pours through my fingers” (88). Certainly, the limits of memory,
particularly traumatic memory, complicate Karr’s task of portraying her earlier self. However, in
its portrayal of a self separated from God (a preconversional or “before” self), the conversion
narrative allows the autobiographer, who at the moment of conversion is authorized and
legitimized by a turning to God, to examine the past, “sinful” self as a field of inquiry.
While Karr does specifically refer to her “sinfulness” in the memoir, she primarily
associates her earlier self with “bad” mothering, class-related self-doubt, and, especially,
addiction to alcohol, a struggle that consumes the first half of the memoir, leading to the break
up of her marriage, a suicide attempt, and a resulting hospitalization before she finally becomes
sober. In many ways distinct from her turning to God is her turning from addiction; while the
recovery process certainly parallels the structure of religious conversion, drawing heavily on
spiritual themes and premises, her journey to sobriety can also be read through a secular
framework. From this perspective, Karr’s “before” self is defined completely by her relationship
to alcohol, and her “after” self can only be realized when she is finally sober. While Karr focuses
the first part of Lit on her relationships with her husband and son, her relationship to alcohol is
as—or perhaps more—intimate and pleasurable. Describing her first drink of whiskey shared
with her alcoholic father, she writes in her characteristic poetic style, “The warm silk flowered in
my mouth and down my gullet, after which a little blue flame of pleasure roared back up my
spine. A poof of sequins went sparkling through my middle” (43). As her addiction worsens, she
describes, “That’s the secret to getting up: the glass talks and my neck cranes toward the drink
like flower to sunbeam… A drink once brought ease, a bronze warmth spreading through all my
muddy regions. Now it only brings a brief respite from the bone ache of craving it, no more
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delicious numbness” (159). And, finally: “I keep getting drunk. There’s no more interesting way
to say it” (171). Her descriptions are replete with compelling imagery and sensory details—
“warm silk,” “flame of pleasure,” “flower to sunbeam”—and convey her consuming passion for
alcohol and the effects it provides. These passages help us understand the presence of alcohol in
her life—its impact is predictable and fulfilling in ways her personal relationships have never
been.
When Karr finally attends her first AA meeting, she immediately rejects the spiritual
element of recovery: “…Higher power, my rosy red ass, I can hear my daddy saying…” (191).
However, she does recognize in “a snippet of a revelation” that “I have a disease whose defining
symptom is believing you don’t have a disease…but I’m not ready to stop listening to the
screwed-up inner voice that’s been ordering me around for a lifetime” (196). This voice—or
self—she begins to identify as a “half”: one half sober, the other drunk and never occupying the
same head space simultaneously. As she progresses through recovery, and begins to consider the
value of a higher power in the process, she recognizes the possibility in her mentor Joan’s
observation: “…drinking is like the butcher knife. You have to put it down before you can let
God in. It’s like you have to break up with the guy who’s beating the crap out of you before you
can scan the room and find the nice guy who’s got a crush on you” (217). In effect, she must
“break up” with her old self before she can be healed. Karr’s identity, characterized by “selves”
primarily defined by their relationship to alcohol, reflects the power of conversion in structuring
autobiographical narrative. Karr easily could have chosen other significant moments as turning
points, such as the birth of Dev or her divorce from Warren, which would have drawn attention
to other parts of her identity or other selves. Instead, she locates her conversion in the moment(s)
when she simultaneously became sober and turned to God. Like the subject of all Christian
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conversion narratives, then, Karr must first be a sinner (in her case an alcoholic) in order to be
saved.
In a review of Lit, Francine Prose observes, “Believers and nonbelievers have long been
drawn to confessions, like Saint Augustine’s, that read like dispatches from the knock-down, dragout encounter between God and the stubborn sinner. ‘Lit’…is one of those.” Just as readers of
Augustine’s conversion may find themselves wondering when he is finally going to convert already,
so would readers of Karr, who describes herself as “blunted, muted, starved, yet stubbornly refusing
the one suggestion everyone sober for very long makes: prayer. I recoil from any talk of spiritual
crap…” (Lit 207). After many false starts and failed attempts at quitting drinking, she finally,
grudgingly, agrees to the suggestion to pray every day for ninety days; her first prayer clearly reveals
her resistance: “‘Higher power,’ I say snidely. ‘Where the fuck have you been?’” (219). Her struggle
to give up the alcohol that has become an integral part of her daily survival is evenly matched by her
struggle to give up control to a higher power, one of the key requirements in the recovery process. In
an interview for Christian Century, Karr reflects on what must be lost in order to move forward:
“You give up control…When you turn to God, you give up that house of cards that you call a belief
system. In that house of cards, you understand how the world works. It is comprehensible to you and
you have some sense of agency in it” (Frykholm 35). For Karr, giving up her house of cards—her
previous belief system—almost costs her life. It isn’t until she attempts suicide and checks herself
into a mental hospital that she realizes she is unable to heal without taking this last, integral step. As
she finally submits to the program, Karr feels “something stir in me, a small wisp of something in
my chest, frail as smoke...The boundaries of my skin grown thin as I kneel there squinting my eyes
shut. For a nanosecond, I am lucent. Inside it: an idea, the thread of a different perspective than any
I’ve ever had” (276). The idea—what she identifies as divinely inspired—is that the trials she’d
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encountered raising her sick baby in the midst of a failing marriage actually kept her from drinking
to the point of death years before. Dev’s frequent illnesses, coupled with an absent husband, required
her to cling to some small periods of sobriety. This realization is characterized not only by a turn to
God but a turn away from her previous self.
As she describes the experience of her conversion, she clearly identifies the change in terms
of her identity as distinct selves. “The change happens before my eyes, the muted colors of the room
brightening from gray to a cool azure. Now when I begin obsessively to gnaw on my fears, I try to
wrestle them loose from myself (who are these two halves?) the way you’d take a slipper from a
Doberman” (281). When the transformation of conversion finally occurs, the result is a newer, truer
version of self. She remembers, “…I lift my just-scrubbed face from the towel to meet my own gaze
in the metal mirror, and I almost see a bold outline around myself, as if inked with magic marker.
Alive, I am, a living, breathing Mary of myself” (284). This last observation echoes the “Same Self”
Karr describes at the end of Cherry, as if the years between had been lived by a different self
completely.
While Karr mainly locates her before and after selves in the process of recovery from alcohol
addiction—her “before” self is a drinker who doesn’t believe in God while her “after” self is a
nondrinker who does—she also characterizes these selves by their intellectual capacity. In other
words, throughout her memoir, Karr frequently separates belief from intellect—belief is reserved for
the weak-minded. This separation, an obvious reflection of a modern paradigm wherein knowledge
and reason are celebrated as distinct from and superior to belief and emotion, has been ingrained in
Karr since childhood. This distinction is critical as it represents the biggest hurdle she must
overcome in her own conversion from a person who believes that God is “a trick for the dim-witted”
to one who believes that faith and intelligence can not only coexist but also complement each other.
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Her initial participation in recovery clearly portrays her skepticism. She writes, “Pray about it, those
religious morons suggest, for they fancy some bearded giant staring down from a cloud is gonna zap
me into shape” (Lit 126), and “…when everybody grabs hands to pray, it’s like some dreary ringaround-the-rosy, and I refuse to mouth the words, instead gaping around at who’s dopey enough to
go along” (195). Morons, dopes, “sheep”—these are the words she uses to describe believers,
contrasting sharply with the intellectualism that defined her childhood identity. For Karr, religious
belief required a surrender or submission that represented not only a lack of will but also a lack of
intelligence. Conversion, in this perspective and following Foucault’s argument, reinforces the
traditional Christian practice of self-renunciation, characterized by a sinner-self that requires
salvation as a corrective act of redemption.
This form of conversion, Foucault argues, is deeply rooted in modernism, specifically as a
consequence of the Cartesian subject that not only separated philosophy (knowing) from spirituality
(caring), but actually positioned it as superior. This move virtually eliminated the need for
spirituality by suggesting that an individual is capable of recognizing the truth and having access to
it in the self simply through acts of “knowing…without…having to change or alter his being as a
subject” (“About” 19). In this model, truth is assumed to be separate from and in a position of
authority over the subject; one “knows” the truth as it is given through sacred texts or revelation, and
the purpose of this self-knowledge is to conform to this version of the truth (Yates 89). This
relationship to the truth, then, is determined by an antagonism to the self; one’s salvation is
dependent on truth as already established by revealed knowledge. Therefore, this knowledge—a
normative truth of the self told from the “outside”—has power over the subject. When we limit our
understanding of Karr’s conversion to the traditional Christian model, we are tempted to see her both
her recovery process and spiritual awakening less as an individual, subjective transformation into a
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truer self than as a submission to normative definitions of experience, already established as “truths.”

Karr’s spiritual struggle in many ways parallels the Cartesian worldview that Foucault works
against, particularly in the separation between knowledge and spirituality. Throughout her life, Karr
consistently associated religious belief with stupidity—believers are “idiots” or “coolies.” In one
telling scene when Karr is describing her middling prayer regimen, her mentor Joan observes, “It’s
like there’s some hook in your head. You’re still fueling your fears by intellectualizing them,
thinking this way and that” (Lit 258). When Karr approaches her recovery as a purely cerebral
pursuit—divorced from faith— she fails time and again. Further, the “letting go” rhetoric of both the
recovery process and religious conversion repels her when it represents the submission or selfrenunciation traditionally associated with both. Her response makes perfect sense, especially when
we return to her Same Self of Cherry, which she worked so hard to create. Instead, when conversion
becomes a process of self-return as Foucault suggests, the self is a site of transformation rather than
rejection. Karr writes, “Before, I’d feared surrender would sand me down to nothing. Now, I’ve
started believing it can bloom me more solidly into myself” (299). This realization reflects the
transformation in Karr’s conceptualization of the possibilities of conversion. While Karr’s
conversion is definitely from agnosticism to a Christian faith (Catholicism), in many ways it more
closely resembles the ancient Hellenistic-Roman conversion of self-return, of a deeper knowledge of
a truth of self that is characterized not by self-denial but self-mastery.
Karr’s articulation of the relationship of her body to her belief both engages and resists a
traditional conversion model. In her essay “Facing Altars,” Karr explains, “The very idea of
prostrating myself brought up the old Marxist saw about religion being the opiate for the masses and
congregations as dumb as cows” (129). Prostration, or kneeling in prayer, seems to embody the
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surrender of self that Karr so adamantly resists; she writes, “…I do try to stretch out my standard
two-sentence prayer habit a little longer…but not on my knees—no way am I gonna grovel like a
reptile” (Lit 224). Tellingly, the actual moment of her conversion in the bathroom of the mental
hospital is marked by kneeling: “I tiptoe to the bathroom and bend onto the cold tiles… I feel small,
kneeling there. Small and needy and inadequate. Pathetic, even. Like somebody who can’t handle
things” (275). In the practice of kneeling to pray, Karr’s submission is not only spiritual but
corporeal. It’s as if she needs to complete a physical act in order to access the spiritual.
Karr frequently recognizes the carnality innate to Catholicism as one of the essential reasons
she was drawn to it. She explains, “…the Church’s carnality, which seemed crude at the outset—
people lighting candles and talking to dolls—worked its voodoo on me. The very word incarnation
derives from Latin in carne: in meat. There’s a body on the cross in my church” (“Facing” 132).
However, it’s not only Christ’s body that’s important to Karr’s spiritual practice, but also her own
joined with others: “Through the simple physical motions I followed during Mass, our bodies
standing and sitting and kneeling in concert, I often felt my mind grow quiet, and my surface
differences from others began to be obliterated” (133). In Karr’s spirituality, the actions of the body
are no less meaningful than those of the mind. In fact, frequently the embodied practice of worship,
including the kneeling and prostration she initially resisted, are prerequisites for her belief. This
aspect of her conversion challenges the Cartesian mind/body dualism that informs the traditional
Christian model wherein self-renunciation is the condition for salvation; and, self-renunciation is
only possible through “knowing oneself,” an act of the mind, separate from and superior to the body.
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Karr’s Conversion as Askesis
A closer look at the role of askesis in Foucault’s theory of conversion reveals possibilities in
reading Karr’s transformation as a means of resistance against a traditional, Christian model. In
Greek philosophical practice, askesis represents a remembering: “the memory of what you’ve done
and what you’ve had to do” (Foucault, Technologies 34). This practice is interested in the discovery
of mistakes rather than faults or sins. The truth, then, is something not buried deep in the soul, but
before the self, as a goal to be actualized. Askesis, in the philosophical tradition, is used to create
truth—particularly, truths about selves—rather than to discover an identity that already exists.
Askesis, the Greek origin of our word ascetic, means “training or exercise.” Although contemporary
usage associates asceticism with self-denial, the original word referred to the physical training
required for athletic performance. Later, the word was used to describe rigorous practices associated
with all major religions as means of attaining redemption or a higher spirituality. Askesis, for
Foucault, is synonymous with self-discipline and essential to conversion. Foucault regards
conversion as the moment when an individual recognizes her mode of being as problematic and
decides to begin the process of transformation (Dankel 82). This change is possible only through
techniques of the self, realized through askesis or daily operations by the self on the self. According
to Foucault, the goal of askesis specifically and of conversion broadly is to move the individual from
an “emerging self” to an “aspiring self,” or at least to shore up the distance between the two.
Foucault’s concept of subjectivation—or the process of becoming a subject—consists of a coconstitution of body and mind, possible through askesis as a dual training of both. Tara Dankel
argues that Foucault’s conflation of the mind and body in this practice demonstrates first, that one
can only reach subjective truth through daily practice; second, that the mind is fundamentally
embodied; and, finally, that the care of the self is defined by pleasure found in discipline and hard
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work (83). The goal of subjectivation, possible only through askesis, is an emerging self that more
closely resembles the “flexible but consistent conduct of the aspirational self,” as determined by true
discourses (83). It is the fulfillment of the aspirational self that Foucault recognizes as salvation
(110). Dankel is careful to clarify, however, that Foucault’s aspirational self is not determined by
conversion; she still has the opportunity to change based on new life created by further practice (84).
In order to understand Foucault’s subjectivation, we must understand its relationship to “true
discourse.” True discourse emerges from any philosophical tradition that has demonstrated, over
time, the ability to affect change in peoples’ lives. Therefore, true discourse must be
transformative—it must have the power to “change the perspective of the individual and call her
from the values and norms of her surrounding society to a different mode of being” (Dankel 85).
Foucault argues that all subjects are created through discourses and practices external to themselves
either through subjectivation or subjection. These discourses, while “contingent and arbitrary,” can
provide the conditions of possibility for an individual’s conduct (11). Judith Butler, in her extensive
work on subjectivity, argues, like Foucault, that to claim a subject is constituted is not the same as
claiming it is determined (“Contingent” 46). This distinction is crucial to understanding conversion
from Foucault’s perspective and the possibilities available to the subject who practices self care.
Mary Karr’s conversion, profoundly influenced by the recovery process, can be interpreted as
a example of Foucault’s subjectivation or the becoming of a self through the practice of askesis.
Returning to the recurring images of embodied worship in Karr’s spiritual practice, we see the
essential relationship between the body and the mind that is essential to Foucault’s theory. One of
the primary premises of Foucault’s work, particularly in Discipline and Punish, is that societal
norms and disciplines are inscribed on our bodies. Foucault argues that the subjectivation of truth
occurs through the repeated practice of both the mind and body; further, subjection of the body can
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only occur through bodily practice. Not only did Karr’s experience involve bodily participation, it
required it—both her addiction and her recovery from it. Because her pleasure of alcohol is
experienced through her body, her recovery from it must be too. Joan advises her, “Put your mind
where your body is. ‘One day at a time’ forces you to reckon with the instant you actually
occupy…” (Lit 208). To accomplish this, Karr rarely attempts prayer without involving her body:
kneeling on a cushion, lying facedown on the carpet, bent on the linoleum. Foucault argues that
because our bodies have been habituated to certain kinds of movements and practices, one can only
subjectivate a different truth through a different form of practice (Dankel 104). When Karr begins
her ninety-day prayer regime, she begins with her body: “…I take a small cushion down and get on
my knees for the first time in my life—prayer number one” (219). This movement interrupts Karr’s
typical routine and redirects her body. As askesis, this daily practice refocuses her attention and
energy, creating different possibilities in her life.
Another way that Karr’s prayer regimen epitomizes askesis is in its consistent repetition. In A
History of Sexuality, Foucault explains “that the truth can not be obtained without a certain practice,
or a certain set of fully specified practices, which transform the subject’s mode of being, that
modify, transfigure, qualify it…” (46). Within the context of the philosophical schools, these
regimens were ritualized because they were validated by tradition and gave shape to communities of
practice. These practices were loosely defined and tailored to the individual needs of the practitioner;
thus, their development required deliberate and reflective thought (Dankel 82). Karr’s daily prayer
routine, while proposed by a young doctor who was herself a recovering alcoholic, certainly reflects
a practice that both defines Karr individually and connects her to a larger community of religious
believers steeped in spiritual tradition. After Karr’s first prayer, “a peevish start, tight-lipped, mean
of spirit, but a prayer nonetheless,” she vows to “make it regular, this half-baked prayer” (220). The
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regularity of the act—“I will silently say every morning, ‘Keep me sober.’ At night, it’s
‘Thanks,’”—is as necessary as the prayer itself (Lit 220). In an interview for The Paris Review, Karr
further describes her daily rituals, practices that engage her mind and her body:
I try to pray formally morning and night starting with breathing exercises or centering
prayer. Then the Lord’s Prayer or the Prayer of St. Francis…Sometimes I listen to the
daily liturgy on my iPod from Pray-As-You-Go.com, or I go online at Sacred Space…At
night I do what Jesuits call an examen of conscience, plus I keep a list of people to pray
for. In times of pressure or anxiety—I’ll do a daily rosary for everybody…The real
prayer happens when I’m really desperate. (Fortini 74)
These activities, like askesis, are daily and consistent techniques of the self that begin to move
Karr from an emerging self to the aspirational self she imagines. They locate her conversion not
in the act of turning from a previous self to a new and different version, but in the daily effort of
looking inward and performing “operations on [the] body, [the] soul, [the] thoughts, [the]
behaviors” that can ultimately lead to “a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of
supernatural power” (Foucault, “About” 203). The self of this conversion is transformed rather
than replaced.
Another crucial aspect of Karr’s burgeoning spirituality as askesis is her participation in the
exercises of St. Ignatius. In the Stoics’ practice of askesis, truth was found in the teaching of the
masters, or in what Foucault designates as “true discourses.” In the classical period, true discourses
were acquired through the philosophical tradition in the form of logos. St. Ignatius, a 16th century
Spanish priest, theologian, and founder of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits), is recognized as a “master”
in the art of spiritual direction, and his Spiritual Exercises, a collection of Christian mediations,
prayers, and mental exercises written between 1522-1524, remains one of the most influential books
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on spiritual life ever written (“St. Ignatius Loyola”). Composed in four sections and designed to be
carried out over 28-30 days, the exercises encourage practitioners to discover Jesus in their lives, and
eventually lead them to follow Christ’s teachings. Although St. Ignatius isn’t considered a classical
philosopher, his exercises clearly serve the function of “true discourse” in Karr’s subjectivation.
Karr learns of the exercises through her friend John, who “as a young man…had been torn between a
career as an athlete and the Jesuit seminary, but he’d drunk his way out of both businesses” (Lit
365). When Karr runs into John, he has been sober longer than her, runs his own swim club where he
coaches Olympic-caliber competitors, and is reconsidering the call to become a Jesuit. In order to
figure out what he should pursue, he “undertakes a lay version of the Exercises, emerging nine
months later like a creature dipped in fine metal, heart-break cured” (365). After this experience, his
coaching career blooms, and he attributes his success to the spiritual practice. Karr explains,
“…following Ignatius jacked up both his mood and his productivity, and—being the competitive
bitch that I am—this spiked my interest” (365).
Like the Stoics of ancient Greece, Karr seeks out a “master” to guide her through the spiritual
exercises. She finds a mentor in “a bulky Franciscan nun named Sister Margaret, patiently going
blind behind fish-tank glasses that magnify her eyes like goggles” (Lit 368). Spiritual direction in
Ignatian practice is defined as “help given by one Christian to another which enables that person to
pay attention to God’s personal communication to him or her, to respond to this personally
communicating God, to grow in intimacy with this God, and to live out the consequences of the
relationship” (“Spiritual Direction”). According to Joann Crowley, this process is defined by mutual
discovery and disclosure, and the goal is deeper self-knowledge, compassion, and “one-ness” with
the Spirit of God. Through her relationship with Sister Margaret and her daily exercises and prayers,
Karr is able to finally make peace with her mother and the horrors suffered because of her addiction,
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to make peace with the neglect of her already deceased father, and with her failed marriage. Most
significantly, however, she makes peace with herself. She writes, “I start to arrive in the instant as
never before, standing up in it as it pushed from behind like a wave, for it feels as if I was made—
from all the possible shapes a human might take—not to prove myself worthy but to refine the worth
I’m formed from, acknowledge it, own it, spend it on others” (Lit 384).
Karr’s relationships to Sister Margaret, Joan the Bone, Tobias Wolff, and many others are
critical to her conversion and imitate the ancient Hellenistic-Roman confessional model. Foucault
situates confession at the center of askesis as one of the primary methods of self care. However, he
clearly differentiates between the Christian and Stoic practice, particularly in their relationship to
truth. At the center of Christian askesis, confession is an exercise of truth-telling, “in which the
devoted objectifies himself in a ‘true discourse’” (Yates 94). This truth is pre-determined and is
offered up to a priest, pastor, counselor, or someone in a position of power. Truth-telling within this
model seeks not to liberate the subject herself but to prepare her for a “final liberation from the
bondage of the self”; all “truths” of the self are identified and evaluated based on divine “Truth”
(95). Instead, the truth of the self in Hellenistic-Roman confession is constructed within a different
relationship: “The truth, passing from one to the other in parrhesia, seals, ensures, and guarantees
the other’s autonomy” (Foucault, The Hermeneutics 379). According to Foucault, parrhesia means
“frank speech” and is essential for the intense, affective relationships necessary for self care. He
defines it as the “virtue, duty, and technique [that] must characterize, among other things and above
all, the man who is responsible for directing others, and particularly for directing them in their effort,
their attempt to constitute an appropriate relationship to themselves” (Government 43). In the ancient
philosophical model, the speech that moves a subject toward the enunciation of the truth of self
originates with the master or counselor, or one demonstrates the “coincidence between belief and
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truth…in a verbal activity” (Foucault, Fearless 14). Parrhesia requires a relationship; it cannot be
undertaken alone. Foucault describes it as an ethics of speech in which both participants open their
hearts, one to allow true discourse to flow out, and the other to allow it to flow in (The Hermeneutics
132). This relationship is defined by intimacy and vulnerability, thus placing both participants at
risk.11 Karr’s recovery from addiction and conversion to Catholicism would not have been possible
without parrhesiasts, interlocutors acting as “masters” or experts, not as judges or priests. Clearly,
the sponsor role in addiction recovery, portrayed in Lit by Joan, Deb, and Patti, embraces parrhesia.
In her spiritual life, Karr’s relationships not only with Sister Margaret, but also Toby, John, and
Father Kane, embody the parrhesiastic relationship where, as Foucault describes, “…the master is
an operator in the reform of the individual and in the formation of the individual as a subject. He is
the mediator in the relationship of the individual to his constitution as subject” (125). The following
exchange between Karr and Sister Margaret reflects parrhesia as Foucault imagined, as “a certain
action one will have carried out on the individual, the individual to whom one will have offered a
hand, and whom one will pull out of the state, the status, the mode of life, the mode of being which
he is in…” (129-130). In their first meeting, Sister Margaret says, “‘I see you—she peers though
those lenses—‘what I can see of you, as my sister, God’s beloved child. The hairs on your head are

Foucault’s recognition of the risk in this relationship is echoed by Judith Butler in Giving an
Account for Oneself. The work of Butler is essential when we think about the relationship
between writers and readers of autobiographical texts. In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler
analyzes how personal accounts are scripted with instructions of how readers are to respond. For
Butler, self-accounts are always, inevitably Other-shaping narratives: “It is not simply a question
of imparting information to an Other who is over there, beyond me, waiting to know. On the
contrary, the telling is the performing of an action that presupposes an Other, posits and
elaborates the Other, is given to the Other, or by virtue of the Other, prior to the giving of any
information” (“Giving” 37). Informed by Freud’s model of the therapeutic dyad and the role of
psychological transference, Butler’s self-accounting proposes that the Other, no less than the
self, is proposed and not discovered, through this interaction (Diamond 46).
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numbered, and we’ve been brought together, you and me, to shine on each other a while.’ So, you
don’t judge me? I want to know. ‘For what?’ she said. ‘I don’t even know you’” (Lit 368).
In Foucault’s imagination of the recovery of the Hellenistic-Roman model of conversion,
parrhesia ideally occurs in face-to-face encounters, particularly in his insistence of the embodiment
of askesis. However, he focuses his attention on reading and writing, particularly in the form of
letters, as an essential aspect of self care that engages both the mind and body and that can occur
without physical presence. In his recovery of the ancient practice of letter writing as parrhesia he
explains, “the letter renders the person ‘present’ to the person whom he addresses. And present not
simply by way of the information that he provides to him about his life, his activities, his successes
and failures, his fortunes and misfortunes; present in a way that is immediate and quasi-physical.”
This is because “[t]he letter that…works to subjectivate true discourse…also constitutes at the same
time an objectivation of the soul” (“Self Writing”). Letter writing, then, brings people “face to face”
or “soul to soul” and is distinct from the Christian confessional model of “bearing one’s soul.”
Instead, letters reflect a daily accounting or inventory of actions. The reader, in the role of a guide,
examines this account for patterns of action, noticing those that form the self of the writer. He can
then assess and assist the other’s progress of self to self (Dankel 156). Examining Karr’s memoir
through this repositioning of the roles of the confessional writer, reader, and text—not as a tell-all
tale of past sins traditionally associated with the genre, and instead as a story of movement,
facilitated by others, from an emerging to aspirational self—will be the project of the next chapter.
In his essay “Self-Writing,” Foucault focuses on another form of writing as self care that he
himself practiced, hypomnemata, or the construction of notebooks in which one gathers pieces of
wisdom about living. Foucault is quick to distinguish hypomnemata from both confessional or
academic writing, insisting that the goal is not to provide an account of oneself, but instead to collect
127

the “already-said” toward the larger project of constituting self. The structure of Lit in many ways
acts as hypomnemata. The memoir begins with an open letter to Karr’s son, and proceeds in 45
chapters, each introduced by an epigraph typically from a famous author or philosopher. Including
the quotes that open each of the organizing four sections, and the line from the Odyssey that begins
the entire text, there are 52 times Karr includes someone else’s words in her memoir, not including
quotations within the narrative itself. A distinct departure from her previous two memoirs, Lit
features brief, individually titled chapters that extend the themes or ideas of the introductory
passages. For example, Karr begins “The Nervous Hospital,” the chapter detailing her experiences in
the mental institution with Dorothy Parker’s question, “What fresh hell is this?” (Lit 278) The
previous chapter describing her intake process starts with Czeslaw Milosz’s words, “The history of
my stupidity would fill many volumes.” She builds on this quote in the chapter title, “A Short
History of My Stupidity” (267). Karr’s careful curation of meaningful words from “masters”—
artists, writers, performers, and philosophers serve the same function as Foucault’s hypomnemata, as
an essential method of constructing the truth about self by a careful assemblage of others’ words.
Her epigraphs not only introduce and contextualize her own story, but also pay tribute to the work of
others that she has spent her life admiring. The title “Lit,” when read as an abbreviation for
“literature,” suggests the importance of stories to her life; in interviews, she’s frequently claimed,
“Poetry saved my life” (W. Smith 52). The echoes of others we hear throughout the text, join with
Karr’s voice in creating what Foucault describes as a “chorus”: “Through the interplay of selected
readings and assimilative writing, one should be able to form an identity through which a whole
spiritual genealogy can be read. In a chorus there are tenor, bass, and baritone voices, men's and
women's tones: ‘The voices of the individual singers are hidden; what we hear is the voices of all
together...’” (Foucault, “Self Writing”).
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Conversion narratives, like Mary Karr’s Lit, offer rich possibilities for a rhetorical approach
to identity, as an attempt to persuade others—to change their beliefs—through an expression of who
we are. In this perspective, identity matters less as something one “is” than something one “does” in
language. To the field of life writing, whose texts are both motivated and shaped by conversion, the
ancient practice of askesis serves an essential rhetorical function in the creation of the selves of
autobiography. Foucault’s theory enables the extension of approaches to conversion beyond those of
a traditional Christian model. While conversion can be read within this framework, as it has been
since St. Augustine, this approach threatens to limit the ways we theorize such essential topics as
identity and truth in life writing. Further, it tends to bind the experience of conversion to spirituality,
rather than understand it as a process of transformation inherent to all autobiography. When
conversion is viewed as self-objectivation—as a denial or death of self rather than a return—it is
easy for contemporary scholars to dismiss, particularly scholars of life writing who are perhaps more
invested in the ways identity is constructed rather than destructed. At best, Christian models of
conversion are viewed as no longer culturally or academically viable, and at worst, an
acknowledgement of a restrictive and oppressive world view. If, as I argue in this dissertation, belief
is very much the concern of rhetoric and life writing scholars, and if conversion is inseparable from
belief, then we need a different approach to thinking about transformation in our stories. Conversion
in many ways is less a trope in autobiographical acts than autobiography itself. Jean Starobinki
explains:
…one would hardly have sufficient motive to write an autobiography had not some
radical change occurred in his life—conversion, entry into a new life, the operation of
Grace…It is the internal transformation of the individual—and the exemplary
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character of this transformation—that furnishes a subject for narrative discourse in
which “I” is both subject and object. (78)
Thus, a “conversion” in our own thinking about conversion is necessary as autobiographical
scholars interested in the ways we consider the selves of life narratives, selves that are ultimately an
amalgamation of beliefs. The phenomenon of conversion reminds us that beliefs can and do change,
even if these changes aren’t the radical rejection of the old for a different and better new as a
traditional conversion narrative suggests. While the work of scholars such as Foucault, Bourdieu,
Ward, and Herrnstein Smith remind us that we can never really separate ourselves from the belief
systems in which we have been enculturated, perhaps we can imagine the ways changing our beliefs
can and does alter the trajectories of our personal and communal stories.
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CHAPTER IV
MEMOIR AS MAKING BELIEF: DESIRE, RELATIONSHIP, AND POIESIS IN MARY
KARR’S CHERRY

The object we call a book is not the real book, but its potential, like a musical score or seed. It
exists fully only in the act of being read; and its real home is in the head of the reader, where the
symphony resounds, the seed germinates. A book is a heart that only beats
in the chest of another.
—Rebecca Solnit
Desire desires the desire of another.
—Elizabeth Grosz
Before I attended my little Christian liberal arts college in small-town rural Indiana, I was
raised in another small town, one state over in Illinois, and attended a little Christian church with
a strong fundamentalist streak. I was excruciatingly familiar with the way this fundamentalism
played out in my life: essentially anything cool or fun was forbidden. Verboten. Out of the
question. The binary worldview embraced by fundamentalism reduces complex issues to a
simple “yes” or “no,” a resounding “good” or “bad.” Duran Duran? Bad. Heavy petting? Bad.
The latest John Hughes movie? Bad. Bible quiz team? Good! This dichotomizing philosophy
extended to much more serious issues, like abortion (bad, obviously) and capital punishment
(mostly good), but I couldn’t care less about anything bigger than my own small self struggling
to come of age in a world in which I was always, first, a sinner in need of salvation. A
fundamentalist is defined by this need. By need. By desire for something beyond self, in a future
only imagined.
Margaret Miles, in her memoir Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter, describes
the fundamentalist worldview as an “acute alertness to wrongdoing, and a particular construction
of ‘self.’” The fundamentalist self, according to Miles’s own childhood experience, begins with
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“an especially poignant sense of lack, the quite valid suspicion that I am not real” (6). Miles, a
“recovering” fundamentalist, reflects that it is the idea that sin defines her, her self, that has been
nearly impossible to eradicate in adulthood. St. Augustine in his Confessions describes sin not as
evil but as the absence or lack, “privation,” of good. Either definition—self as sinner or, perhaps
worse, self as nothing—has significant impacts on the fundamentalist believer. It certainly did in
my case. Where I was lacking, the Church, their God, and my parents as ambassadors of both,
completed me. Every single spare space was stuffed full with prayer requests, Sunday school
stories, praise songs, memorized bits of the Old and New Testaments, and pat answers to all the
questions I could think to ask. And yet, I never felt full. Perhaps this is the greatest tragedy of
fundamentalism for its believers: the inability—no matter how ardent the attempts—to be
satiated. In this way, the fundamentalist self is completely ordered by desire, a desire defined by
what is presently missing. This characteristic is most evident in the apocalypticism woven into
the fundamentalist worldview, a phenomenon originally associated with prophetic revelation that
mostly refers to the belief that the world will come to an end, probably within a believer’s
lifetime. Apocalyptic believers tend to live with one foot in the world and the other in the
promise of a future paradise where sinners are punished and believers are rewarded by eternity in
heaven. To live with this belief is to live in a perpetual state of lack, desiring not what is but what
could be.
Reading was an attempt to fill that lack—to make present what was absent. Stories—far
beyond the ones I learned in the Bible—offered me something I could never presently have, and,
in this way, shaped not only what I believed but, more importantly, how I believed. For example,
the first time I remember actually losing myself in/through a book was C.S. Lewis’s The
Chronicles of Narnia. While my earliest and fondest memories involve stories and books, it
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wasn’t until I followed Lucy through the magic wardrobe to Narnia that I really understood what
reading could not only mean but do. Narnia, with its talking animals, snowy landscapes, evil
witches, and ancient prophecies captured my imagination in new ways. Narnia, and getting to
Narnia, consumed my waking thoughts—I dreamed of ways that I, like Lewis’s characters, could
stumble though a wardrobe or leap into a picture frame and be miraculously transported to a
different world. I was always on the lookout for possible portals to Narnia, and not because my
eight-year-old self was unhappy or angstful—I wasn’t looking for something different—I was
looking for something more.12
Narnia, of course, has no external existence, no actual location on any “real” map. The
making present of Narnia requires a creative act, as the word “making” suggests; we are neither
simply passively observing nor actually discovering another world. Graham Ward argues that the
role of literature in making present requires making us believe and therefore helps us understand
how beliefs are made believable. To explain this process, Ward draws on William Wordworth’s
and Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “poetic faith” from their Lyrical Ballads, a concept that I use to
frame this chapter. Literature caters to desire by presenting to us a world/experience/reality that
is both given (by the text) and responded to (by the reader) (Ward 134). There is not “another”
world, but the one we create that we imagine and emotionally interact with as we read
(Unbelievable 134).

12

In The Faraway Nearby, Rebecca Solnit writes of same power The Chronicles of Narnia held
over her as a young reader, particularly in Lewis’s use of doors. Narnia can only be discovered at
the end of a portal—most famously a wardrobe, in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, but
also through picture frames, landscapes that come to life, and secluded forest pools. As a
metaphor for the act of reading itself, Lewis’s characters must travel through doors to enter other
worlds, just as his readers must do. Solnit explains, “Every book is a door that opens onto
another world, which might be the magic that all those children’s books were alluding to” a
description that captures the experience of reading for me (62-63).
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Coleridge, in his 1817 Biographia Literaria, famously writes of the “semblance of truth”
with which all literary endeavors are involved, and of the “procuring” of the “shadows of
imagination,” that “willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic
faith” (Chapter XIV). “Procuring” suggests lack, the desire to obtain something. The imagination
desires—and this association with belief, a reminder of the word’s Old High German root
“galaub,” meaning “to desire, care, love” (Unbelievable 135). Stories pander to our desire, and
what we desire is the suspension of disbelief, which Ward argues is not the antithesis of belief
that Coleridge suggests, but a reaction to the cultural rationalism still prominent. Instead, Ward
argues that there is no such thing as “disbelief,” only a displaced object of another belief (135).
In other words, to believe in nothing is still to believe.
The rational mind, a direct result of John Locke’s epistemology, is not open to the
possibilities of miracle or to what Coleridge portrays as “the wonders of the world before us;” it
cannot transcend the natural or respond to the transcendent. To suspend our disbelief suggests a
“giving in,” and although Coleridge describes this as “willing,” Ward identifies this process less
as an act of the deliberate will and more as “a giving-in to the erotic solicitations of the poetic”
(Unbelievable 136). He explains, “A shadow crosses the relationship between the affective
(desiring), imagining, believing, and knowing. It is the shadow of seduction, the eclipse of
reason by the libidinous passions, and the overwhelming of the will” (136). In Biographia
Literaria, Coleridge distinguishes his own poetic attempts from Wordworth’s when completing
the Lyrical Ballads; while Coleridge believes “endeavors should be directed to persons and
characters supernatural,” Wordsworth strove “to give the charm of novelty to things of every
day, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural” (Chapter XIV). The excitation of
feeling is associated with “awaking the mind’s attention”—the emotional is inseparable from the
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intellectual and rooted in the imagination. According to Coleridge, the result is not only
therapeutic, but also salvific. Poetic faith, thus, invokes a transcendence that is both theological
and ethical; we will be moved from our “selfish solicitude” as “we have eyes, yet see not, ears
that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand.” The very ways we believe are affected
by literature, by stories, as we are moved from our locations and perceptions of the individual
self (Ward, Unbelievable 136). Thus, belief is not only given expression when we read—but also
created. As Ward explains, “…we can go even further with reading: to be ‘engrossed’ is to be
absorbed into the world presented; its world co-evolves with our participation” (139). Ward
notes, and I explore further in this chapter, that our capacity for poetic belief—like all belief—is
not just a cognitive event but an embodied and affective experience. He categorizes this process
with the acts of receiving and responding: “We enter an interaction that resituates us, not
topographically but in terms of what we are receiving and responding to in our substituted
locality. That receiving and responding acts upon and within our structures of believing. We
could not read at all if we did not have the capacity to believe; to make believe” (140).
Accordingly, “suspension of disbelief” makes possible alternative states of believing, and, thus,
the suspension of belief is impossible (140).
My interest, particularly in the experience of reading memoir, is in this process of
receiving and responding between people—both “real” and imagined—as identified through the
relationships forged through and within autobiography. Drawing upon Ward’s work on poetic
belief, as well as affect theory, I imagine these relationships as structured by both desire and
belief in the ways we imagine the other. Thus, in this chapter, I examine relationships—between
belief and desire, between autobiographical narrators and characters, between writers and
readers, between readers and texts, as affective and embodied responses rooted in and motivated
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by an anticipation of something or someone beyond the individual self. Engaging contemporary
understandings of desire resulting specifically from the field of affect theory, I focus on how
desire moves between people and structures relationships through the writing and reading of
memoir. To do this, I engage Ward’s work on poetic faith, particularly in the act of reading as a
productive relationship that is mediated by desire. Using Aristotle’s concept of poiesis, I argue,
like Ward, that reading itself is poietic, a transformative and creative act that that both actualizes
and demands belief (Unbelievable 147). However, while Ward’s argument focuses on reading
fiction, I extend poiesis to the act of writing and reading autobiography, uniquely motivated by
the mutual desire to know, recognize, and make believe, as creative acts offered by the
relationship between life writers and readers. Through an examination of the memoir Cherry,
particularly as it both illuminates and fosters our desire for relationships, I posit that Mary Karr
is able to skillfully negotiate the tricky spaces between our identities and our beliefs. And,
ultimately, it is this ability, realized through the relationship with her readers, that makes her
beliefs believable—that makes us believe.
As I noted in chapter one, “belief is both emotional and relational before it is rational”
(Ward 55). Thus, the relationship between reader and writer of autobiography provides a
fascinating space for inquiry, extending beyond an autobiographical “pact,” predicated on the
basic belief in the veracity of the narrator’s identity, to a relationship, or, as Egan describes, “an
intersubjective exchange between narrator and reader aimed at producing a shared understanding
of the meaning of a life” (Smith and Watson 16). I believe Mary Karr, not just in a fact-checking,
verifiable kind of way, although, as I’ve previously noted, her attention to historical accuracy is
widely known in the field. What I mean when I say I believe Mary Karr is much more
complicated, motivated by a different kind of truth-seeking, caught up in the narrative interaction
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between writer and reader, rooted in a myriad of desires, and enacted in the embodied processes
of writing and reading. And yet, this belief isn’t mine alone as Karr’s enduring popularity attests,
spanning readers from various professions, ages, faiths, and interests. In the wake of the memoir
boom—when memoirs continue to capture our public attention and private imagination—why
does Karr’s work resonate with both popular and critical audiences? With secular readers and the
most ardent believers? I argue that her stories transcend such distinctions by deftly navigating the
spaces between them, and by extending to readers a “truthful” story, regardless of how we
choose to define that elusive word. In a culture that simultaneously champions and subjugates
belief, Karr’s memoirs unapologetically reveal hers and require ours. And yet, what we believe
might mean less than the ability to believe. Of Karr’s rare skill to speak to such diverse
readers/believers, Francine Prose remarks, “We believe she means every word, fiercely dredging
up memories, however wrenching to revisit. At the same time she’s keeping a cool eye on what
makes a story work.” Karr’s stories invite us to not just suspend our disbelief, but to actually
make belief. Readers believe in the “truth” of Mary Karr, perhaps because she allows us to hold
our own beliefs while still believing her.
Desire and the Transmission of Affect
To understand how Karr achieves this effect on her audience—to make us believe, to
make belief—affect theory is particularly suggestive. If belief is, as Ward argues, a mode of
cognition associated with imagination, motivation, desire, intuition, and feeling” (Unbelievable
77), then affect theory can illuminate how desire and belief work in tandem. Ward’s use of
motivation is instructive here; he explains, “by motivation I mean the energies that swirl within
embodiment itself, fed by air and water and various foods, orientated by appetite…” (77). Ward
compares this function of belief to appetite, resembling Baruch Spinoza’s conatus or self137

protective drive to live, and desire, as stronger and deeper than appetite because it “longs for
what it cannot name” (77). “Motivation,” from the Latin to move or to motor, yokes belief with
movement forward—with anticipation and projection of something beyond (“Motivation”). Our
beliefs are not only revealed in our desires but are also shaped by them.
A limited examination of prominent cultural theories of desire, particularly as a result of
the “affective turn,” is useful in understanding the relationship between self and other. Very
broadly speaking, our cultural conceptualizations of desire have shifted as a result of postmodern
intervention and as a result of affective theory based on the work of scholars such as Lauren
Berlant, Baruch Spinoza, and Brian Massumi. Berlant describes desire as a “state of attachment
to something or someone, and the cloud of possibility that is generated by the gap between an
object’s specificity and the needs and promises projected onto it” (“Intimacy” 6). This gap is a
large and tricky space, full of intricate signals that we confuse with other things like love.
According to Berlant, desire visits us as an impact from the outside, but when it engages us
emotionally, it makes us feel as though it comes from within. So when we desire something, like
a piece of dark chocolate, or someone, we feel alive from the inside out. The inside-out metaphor
is especially illuminating when considering the relationship between reader and writer. When we
engage another, anticipation and projection excites the imagination; there is a desire to
understand, a desire for the immediacy of relation, a desire for transparency. In autobiography,
these desires often translate into a desire for “truth,” an occurrence that surely muddies the
already contested issue of autobiographical authenticity.
Desire, like belief, is not only a disposition but also a forward-looking drive, an example
of what German critical theorist Ernst Bloch labeled “positive expectant emotions”:
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Expectant emotions (like anxiety, fear, hope, and belief) are those whose driveintention is long-term, whose drive-object does not lie ready, not just in respective
individual attainability, but also in the already available world…thus the
expectant emotions are distinguished from filled emotions by the incomparably
greater anticipatory character in their intention, their substance and their object.
(74-75)
According to Bloch, all emotions are bound by the “horizon of time,” but the expectant emotions
“open out entirely onto this horizon” (74). Temporality, as an organizing structure, orients these
emotions forward, always moving toward the future and something or someone else that is not
yet ours.
One of the most useful definitions of desire, Kristyn Gorton argues, can be found in JeanPaul Sartre’s 1956 Being and Nothingness wherein he describes desire as trouble, drawing on the
analogy between troubled water and the desiring consciousness (387). According to Sartre,
desire stirs up things from below, disturbing the surface, and clouding our judgment (Gorton 18).
Sigmund Freud famously theorizes desire as movement, emphasizing the connection between
desire and drive; he also defines desire as lack, a concept that is further developed by Jacques
Lacan. Lacan conceives desire through the question of the Other, and thus establishes the role of
the analyst to find meaning and establish a cure (18). In their groundbreaking work on desire,
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari move away from the idea of lack and toward desire as
production, playing a central role in capitalism. Gorton argues that this shift reflects a contrast
“between a negative conceptualization of desire and a positive or productive one and also a
contrast between a (modern) search for meaning and a (postmodern) recognition of multiple
interpretations” (18). This shift, toward a conflation of desire with production, has complicated
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how we theorize desire, not only what it is but what it does. A view of desire as production has,
rather than freeing up our relationship to desire, commodified and alienated it; as a result, desire
has become less accessible. Berlant addresses this failure in her work on intimacy, suggesting
that “Virtually no one knows how to do intimacy…People talk about the desire for it and the fear
of it…in its instantiation as desire, it destabilizes the very things that institutions of intimacy are
created to stabilize” (“Intimacy” 2).
Theorist Elizabeth Grosz reimagines Deleuze and Guattari’s work on desire as production
by placing it in conversation with feminist theory, attempting to move beyond a psychoanalytical
‘ontology of lack’ towards the ‘productive potential in becoming.’ In this repositioning, Grosz
argues, “Desire does not take for itself a particular object whose attainment it requires; rather it
aims at nothing above its own proliferation or self-expansions…it moves, it does” (165). Elspeth
Probyn engages Grosz’s work to consider how desire moves and what it does, how
“desire…propels…touches off and sets into motion different possibilities” (13). In her
reconfiguration of lesbian desire, Probyn is interested in a queer use of the concept; rather than
conceive of desire as pointing toward one object (person, place, or thing) and therefore slipping
into the “negative polemics of lack,” she considers the movement inherent to desire. Like
Guattari and Deleuze, Probyn argues that “desire is productive; it is what oils the lines of the
social” (13), and, therefore, “desire…and writing are about the modes of affecting movement,
movement aimed at creating a momentum of change in social relationships” (14). What Probyn’s
work reveals, most relevant to my work in this chapter, is the “positivity of desire as it produces
new relations and relationships among individuals, things, groups, etc.” (14) Desire, like belief,
moves us toward objects and others as it looks forward in expectation.
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Like belief, desire does things—to texts, to lives, and to stories about those lives. Gorton
explains, “Desire creates recognition (through identification and the gaze); it marks the narrative;
it highlights the moment when lovers’ eyes meet; it affects the lives of characters; it marks their
bodies, forcing them to move, act or react differently; and it transforms people—radically alters
their being-in-the world” (19). If desire works as Gorton suggests, an examination of its effects
on writers and readers of autobiography yields provocative discoveries as both are engaged in
relationships to individual stories and to collective others, relationships motivated and mediated
by desire. Understanding desire as movement, as embodied in autobiographical relationships
(between characters, readers, writers, texts), and expressed in various ways, necessarily draws
upon recent work in affect theory, specifically on the transmission of affect, to illuminate its
intensity and potential to motivate change.
To understand how desire is transmitted or moves, Sara Ahmed’s work on the cultural
politics of emotion is particularly informative. Ahmed defines emotion as “the feeling of bodily
change” and notes that emotions “shape the very surfaces of bodies which take shape through the
repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations towards and away from others”
(4). This movement towards and away is highlighted in the Latin root of emotion emovere,
meaning “to move, to move out” (11) and serving as the origin of the words motive and
motivation. With her work, Ahmed critiques both “inside out” and “outside in” models of
emotion that have dominated our cultural assumptions of how emotions move. In the inside out
or “psychological model,” emotions are discovered by looking inwards, asking myself “How do
I feel?” and then expressing my feelings, allowing others to respond to them. If the other
sympathizes, then we might have a “fellow-feeling,” and if not, then we might feel alienated
from each other. The logic behind this model is that “I have feelings, which then move outwards
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towards objects and others, and which might then return to me” (9). The “outside in” model
reverses direction, where the individual is no longer the source of the feeling. Instead, the feeling
comes from without. Ahmed argues that both of these models rely on the distinction between
“inside and outside, the individual and the social, and the ‘me’ and the ‘we’” (9). Rather,
emotions are relational, involving reactions and relations of “towardness” or “awayness” in
relation to objects. Therefore, emotions are not ‘in’ either the individual or the social but produce
the very surfaces and boundaries that “allow the individual and the social to be delineated as if
they are objects” (10).
Teresa Brennan’s work on the transmission of affect further troubles the illusion of
boundaries between objects, as “there is no secure distinction between the ‘individual’ and the
‘environment’” (6). Brennan uses the term “transmission of affect” to name a process that is
social in origin but biological and physical in effect; “the origin of transmitted affects is social in
that these affects do not only arise within a particular person but also come from without” (3).
Affects, while coming from interactions with other people and the environment, have a
physiological impact. Simply, by “transmission of affect,” Brennan means, “the emotions or
affects of one person, and the enhancing or depressing energies these affects entail, can enter into
another” (3). Affect, then, is not a personal feeling, but the means through which bodies interact
in context with each other. Ahmed, too, argues that emotions are not just a result of movement
but also about attachments between bodies. She explains, “What moves us, what makes us feel,
is also that which holds us in place, or gives us a dwelling place….movement…connects bodies
to other bodies: attachments take place through movement, through being moved by the
proximity of others” (11). Because this chapter is specifically about desire, about how it works
affectively to structure relationships in autobiographical projects, Ahmed’s and Brennan’s work
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on the boundaries between objects—between self and others—is particularly cogent. My
argument, thus, builds on this theory of affective movement or of the potentialities of
attachments between bodies. These attachments, produced by the constructed relationships
between autobiographical readers, writers, and texts, form a complicated “web of affect” by
which desires and beliefs are shared. Our desires move us just as we are moved by other’s
desires.
Perhaps it is no surprise that I chose Karr’s second memoir Cherry as a text through
which to examine desire as the memoir traces her coming-of-age, “detailing…the usual rites of
passage for a talented, spirited girl between the ages of 11 and 16 in a small town: her first
pimple, her first crush, her first ‘sex club,’ her friendships, teenage romances, experiments with
drugs…and so on” (Law-Yone). Desire seems to go hand-in-hand with our cultural
characterizations of adolescence, yet the burgeoning sexuality commonly associated with early
teenage years isn’t the only focus of the memoir. While she definitely desires the attentions of
her crush John Cleary, Karr more explicitly desires the intimacy of a close friend, the affection of
her parents, the recognition of her peers, the escape of drugs and alcohol, and the promise of
poetry. Thus, desire, as a “positive expectant emotion” organizes the memoir and moves the
narrative forward in expectation—both Karr’s and her reader’s. Will Mary get what she wants?
This question motivates the story, and our reading of it as we recognize in Karr’s struggles our
own. In her review of the book, Sara Mosle explains, “Cherry succeeds because of its
universality.” Perhaps it is the familiarity of Karr’s childhood, what Alix Kates Shulman calls
“an ordinary plot: American girl traverses the tricky terrain of adolescence,” that initially hails
readers and with the promise of mutual recognition and offers the invitation to believe. This
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invitation defines the act of autobiography itself, as a shared experience between writer and
reader, defined by the desires of both.
Cherry provides us with a number of relationships to consider both within the memoir
and in our lives. However, before I examine these relationships, a brief exploration of
autobiographical subjectivity is crucial with a particular emphasis on the complicated position of
the “I” and “you” in memoir. The distinction between these subjectivities has been theorized
extensively in the field and continues to inspire compelling scholarship. Perhaps most notably in
Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives, scholars Sidonie Smith and
Julia Watson explain the complicated role of the speaker/narrator using five distinctions: the
autobiographical “I” (the producer of the story), the “real” or historical “I” (the flesh-and-flood
person located in a particular time and place), the narrating “I” (the “I” who tells the story), the
narrated “I” (the version of the self that the narrating “I” chooses to constitute through
recollection for the reader), and the ideological “I” (the concept of personhood culturally
available to the narrator when telling the story) (72-76). Readers of autobiography can easily be
seduced into confusing the autobiographical narrator with the historical person who is writing the
text (or narrating the story or being narrated by the story), especially if the author is still alive,
like Mary Karr. Smith and Watson remind us, however, that the “real” or historical “I” is
“unknown and unknowable by readers and is not the ‘I’ we gain access to in an autobiographical
narrative” (72).13 Because an autobiographer can inhabit multiple positions simultaneously, the

Karr’s narrated “I” is further complicated by her narration of childhood experience from her
adult perspective. Smith and Watson explain, “That child…is an objectified and remembered ‘I,’
the memory of a younger version of a self. The child is not doing the remembering or the
narrating of the story” (73). Cherry’s narrator, then, occupies multiple subject positions,
challenging any attempt to establish any dichotomy between the narrating “I” and narrated “I.”
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reader inevitably finds herself cast in various roles, each offering a different relationship to the
text and each exciting different desires. In the remainder of this chapter, I identify some of these
key relationships and, using various theoretical contributions, suggest how they work broadly to
“make belief “or make us believe in the stories of Mary Karr. When appropriate, I refer to the
narrated “I” as “Mary,” or the version of self that Karr is narrating based on her memory, and
“Karr” generally to refer to the autobiographical “I” or narrating “I.” However, because of the
complicated concept of autobiographical subjectivity, my attempt to neatly categorize such
relationships feels tentative at best. I offer the following “sections,” organized by relationships
and the desires each reveals, with the caveat that such distinctions can only be suggested. The
boundaries remain temporary and contingent, mirroring the borders between selves and others, as
revealed in any autobiographic project.
The Relationship between the Narrated “I” and Autobiographical Characters
To understand how desire structures relationships in Cherry, I first want to look at Karr’s
position as the narrated “I.” What does Mary desire? This perspective allows us to observe
Karr’s most crucial relationships as an exploration of adolescent longing and then experience
them as a model for our own desires. What Mary longs for in others—to be desired, yes, but
more importantly to be recognized—mirrors our own desire as readers. While I am not limiting
my analysis of desire in Cherry to Karr’s sexual awakening—or conflating desire with sexual
desire—it certainly cannot be underestimated. Indeed, it is the desire between characters,
specifically Karr and a number of her early boyfriends, that has garnered the most attention in
the memoir. However, expanding our view to consider the multiple subjectivities Karr inhabits,
and the resulting effects on readers, broadens our understanding of how desire works in the
relationships fostered by autobiography.
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Certainly, at first glance, Cherry is a story about awakening desire, realized in the
relationships between the adolescent characters. Karr’s frank and lyrical exploration of some of
her earliest longings establishes desire at the center of the memoir. Writing female desire in
autobiography is notoriously and historically difficult as memoirist Claire Dederer argues in her
article, “Why Is It So Hard for Women to Write about Sex?”14 She answers her own question,
“Because it’s easier to titillate, shock, and lie than to get at the messy truth about female desire,”
requiring “even the boldest of writers to stare down the specter of modesty” (102). She explains,
“Female desire and arousal have for so long been represented as a form of incitement to men that
it’s hard for a woman to describe lust” (102). Arguing that female desire lies perhaps as much in
the mind as in the body—“Female lust is a powerful force, but it surges in the form of an
interrogation, rather than a statement. Not I want this but Do I want this? What exactly do I
want? How about now? And now?”—Dederer identifies the difficulty of “narrative truth-telling”
when attempting to capture just how “equivocal yet irrepressible female sexuality is” (104).
Dederer recognizes Karr’s Cherry as an autobiographical attempt to complicate female desire
and suggests that the challenge facing contemporary memoir writing is “to get at what feels true,
which is that the endless internal oscillation that happens during sex needn’t sabotage our sexual
experience, much less our autonomy. If questioning can’t be part of expressing female desire,
that is a diminishment” (104). Dederer’s observations feel particularly cogent to Cherry’s
portrayal of desire—what makes Karr’s scenes so memorable, so sexy, is not necessarily sex
itself, but her response to it. Robin Bradford notes, “Sex is what really stands out in Cherry—not
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Both Miller and Eakin are interested in the impact of gender on reading autobiography. For a
further exploration of this topic, please see Nancy K. Miller’s “Facts, Pacts, Acts” and Paul John
Eakin’s “Relational Selves, Relational Lives: The Story of the Story.”
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the hard-core act that the title suggests but the chaste sexual longing of girls.” Sexual longing is
the effect of desire, clearly differentiated from the act itself—to long for is to yearn for
something that has not happened yet, for something beyond the present self.
Karr admits her struggle to get the sex right: “Our culture doesn’t recognize what is
libidinal for a young girl. There’s not a language for girls to have sexual feelings. Though the
world is saturated with the language of male stimulation, there’s nothing comparable for girls”
(Bradford). Of the autobiographer’s challenge in writing desire, Karr says, “Women don’t write
about it—except aberrant sex. Maya Angelou’s rape scene in I Know Why a Caged Bird Sings
comes to mind and Katherine Harrison’s The Kiss. But most women memoirists just skip over
the years 12 to 16” (Bradford). And then there’s the added challenge present in all childhood
autobiography of authentically capturing experiences that happened deep in the past. Dederer
describes this as “the difficulty of knowing exactly how you feel at any given time, and then the
added difficulty of traveling back in time to find the words to say what it was really like” (108).
Karr explains that she mostly “mined her memory” for what her sexual fantasies were “back
then,” surprising herself by how simple her desire was (Bradford). It is perhaps this simplicity
that lends some of her most innocent and intimate moments a fierce sexuality. The object of her
first crush and earliest desire is John Cleary, whom she first declares her love for at six years old
“with little subtlety; I walked the road before his house with I LOVE JOHN CLEARY in black
magic marker on the back of my shirt” (Cherry 42). Later, as she gets older, she notes “the
instant a tensile line stretched between us. Some silk actually seemed to spin in the summer air
from him to me” (44).
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What the young narrator imagines is less about her sexual identity than her identity in
general as shaped by this early desire. In the following passage, she pays attention to the impact
our first loves have on our selves and our relationship to others:
First loves take us like that. But because they rarely have any consequence,
people slight them…our own features in youth have not yet been sharply carved.
So in some way, we don’t exist yet. Thus we mock ourselves for loving so easily
and in the process choke the breath from our first darlings. Which denies their
truth, I think, for my inner life took full shape around such a love. I learned to
imagine around his face. Before such enchantment takes us, there are only the
faces of parents, other kin. These are doled out to us; they are us in some portion.
These first beloveds are other. And we invent ourselves by choosing them.
(Cherry 44)
Echoed throughout this passage is the questioning or “internal oscillation” that Dederer argues
complicates female desire. In autobiography, it is the “truth” of present awareness recast on past
experience that authenticates the narrative.
Like Dederer, who suggests, “If the point is to find truths about desire—not in what the
author did but in what she felt and thought while she did it—outré territory in the realm of sex
memoir gets redefined: the memoirist needn’t have sex at all” (104), Karr’s sexiest scenes exist
in her imagination rather than her body. Describing a neighbor’s cousin visiting for the summer,
who was “slim and brown and expressionless in a way that let [her] manufacture complex
thoughts for him,” Karr writes: “…his thoughtless beauty dragged from me the faint tug of
something like desire…This wasn’t desire as it would become. Not yet. The cool fire circled
more in my abdomen than between my legs, and it was vague and smoke gray. I pictured no boy
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yet—not even John Cleary—gathering me into his arms” (Cherry 45). Her desire is focused not
exactly on being touched but instead, on being seen—recognized. Karr remembers:
I’ve never met a girl as young as I was then who craved a bona fide boning. But
flowing nonspecifically from my solar plexus was this forceful light. I wanted
John Cleary...or some other boy to see that light, to admire it, not to feed off it for
his own hungers. When I closed my eyes at night, I did not manufacture naked
bodies entwined…I pictured John Cleary…taking my hand for the couples’ skate
at the rink…with his gaze inventing me in the stare of those we passed. (46)
The image of desire having the power to “invent” is echoed later in the memoir when Karr
describes “a va-va voom moment, and you’re drunk on being both source and recipient of that
desire. After the vast years of solitude, his aqua eyes carry you into the air. Incarnate you. Your
fleshly image of yourself is deriving from what he sees” (168). The reimagination of adolescent
female desire as an authentic reflection of the “contrasting Sturm und Drang in [the] heart and
brain that accompan(ies) it” (Dederer 102) distinguishes Karr’s Cherry.
Karr suggests that the lack of memoirs about girls’ adolescent experiences might be due
to a lack of language for such experience. In an interview for The Paris Review, she explains,
“When I started Cherry, I realized there were no words to describe an awakening female libido.
Boys have these childlike words like chubby and woody, but the parlance for female genitalia
and female desires is too porno.” The longing of teenage girls, Karr argues, is as powerful as
sexual longing, but “not so genital.” Instead, “It’s somewhat about being seen—what feminist
critics might call a longing for the male gaze. Being looked at in this culture invents you as a
woman long before you’re getting laid. It was about love more than sex—about beauty, desire”
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(Fortini 71). Karr connects desire here with being seen and the recognition inherent to
intersubjectivity where the self is developed in and in relation to someone else.
While Karr certainly traces her burgeoning identity to John Cleary, Phil, and other male
characters in her adolescence, perhaps the most powerful recognition she experiences is with her
friend, Meredith Bright, who moves to Leechfield from Mississippi when Karr is in high school.
On a constant search “for like-minded souls,” Karr first notices Meredith reading Dostoevsky on
the bus, “a rarity since books by Russians can make teachers question you vigorously about
Communism” (Cherry 143). Encouraged by Meredith’s boldness, Karr approaches her and says,
“I hear you’re a genius” (143). Meredith returns with “This is true,” and the most momentous
friendship of Karr’s life is born. When Karr recites an obscure poem from memory that Meredith
finishes, they recognize in each other something completely new. Karr remembers of this
moment, “Meredith continues to nod slowly at you, and you at her. You’re lost in some capsule
of wonder that will sustain you both in years to come beyond anything you could hope for. When
a smile breaks out across her moon face, something worthwhile has been granted” (146).
Meredith, a genius who can discourse not only on Dostoevsky and Pynchon, but also on most
contemporary poetry and philosophy, becomes Karr’s “heart companion.” The desire motivating
Karr’s intellectual awakening is as profound as her sexuality.
Not only does Meredith mirror Karr’s academic and literary interests, but she also seems
to understand the neglect and isolation that have shaped Mary’s past, a connection that is
particularly evident in the characters’ dialogue. Jessica Benjamin’s theory of intersubjectivity, a
theory that “maintains that the individual grows in and through the relationship to other subjects”
(Egan, Mirror Talk 19-20), highlights the role of dialogue in realizing identity in autobiography.
Dialogue can position the self as both respectful of and distinct from others. Life writing scholar
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Nancy K. Miller explains: “Autobiographers who, within one text, are both subject and object of
speech and regard, becoming in turn self and other for each other, play out the politics of lived
experiences as a realistic trope for exploring, defining, and expressing just who they are”
(“Facts” 8). Intersubjectivity requires mutual recognition, “the necessity of recognizing as well
as being recognized by the other...”(Benjamin, The Bonds 23). This idea implies that we actually
have a need to recognize the other as a separate person who is like us yet distinct. The dialogue
between Karr and Meredith vividly represents this need in both girls. After a passage where the
two discuss Victorian fainting couches and the merits of Thomas Pynchon’s V (Meredith’s
recommendation), Karr writes, “This kind of banter is part of an unspoken contract whereby
Meredith will pat you on the head a few times before she actually undertakes explaining
whatever book has stumped you. The charade somehow dilutes the fact that the most meritorious
opinions invariably stem from Meredith. Without this oblique shoring up, the friendship would
consist of her lecturing while you take notes” (Cherry 149).
Karr explains, “Kids in distressed families are great repositories of silence and carry in
their bodies whole arctic wastelands of words not to be uttered, stories not to be told” (Cherry
156). The secrecy inherent in dysfunctional family systems causes, “a bristling agony” which can
only be relieved by talk—“hours and hours of unmuzzled talk, the recounting of stories. Who
listens is almost beside the point…” (156). Without a space for such conversation, kids tend to
assume personal fault for the failures of their families. Karr recognizes the “gravity of such
silence” in Meredith, and Meredith in her. Meredith observes, “I can see that you’ve suffered,” to
which Karr replies, “I can see that about you too” (157). This mutual recognition binds the girls
further together, permitting both the opportunity to “air family dramas abstractly…without
betraying the tribal silence you’ve both forsworn” (157).
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Throughout Cherry, Karr portrays Meredith as both a kindred spirit and distinctly
separate. As the calm to Mary’s storms, Meredith is unfailingly kind and singularly brilliant.
When Karr plummets into the drug and alcohol abuse that will follow her into adulthood,
Meredith opts instead for the stability of a relationship, eventually leaving Leechfield and Karr
behind. However, at the end of the book, Karr reconnects with Meredith who is home for Easter
to share the epiphany of self-discovery that concludes the memoir. As “Meredith listens through
the screen with head bowed like a confessor,” Karr delivers her discovered truth: “There’s no
place like home” (Cherry 273). Predictably, Meredith problematizes the originality of Karr’s
“ultimate sentence” (“You do remember it’s from Wizard of Oz? she asks”), but offers her friend
something much more poignant in return: “You’re your Same Self” (276). Karr recognizes the
truth in her friend’s observation, “Like I’m chocolate through to the center…Same Self” (276).
She concludes, “That oddball catchphrase will serve as a touchstone in years to come, an instant
you’ll return to after traveling the far roads. Like everything else, Meredith thought it up. You
were there solely for embellishment and witness. You were there to watch” (276). In this
compelling scene, Meredith and Karr literally call Mary’s identity into being, as a collaborative
creation of self—a self that is simultaneously the same and different than her best friend. Karr’s
desire for recognition is met in Meredith, and their relationship exemplifies intersubjectivity as it
works to shape individuals in response to others. The “you” in this passage could be read in
another way, again an example of intersubjectivity, as a relationship between the narrating “I”
and narrated “I”—between Karr and Mary—as a version of self available only through the act of
autobiography. Both selves, as versions of “you,” reveal the rich complexities of subjectivity in
life writing. Simultaneously revealing both self and other, the identities that we create on the
page reflect a collaborative production of co-creation.
152

The Relationship between Narrators, Characters, and Readers
If female desire works the way both Dederer and Karr seem to suggest—less a result of
complicated sexual acts than a nuanced exploration of the complicated thoughts surrounding
them—then perhaps that is why the desire portrayed in Cherry feels real or “true.” Not only does
it move readers to believe in its authenticity, it moves readers to feel the same desire. We
recognize in Karr’s experiences our own; thus, our relationships to the characters in Cherry,
including our relationship to Mary as the narrated “I,” are born of and fueled by our own desires.
A return to Ward’s concept of poetic belief as it extends to the relationship between
reader, narrator, and characters is fruitful here. Ward argues that our projection toward others,
inherent in the process of reading, is a manifestation of both desire and belief as we create the
other person (Unbelievable 141). Although Ward’s focus is on the act of reading fiction and on
our relationship to fictional “characters,” I find it especially productive when considering
autobiographical subjects, specifically, how—as rhetorical constructions—they challenge and
resist traditional categorizations. Ward notes three places where the encounters between a “real”
person and fictional character diverge, arguing that such divergences reveal belief, desire, and
the imagination (144). I argue that Ward’s distinctions can be applied, also, to the narrating “I”
and narrated “I” as “characters” we meet on the page. First, when we encounter an unknown
person, unlike a narrator or character, the relation established is reciprocal. The person I meet
can make judgments about me based on my reception and response, as I her. A narrator/character
cannot reciprocate, regardless of my participation. Further, in a reciprocal relationship with
another person there is the possibility of deception and manipulation.
Secondly, Ward argues that projection and anticipation work differently in these
relationships; “for what is anticipated with a character is a narrative—a future development
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related to the direction taken by the plot” (Unbelievable 145). While our imagination can create
various alternative narratives for people we meet, narrators/characters are already “in the
narrative” and bound as such: “…the curiosity to know that informs our reception and response
cannot be divorced from an expectation that something is certain to follow” (145). A final
difference is felt in our reception and response to narrators/characters. Ward explains that what
we are seeking in characters is a means to fill a “fundamental absence, a more profound and
affective invisibility…that calls for a deeper commitment to an engagement in the process of
believing” (145). With the stranger in front of us we are not asking whether or not she exists. On
the other hand, a relationship with a narrated “I” or autobiographical character requires
something different from us: we are “co-creating, we are making them present within us, not
before us; and whilst believing in them, we know they are not there at all” (145). Poetic faith,
then, engages our ability to make present—our interest is a testament to the intensity of our
“willing suspension of disbelief” (145).
How much more complicated poetic faith and belief become when considering the
“characters” in autobiography, people who really do exist. For example, I have met Mary Karr
twice. A quick Internet search can reveal pictures of her sister Lecia, her son Dev, her exhusband Warren, and her ex-lover, David Foster Wallace. These people have lived and live in the
“real world” as well as in readers’ imaginations, shifting the way we think about our
relationships to narrators/characters in autobiography and thus our relationship to the “truth” in
these narratives. In this way, our desire for recognition threatens to be satisfied when we imagine
that the person who historically exists or exists on Facebook is the same as the narrator as a
“character” when we conflate the autobiographical “I” with the historical “I.”
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Life writing scholar Leah Anderst explores the affective possibilities afforded in the
relationships between readers of autobiography and the characters they encounter. Anderst’s
focus is on empathy, and she argues that while most scholarship considers the empathetic effects
of reading fiction, the possibilities of “feeling with” autobiographical characters might be even
more profound (272). Because autobiography is rooted in the “real world,” readers read it
differently from other kinds of texts, and this difference, Eakin argues, “is what makes
autobiography matter to autobiographers and their readers” (Touching 30). In recognizing the
power of Mary’s desire, we “feel with” her along with the other adolescent characters in the
memoir. What does Mary want? Or Meredith? Doonie? John Cleary? As we discover the
answers to these questions, our own desires are (re)awakened, as our memories incite affective
responses. “Interactive remembering,” Miller explains, “where the screen prompts the
construction of memory itself,” is one of the richest possibilities autobiography can offer (But
Enough 7). She explains, “When you read a memoir that has already given a life something like
yours a shape…it gets harder to hold onto your sense of self-possession; the boundaries of your
past self may start to blur around the edges” (7). Rather than a loss, however, this prospect is a
gain: “you can seize what it is that escapes the grid” (7). Perhaps what we desire when we read
memoir is to simply remember what time constantly threatens to erase.
The power of Karr’s narrative to produce desire in her readers isn’t based solely on her
ability to accurately capture female desire. Her poetic language, too, imbues her experiences with
lush possibilities. Shulman describes Karr as “a poet, high on language” and goes so far to
suggest that the true “hero” of Cherry is “Karr’s slangy, muscular, free-wheeling prose: the
English language goes wild with arousal and submits to her will as Karr takes any liberties she
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likes…never before has a kiss been described so fully,” as is evidenced by this scene describing
her first kisses with Phil (19):
You often go meandering inside his breath until you feel yourself vanish into the
plush warmth of his tongue, each movement of which is a word or piece of
punctuation in a conversation so intricate, all your diligence is required to keep
up. He runs his tongue along your lower lip like a question, and you return the
inquiry. Then in unison your tongues meet all soft on that same territory and glide
together the small distance. Touch and withdraw, taste and test. All the light of
your being seems to pour into him at such moments, and his into you. His tongue
barely spirits along a closed eyelid leaving a light stripe of cool damp. For the
whirled cartilage of your ear, it’s cyclonic. Or he can hypnotize you by lightly
tracing a finger along your jawline as if he were drawing you into being…”
(Cherry 167)
The comparison of the kiss to a conversation, highlighted by the punctuation of touch, embodies
the highly metaphoric prose characterizing all of Karr’s writing. This passage also marks the
moment when desire joins together the body and language, locating the origin of both in the
mouth. Mary is “drawn into being” not only by Phil’s kiss, but the discourse that the touch
embodies.15
Because desire, like belief, is an expectant rather than filled emotion, Bloch reminds us
its “drive-intention is long-term” motivated by the anticipation and projection of something
beyond. To further underscore her own early desire, and to evoke it in her readers, Karr employs
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Thank you to Dr. Brian Rejack, Illinois State University, for this connection.
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a deliberately slow pace to some of her most erotic passages. In the passage quoted at length
above, she literally stops time in order to let the reader linger in the moment and savor the
details. The narrator, herself, feels no consequence of time, no urgency to move into the future
and the increased sexual involvement it will inevitably demand. Karr explains, “Time will never
again stretch to the silky lengths it reaches that spring when you and Phil first sit entangled in his
car…Because the nights don’t have sex as an end…the kisses are themselves an end. And in that,
they become endless” (Cherry 167). This, perhaps, is the power of Karr’s passages themselves—
like the 15- year-old narrator, they are in no hurry to progress; they invite the reader to imagine,
like the writer, future possibilities. Karr remembers:
It’s either spectacularly sad or spectacularly innocent that while your solar plexus
churns and all your body rushes with desire, you don’t long to unzip Phil’s pants
or otherwise dismantle his clothing, nor do you even get so far in fantasy to
actually envision sex, the brute carnality and mechanics of which would ruin all
the verdant, soft-focus power of his kisses…(168)
While Karr recognizes that Phil’s “dream of sexual paradiso seems to differ quite strongly at
eighteen from [hers] at fifteen,” she neither fulfills his expectations quickly or her reader’s, at
least until her older sister Lecia tells her to “Get your skinny ass up and double-dog fuck him…”
(169). When Karr finally decides to take her physical relationship to the next level, she only
allocates six lines to the actual act, remembering now that his “kisses seem to come from some
boy you never knew. He’s trying to be slow…but this urgency emanates from him. In your
eagerness to please, you stand aside for his passion, let it dwarf your small wants till you feel
somewhat beside the point” (182). And after: “The myth of absolute like-mindedness, cathexis,
soul-deep entwinement that you cooked up inside those infinite kisses has been banished. You
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could have wallowed forever in the silky infinity of those nights, whereas for him, those
wordless conversations were doubtless arrows aimed at this night, precursors to it, erotic cheese
and crackers” (183). Like Dederer suggests in her own complication of female desire, what is
desired in Karr’s sexual experience is less about fulfillment than the anticipation of it.
Sharing Desire between Writer and Readers
Finally, I turn my examination to autobiographical writers and readers and the
complicated relationship between the autobiographical “I” and “you.” What do autobiographers
desire? What does Mary Karr, the writer, want? And what do readers want when they open the
pages of any memoir? How does the relationship between writer and reader fulfill our own
desires? Karr’s Cherry, like most autobiographical projects, reveals a multitude of answers to
these questions. Judith Butler’s work on self-narrative provides a useful starting point as she
reimagines the boundaries between the individual and the social. While a brief mention of
Butler’s conceptualization of self-accounts as Other-shaping narratives appeared in the previous
chapter, I expand her ideas a bit further here to explain her argument of the impossibility of a
distinct “I” and “you” in autobiography. Building on the work of feminist philosopher Adriana
Cavarero, Butler argues, “I am not…an interior subject, closed upon myself, solipsistic, posing
questions of myself alone. I exist in an important sense for you, and by virtue of you” (Giving
32). Butler explains, “…one can tell autobiography only to an other, and one can reference an ‘I’
only in relation to a ‘you’: without the ‘you,’ my own story becomes impossible” (32).
According to Butler, Cavarero’s argument offers two salient points: first, we are fundamentally
social, dependent on the other, and “cannot exist without addressing the other and without being
addressed by the other” (33). The second point, however, limits the first. “No matter how much
we each desire recognition and require it, we are not therefore the same as the other” (33). The
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tension between these points—the limits and possibilities of intersubjectivity—certainly impacts
the relationships forged by the stories we tell about ourselves. Our desire to know and be known,
to recognize and be recognized, seduces both readers and writers of autobiography, even as we
are aware of the impossibility of either.
In Cherry, Karr employs a number of rhetorical and stylistic choices that muddy the
boundaries between the writer and reader, a move that, like Butler argues, complicates the “I”
and “you” of autobiography. I previously analyzed Karr’s use of dialogue as a tool to not only
develop but also to differentiate characters, specifically the adolescent Mary from her friend
Meredith. The dialogue in Cherry can also be seen as an attempt to dissolve the borders between
the characters, specifically considering Karr’s formatting choices. Unlike in The Liars’ Club,
much of the dialogue in Cherry appears without quotation marks, even visually suggesting a
blurring between characters and their words. For example, when Karr first meets her drug buddy,
Doonie, at his sister’s sleepover, the interaction looks like this:
…You sit upright to watch Doonie in his pajama bottoms using his elbows
to drag his skinny body forward to your side of the bed.
…He says in a whisper almost wholly starved of air, Wanna see
something?
Like what? You say curious.
At which point, Elizabeth bolts up like some marionette jerked from full
slumber into straight-backboned fury…She says, Get out of here you little
pervert. (191)
Freeing the dialogue from quotation marks not only softens the borders between the speaker and
words but also shifts the way we think about the historical accuracy of the conversation, further
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complicating the “truth” of the experience. Although quotation marks aren’t universally
indicative of an assumed correlation between accuracy and language, Karr pushes against
generic expectations she when removes them. In this move, Karr distinguishes the structure of
Cherry from The Liars’ Club; she explains, “…by not using quotation marks in later books, I
seek to keep the reader more ‘inside’ my experience—the subjective nature eschews the
standards of history, I think” (The Art 24).
Karr uses this strategy in the Prologue and Parts Three and Four of Cherry, sections that
are additionally separated by the use of the second person pronoun “you” as the previous passage
shows. This move has been examined by a number of readers who find the switch a bit
confusing, particularly in the consideration of the three memoirs as a “whole.” While one critic,
Wendy Law-Yone, describes the device as “largely unobtrusive” in Karr’s hands, others such as
Shulman find it “awkward,” “disconcerting,” and “annoying” (20). Bradford remarks that
“Cherry must be the only memoir in the history of the universe that is written about 50% in
second person” as “the notion of using ‘you’ when you are clearly writing about ‘I’ is a strange
one.” However, Karr explains, “I needed to create a sense of detachment; at the time I didn’t
have a self to be inside. Second person gave me a sense of remoteness which is how I felt…”
(Bradford). Thus, Bradford argues, the reader, in taking in Karr’s thoughts and experiences
through the second person, actually helped the young Karr create herself. Smith and Watson
explain that the use of second person complicates the roles of the narrator, by “rerout(ing) the
expected address between narrator and reader to an unexpected intimacy of exchange between
the narrating “I” and narrated “I” (74). Whether the effect is directed toward the narrator, reader,
or both, certainly the use of “you” requires a different level of rhetorical engagement in the text,
asking participants to inhabit different positions or roles in the text. In Cherry, the use of “you”
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calls specifically to the reader, requiring not just recognition of the writer’s experience but
almost a substitution, as if Karr is placing the reader directly into the narrative, further blurring
the boundaries of subjectivity. However, a different reading could suggest that rather than
speaking to the reader, Karr, as the narrating “I,” is speaking to her teenage self (the narrated “I”)
as other and not the reader at all. This perspective possibly alienates the reader, moving her to
the sidelines to simply observe the action in the scene. Perhaps these multiple interpretations
contribute to the ambivalent response readers have had to the narrative style of Cherry; Karr’s
second memoir requires them to negotiate different positions, different relationships to the
characters, the narrator, and the text.
This narrative technique is particularly significant in the passages where Karr revisits her
own adolescent desires inviting the reader, for instance, to relive the innocent kisses of
adolescence from a slightly different perspective than most autobiographical narrative rendered
in first person. The “I” reading the text becomes the “you” in the story. In this shift from writer
to reader, affect—specifically desire—gets transmitted, as Teresa Brennan’s theory suggests.
Thus, desire (in the writer) creates desire (in the reader). This way, as Jennifer Cooke argues in
her article on the risks of intimacy in autobiographical writing, texts do not just describe
intimacy; they are capable of creating it (6). This process is mutual, Grosz argues, as “desire
participates in elements of both need and demand: it re-establishes the specificity and
concreteness of the satisfaction of need, while it participates in and demands orientation to the
other” (64). The writer not only creates but also desires desire in the reader. Thus, desire is made
present through the imaginative act of reading, shared in the relationship between writer and
reader.
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Additionally, Karr’s narrative shifts from the first person singular “I” to the plural
“we/us” and calls the reader to the text and into an intimate position to experience the moment
alongside of Karr, to share in her most personal memories. The passage previously noted on first
loves illustrates this strategy: “First loves take us like that. But because they rarely have any
consequence, people slight them...Our own features in youth have not yet been sharply carved.
So in some way, we don't exist yet” (Cherry 44). The move from the personal “I” to the
universal “we” assumes readers “feel with” Karr in a similar way. We must trust Karr in order to
feel a part of her “us.” Not only are intimacies complicated between writers and readers of
autobiography, so too is the trust that is at the foundation of the relationship. Smith and Watson
argue that because persuasion to belief is crucial to the intersubjective exchange between
narrator and reader, issues of trust figure prominently into autobiographical narrating (33).
Cooke remarks, “There is a choice for the reader: to believe or not believe in the authenticity of
the author, the narrator…” (13). Since the relationship depends on the narrator gaining and
keeping the reader’s trust in the plausibility of the narrated experience and the credibility of the
author, the bond between author and reader is complex (Smith and Watson 33-34).
Readers must trust Karr to not only understand their individual experiences but also
portray them authentically. With these moves, Karr reveals her own desire to be believed by her
readers. This belief is possible only because Karr can offer us something that feels true. Nancy
K. Miller suggests that the very desire that motivates readers and writers to engage in
autobiography is the desire to read and be read according to the expectations of autobiography as
a “true story” (“Facts” 12). Thus, the desire to be read “truthfully…states a meeting with the
symmetrical desire in the other constituted by readers” (12). Miller offers an example from JeanJacques Rousseau who when writing his Confessions explained, “The reader doesn’t need to
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know this, but I need to tell him” (12). As readers, we respond to that need either sympathetically
or unsympathetically—with belief or without—and in that event, the pact between writer and
reader becomes affective (12). In Miller’s part-theoretical/part-autobiographical text But Enough
about Me: Why We Read Other People’s Lives, she considers how postmodernism has shaped
our relationship to truth in memoir, and thus complicated the ways we theorize the “pact”
between writer and reader. In explaining the contemporary memoir phenomenon, Miller
attributes the genre’s popularity as a reaction to postmodernism: as a “desire for story killed by
postmodern fiction; it’s the only literary form that gives access to the truth; …it’s a desire to
assert agency and subjectivity after several decades of insisting loudly on the fragmentation of
identity and the death of the author…” (12). Unlike fiction, autobiography promises readers a
“truthful” story—an experience we desire even as we recognize its impossibility. Karr is a
memoirist, who, unlike many of her contemporaries, embraces rather than resists the
complications that inevitably present themselves when constructing a remembered life based on
the elusive nature of memory.
According to Miller, the relationship binding self to other has shaped most
autobiographical narrative experience beginning with St. Augustine and his mother Monica,
whose death ultimately motivates the Confessions. And while feminist theory has persuasively
linked relational identity to life writing, it has been postmodernism that has suggested that the
autobiographical subject almost always requires a reader or “a partner in crime” (But Enough 2).
Miller argues that the “bonds and desires that attract readers to the contemporary memoir” have
everything to do with attachment—a bond created through “identifications” and
“disidentifications” (3). The desire for identification is not only what drives readers to the
memoir section, but also “the other side of this desire is the author’s wish to be encountered in
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this way, found on that particular shelf” (3). Recalling her own memoir reading experiences as a
fulfillment of similar desires, Miller illuminates, “Another’s text can give you back your life”
(7). Miller’s work reveals what might be the most compelling reason we read autobiography
today: we want to be seen.
The desire for recognition is one of the primary motivations compelling the reading and
writing of autobiography. Drawing upon both Hegelian and Lacanian theories of desire, Butler
explains, “the desire for recognition…will be under an obligation to keep itself alive as desire
and not to resolve itself. ‘Oh, now I know who you are’: at this moment, I cease to address you
or be addressed by you” (Giving 43). In Butler’s attempt to revise recognition as an ethical
project, she argues that we need to see it “as, in principle, unsatisfiable” (43). Butler asks if our
desire to be—“to persist in one’s own being”—is fulfilled through the desire to be recognized.
Further, if recognition works to capture or arrest desire, then what happens with our desire to
persist in our own being? Any ethical theory of recognition, then, requires us to account for these
desires, “remembering that desire sets the limits and conditions for the operation of recognition
itself” (44). When we read memoir, such as Karr’s Cherry, and we recognize ourselves in and
through the author’s narrative, we are both seeing and being seen. When I read the passages that
detail Mary’s adolescent longings, I see a younger version of myself, feeling, loving, and
desiring in similar ways. I also see myself being seen. Karr’s ability to imbue personal intimacies
with universal significance allows me to not only remember my own experiences—my own
intense crushes, first kisses, heartbreaking betrayals—but also to imagine them as beyond self, as
part of a larger, collective narrative of adolescence. These moments of recognition, affective
attachments of us to others, feel rare and precious in a culture that seems to be ever moving away
from such experiences.
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And yet, recognition, and the intimacy it promises as imagined in autobiographical
relationships, has been problematized within the field, particularly as it operates in confessional
accounts. Elizabeth Bruenig warns that autobiographical relationships
…create a particular confidence, a kind of intimacy between speaker and listener
that, for all its closeness, is actually a capacious cultural space…The intimacy in
confession can be equally disorienting and disaffecting. As in most relationships,
the closer one comes, the more danger she is in. We desire to be intimate with one
another, but can scarcely ever estimate the price.
Cooke explains, “intimacy is about knowledge: knowledge of an other or others gained through
shared experiences…yet to think, write, or represent intimacy involves an encounter with the
limits of knowledge too, whether of the self or the other. There are those times when we presume
we know someone when in fact we cannot or do not” (3). Our desire to recognize ourselves in
the “other” of autobiography, and to experience the intimate relationship such recognition
suggests, is impossible to ever completely satisfy. And yet, we cannot resist the possibility. This
desire, like other affective responses, moves within autobiographical acts, to create what Cooke
terms, “a dangerous and brave form of intimacy between author and reader” (13). The intimacy
such a relationship offers, is, like autobiographical acts themselves, infinitely complicated by the
contemporary relationship between public and private lives.16

Autobiographical narrative offers the illusion that we can imagine “autobiographical” lives as
belonging to individuals and individual lives as representative of a community of lives. Life
writing, thus, functions personally and publicly in similar and disparate ways. A private
individual gains legitimacy through the representation of a life worth living as one worth
publishing, reading, and circulating. And yet the very act of this legitimization continues to
reinforce the national mythologies that contribute to our ideas of identity and subjectivity (Smith
and Watson 5).
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Whether the narrative effectively creates a relational space of intimacy, belief, or trust,
Butler maintains that the relationships between the “I” and “you” in self-accounts are yoked in
their mutual efforts to create something new. Butler explains, “The other represents the prospect
that the story might be given back in new form, that fragments might be linked in some way, that
some part of opacity might be brought to light” (Giving 80). Autobiography scholar James Olney
similarly notes the creative potential between the reader and writer, as “the encounter of two
lives…produces the biography that is in its nature a work of art or of literature”
(“(Auto)biography” 429). Thus, autobiographical writing becomes not only an intimate
involvement of self-recognition between writer and reader, but also “co-respondence” in which
two or more voices encounter each other, interact (Egan 3). Susanna Egan uses the term “mirror
talk” to describe this “encounter between reader and writer of life and of ‘life,’ repeated both
outside and inside the text” (Mirror Talk 3), as a site of creation. The intersubjectivity inherent in
these encounters is crucial to Egan’s theory. Drawing on Benjamin’s definition of
intersubjectivity, Egan emphasizes the need for mutual recognition—the necessity of
recognizing, as well as being recognized, by the other—as “what many theories of the self have
missed” (8). Egan’s work, like the work of life writing scholars such as Paul John Eakin and
Nancy K. Miller, is motivated by a view of identity as relational, co-created in response to others
and implicated by cultural moments (9).
Clearly, Karr holds a similar view of identity, as evidenced throughout Cherry. Frequent
references to her “self” pepper the narrative: “We tend to overlay grown-up wisdoms across the
blanker selves that the young actually proffer” (24); “This mental skitter for the mastery of my
public self rose up from nowhere” (41); “I felt another trapdoor in my quivery sense of self fling
open” (42); “A few times you try to explain to certain people—that your Old Self had been
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falsified, a mere mask tacked over this Real Self…” (135). However, these selves are always
only imagined with and through the eyes of another—Phil, Lecia, Meredith, her mother, and
Karr as narrating “I.” The Mary she remembers and the Mary Karr she becomes are possible
only through the intersubjective exchange or “mirror talk” between author and reader. Smith and
Watson explain that this process has the potential to disrupt contemporary notions of subjectivity
as, “The routing of a self known through its relational others undermines the understanding of
life narrative as a bounded story of the unique, individuated narrating subject” (88). No “I”
speaks except “as and through an other” (88).
French literary critic Ross Chambers, writing on the power of literature to transform
desire, discusses the relationship between reader and writer and concludes, “As an activity of
mediation, reading—as the production of a text-reader relation in which each component
functions as the other’s other—demonstrates that the production of identity is relational and
systemic and that, as a consequence of this systematicity, its outcome is change” (249). Change
here is “forward-looking,” pointing or moving toward a desired end and bound by the temporal
limits of narrative. Chambers explains, “such textual production represents life precisely only
because narrative protention, personal transformation, or political change, rather than conclusion
(as in fiction), is the desired, even necessary end” (10). Before forging relationships, then, the act
of autobiography offers the possibility of producing (of making present) our very identities.
The making present of something new, possible in reading—new identities, new
relationships, new ways of being in the world—“bears ontological weight,” according to Ward,
and cannot be dismissed as “fiction” or a “mode of non-existence.” That which is made present
“…changes us; impacts upon the cultures in which we live; it transforms values and ideas; it
informs behavior” (Unbelievable 145). Ward uses Aristotle’s understanding of poiesis to explain
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the rhetorical work involved in the creation of making present. Poiesis, related to the verb poieo
meaning “to produce, perform, execute...generally, be active,” is historically associated with
praxis, from the Greek prasso, meaning to act, manage, do, or accomplish (146). Ward argues
that for Aristotle, a distinction is drawn between a specific form of making (poiesis) and a more
general notion of doing (praxis), where praxis is associated with ethics, politics, and the
formation of character. However, in Ward’s conceptualization of the term, he doesn’t isolate
aesthetic production from ethical activity. Neither, Ward argues, can poiesis be reduced to
techne, as it doesn’t simply reproduce, “but draws into visibility that which is invisible and in
this way creates anew” (146). Perhaps the most relevant usage of the word of interest to the study
of autobiography comes from the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben who relates the creative
act of poiesis with aletheia or “truth-making”—“the truth that emerges only in and through the
act of creation” (146).
In “On the Soul,” Aristotle argues that poiesis is deeply connected to modes of affectivity
and that neither desire, thought, nor imagination can be separated from either sensation or “the
soul.” Aristotle uses the word orexis as a general word for longing involving three forms of
desires: “passion (thumia), wishing (boulesis), and wanting (epithumia).” For Aristotle, desire is
not a source but a condition, as Ward explains: “If the condition of the soul is both the origin of
motion and always in motion, this motion is related to the soul’s desiring. What is desired is
actuality, the complete realization of their form in the body” (Christ 312). According to Ward,
what is actualized is poiesis, as what “desire desires, what believing believes and imagination
imagines” (Unbelievable 147). The selves that are created when we read and write autobiography
are poietic, possible only through the making present of something new, which Agamben argues
is the only truth. Truth, in this conceptualization, is possible only through belief; Ward explains,
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“With a character we are co-creating, we are making them present within us, not before us; and
whilst believing in them, we know they are not there at all” (145). When that “character” extends
beyond the page, when we extend poiesis to creating new selves, the concept of autobiographical
“truth” takes on new significance and meaning. It is the formation of Karr’s “Same Self—her
true self—that closes Cherry, representing her greatest epiphany and the awareness that will
carry her into adulthood and her next memoir. This truth of self reveals itself only through
poiesis, the result of a co-created, intersubjective practice between narrator, character, and
reader.
Wayne Booth’s work on the ethics involved in truth telling between writer and reader
gives us yet another perspective of the creative potential (and limitations) of this bond. Booth
portrays this relationship as a “friendship,” and stories as gifts or friendship “offerings,” arguing
that “all narratives offer with their titles and opening sentences a cry of invitation, ‘Join me…’”
(The Company 174). 17 However, no matter how many “gifts” the narrator offers with a story,

Marilee Misfud in “On Rhetoric and Gift/Giving” offers a compelling look at the rhetorical
possibilities and risks associated with the cultural practice of gift-giving, ultimately imagining
rhetoric itself as gift/giving. Misfud argues that a return to the archaic Homeric gift economy,
drawing broadly on the anthropological theory of Georges Bataille and Marcel Mauss, might
provide resistance to the classical polis economy of gift-giving that separates and commodifies
both giver and object. Of particular interest to the idea of autobiographical stories as gifts are the
inextricable relations between the public and private/person and things in the Homeric gift
economy (93). In archaic gift cultures, no absolute boundaries exist between public/private or
between persons/things. “Things are an extension of persons…because the thing itself possesses
a soul. To make a gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself”
(93). This model contrasts with the polis economy (reflected in modern capitalism) where
exchange meets the needs of the nation-state, “where things and people…are related through
distant, abstract mechanisms of power, rather than personal relations…” (98). Engaging the work
of Jacques Derrida and Hélène Cixous, Misfud suggests us that while “The archaic Homeric gift
economy is not our savoir,” that exploring it in contrast to the classical polis economy, not only
creates an experience of alterity, but also recognizes the “radical otherness that the polis is to the
gift” (101). Thank you to Dr. Susan Kim, Illinois State University, for this connection.
169
17

unless the listener engages in the story as story, “and that means engaging with the author in a
patterning of desire for this kind of gift,” the offer will not be recognized (201). In this way, the
didacticism present in the friendship is evident; stories will only work as stories, “as something
that leads-from-here-to-there” if they make the reader want more of the friendship, to “move
forward…from here to there, from beginning to ending, and then, sometimes, back again” (201).
Booth explains that the most powerful effect, then, on the reader’s ethos is the attentiveness to
desire, fear, and expectation, leading her toward something further, toward possible future
fulfillment. Thus, as a reader, I am made to want more of what I don’t have enough of; “so long
as I continue to read, my whole being is concentrated on ‘how it will all turn out,’ or on ‘what it
will turn out to be’” (201). The relationship between writer and reader is disciplined by the
affective consequences of desire as a positive expectant emotion. It is pointed toward the future,
the possibilities of which could be the greatest of friendship offerings. According to Booth,
stories are active rhetoric—engaged in “the total patterning of the reader’s desires and
satisfactions” (206).
Readers of Karr’s memoirs have been offered many “story gifts,” and with them, the
invitation into a relationship with the author that is imaginative, provocative, complicated,
rewarding—but, above all, constructed. This relationship, like most between the writers and
readers of autobiography, is motivated and structured by a myriad of individual and shared
desires. In Cherry, Karr portrays not only a candid and erotic description of her awakening
sexuality, but also the development of her very self as a result of her own powerful desires. The
teenaged Mary simultaneously yearns to belong and to escape—to love and be loved—and
through her story, these desires resonate with her readers, inviting them to a shared affective
experience. Just as Karr needs John Cleary, Phil, Doonie, Lecia, Meredith, and the entire cast of
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family and friends that appear in the narrative to lead her to the self-realization evident at the end
of the text, she needs her readers to call this self into being. It is this possibility that she offers
her readers—a role that extends beyond casual observer to co-participant—that makes her story
feel true. Blurring the boundaries between “flesh and blood” author and narrator, and between
writer and reader, Karr’s writing provokes readers’ desire by calling on their imagination—on
their beliefs—to facilitate her own self-discovery. In turn, the recognition (and misrecognition)
inherent in this relationship can produce discoveries in the reader, by making present what has
previously been invisible. Through this creative act of poiesis as “truth-making,” we can realize
what Agamben described as the truth that emerges only in and through the act of creation”
(Unbelievable 146).
Poiesis, defined as such, presents us with fresh ways to think about autobiographical
truth, as a co-created product of the writer/reader relationship. In The Art of Memoir, Karr
describes the job of the memoirist as discovering “The Story” and a voice “exactly suited to
telling that tale in the truest, most beautiful way” (xxii). By “true,” she means without trying to
pass off fabricated events to the reader, and by “beautiful” she means “for the reader” (xxii). The
reward for writing that is both true and beautiful—“a memoir (that) feels so intimate—
believable, real” is a story to which readers are “lured back time and again” (xxiii). However,
Karr recognizes no matter how many intellectual pleasures a memoir offers readers, it is
ultimately the emotional connection to the narrator that resonates the strongest. She writes, “A
good writer can conjure a landscape and its people to live inside you, and the best writers make
you feel they’ve disclosed their soft underbellies. Seeing someone naked thrills us a little”
(xxiii). Perhaps it is the thrill of such revelation, such nakedness, that calls us from our own lives
and into the stories of others. Regardless of our own desires, what creative potential is realized
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through the act of autobiography relies, to an extent, on the relationship between its writers and
readers. Sarah Smarsh’s article “Believe It” powerfully captures the role of both: “In matters of
truth, much has been said of the memoirist’s responsibility in wielding accuracy; much less has
been said of the reader’s responsibility in wielding belief.” Like Booth, Smarsh characterizes
stories as “offerings,” an exchange between writer and reader that says as much about the
receiver as the giver. Belief, for Smarsh, is a “form of reverence; disbelief, a form of
rejection…whether we stick out our tongues to deny or savor another person’s claims, the
revelation is about ourselves.” What lies beyond our critical ability to judge a story, then, is
something transcendent, bound to our own ability to receive it.
Of the shared experience of remembering—of identification and disidentification—Miller
writes, “You follow the threads that take you back, even if then there was no story, just the loose
threads you see now woven into a readable fabric, material for another story: your own” (But
Enough 10). My own story has been forever altered by Mary Karr’s. Most obviously, this
dissertation reflects the ways in which her stories have transformed my own thinking, have set
me down specific paths of inquiry, have shaped the past two years of my life. As such, this
project is a revelation of my own desires, realized through the processes of reading and writing.
While my primary academic concern centers on the rhetorics of belief, I find that study
impossible, or at the very least hollow, without a consideration of stories, specifically those that
attempt to illuminate the “truths” of our lives. Of all the autobiographies available, I chose Karr’s
memoirs specifically because of the ways they resonate in my own life—both academically and
personally—the ways in which her stories simultaneously provoke and fulfill my own desires.
Why do I believe Mary Karr? What makes her stories “true”? The answers to these questions
reveal as much about me as Mary Karr, and in this way, resist the kinds of conclusions this
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dissertation attempts to achieve. Karr’s critical and commercial success as a memoirist suggests
that her work speaks to her readers in profound ways, serving as testament to the unique
relationship between writer and reader that her stories foster.
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CHAPTER V
READING, WRITING, TEACHING MEMOIR:
TOWARD A RADICAL PEDAGOGY OF PASSION

Grief, hatred, bitterness, anger, rage, terror, and apathy as well as emotions of self-assessment
such as pride, guilt, and shame—these form the core of the hidden curriculum for the vast
majority of people living and learning in a highly stratified capitalist society. This curriculum
holds most of us so deeply and intimately and yet differently within its logic that our affective
lives are largely immune to the legislative efforts of social critique and to the legislative gains of
progressive social movements.
—Lynn Worsham
You can’t really change the heart without telling a story.
—Martha Nussbaum
In 2015, after thirty years of teaching and theorizing the craft, Mary Karr published her
own text on writing autobiography. The Art of Memoir, described as “chaotic,” “lively,” and
“thought-provoking” (Maslin; Baker), details Karr’s advice for would-be memoirists, drawing
heavily on examples from her favorite autobiographies and vignettes from her own experiences.
According to Karr, the book began with the syllabus from her course at Syracuse University and
ultimately reflects her belief that memoir is “an art, a made thing,” a democratic telling available
to anyone who has lived (Kephart). In this pedagogical move, Karr shifts between the roles of
writer to that of reader/critic/teacher, requiring her (and us) to think about autobiography from
many positions.
In this final chapter, I examine Karr’s newest text, The Art of Memoir—a “how-to” book
for people interested in writing memoir—for further answers to my primary question: What
makes Mary Karr believable? To accomplish this goal, I argue that our pedagogies are
inextricably bound to our beliefs, and, as such, deeply and affectively connected to who we are,
not only as writers but also as teachers of memoir. I contend that what Karr teaches us about
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writing memoir is ultimately about how to be believed; by “believed,” I mean extending to
readers a narrative that is truthful, even as it resists or revises contemporary “truths” that are
currently celebrated in our culture. Additionally, I look to Lynn Worsham’s work on the
pedagogy of emotion to understand how we have been schooled to feel in very specific ways,
ways that preserve rather than resist the dominant culture. Finally, I turn to memoir, as Karr
imagines it and teaches it to us as a pedagogical tool for possibility and change, both individually
and socially.
Pedagogy and Belief
A brief survey of trends in education scholarship, particularly in the past fifteen years,
reveals a growing interest in the connection between belief, particularly “teacher beliefs,” and
pedagogy. Scholars from many different perspectives within the field, from teaching preparation
to educational psychology, have concentrated on the complicated connections between beliefs—
not only about education but also about selves, others, and worlds—and classroom practices.18
However, just as the concept of belief escapes the boundaries of a simple definition, so, it seems,
do its effects on our pedagogy. According to Vicki Snider and Rebecca Roehl, the complex
relationship between beliefs, which influences the way knowledge is viewed, and knowledge,
which influences beliefs, “makes the study of teacher beliefs messy” (873). While education
scholars may disagree on what exactly belief is or how it works, most agree, “Teacher beliefs

18

Lortie, Borg, Calderhead, Pajares, Snider, Roehl, Khader are some theorists that have informed
this chapter, although their work focuses on primary and secondary teachers. While less
scholarship exists on teacher beliefs in higher education, Maria Northcote’s article, “Educational
Beliefs of Higher Education Teachers and Students: Implications for Teacher Education”
provides a useful overview and review of literature (although focused on the implications of
belief for teacher preparation programs).

175

influence classroom practice, expectations for success, and even public policy” (873). For this
reason, belief is a topic that continues to be relevant to contemporary pedagogical theories. Of
particular significance to classroom practices is the assumption that beliefs dispose or guide
people’s thinking and action as well as the correlation between belief and our value
commitments (Borg 186). This correlation recognizes an evaluative aspect to the concept and is
not surprising as the word itself originates from the Germanic galaub meaning “to love” (186).
In other words, we believe what we love (and love what we believe). In this perspective, our
pedagogies—as belief practices—reflect what we value or love.
The recent attention to belief and its role in pedagogy grows increasingly critical as
researchers have discovered a staggering lack of disciplinary consensus about best practices
based on objective evidence. Instead, D.C. Lortie argues, teachers rely on intuition and practical
knowledge acquired from experience rather than empirically based principles and practices
learned through education and training to shape their pedagogical beliefs. Further, contextual
factors, such as the heterogeneity of students, teachers, schools, and families, create complexities
that make it challenging to establish empirically based principles of teaching and learning that
can accommodate dynamic and idiosyncratic classroom scenarios (Snider and Roehl 873). This
lack of consensus, then, elevates the importance of teacher beliefs in education, particularly as
pressure continues from the current political climate and reform initiatives requiring teachers to
use “scientifically based” methods (873).
In one of the most telling examples from Snider and Roehl’s recent study of teachers’
beliefs about pedagogy, the researchers examined the effects of the accountability movement in
education, particularly in the wake of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 and the
Responsiveness to Intervention (RTI) initiatives. The assumption driving both of these initiatives
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is the “presumption that increasing academic achievement is the primary function of schools, and
the expectation that all children can achieve basic academic skills” (Snider and Roehl 876).
However, a recent study revealed that only 53% of teachers were “somewhat confident” that
“most of [their] students will learn the skills and knowledge they were supposed to by the end of
the year” and 42% said that “the effort students make in the classroom is mainly determined by
the motivation students bring” rather than by the actions of the teachers (Farkas, Johnson, and
Duffett). This discrepancy—between “evidence” and practice, between policymakers’ and
practitioners’ expectations—reveals a sharp disconnect between what teachers “know” and what
they believe to be true. If teachers are making pedagogical choices based on what they believe
versus what empirical evidence suggests, then teacher beliefs are of crucial significance to any
pedagogical theory.
Of course, our individual pedagogies are smaller, “local,” and contextual versions—
microcosms—of much larger systems, which reflect broader cultural ideologies that are
“educating” us far beyond our classrooms. Lynn Worsham, in her article “Going Postal:
Pedagogic Violence and the Schooling of Emotion,” distinguishes between these “two senses of
pedagogy”—as practiced in our classrooms and practiced in the world—and argues that the two
cannot be isolated despite our greatest intentions. What Worsham refers to as “dominant
pedagogy” draws primarily on Louis Althusser’s conception of ideological state apparatuses and
Michel Foucault’s notion of discipline and consists of “the ruling ideas of the ruling class or
group” (221). Pedagogy, in this sense, refers to the power held by dominant discourses to
“impose meanings that maintain and reinforce the reigning social, economic, and political
arrangements as legitimate when in fact they are entirely arbitrary” (221). Worsham focuses
much of her argument on the violence inherent in such systems, and while her observations are
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compelling to any discussion of pedagogy, I’m interested specifically in her consideration of the
relationship between dominant pedagogy and our individual pedagogical beliefs as well as her
concentration on the role of both in “schooling” our emotions.
According to Worsham, dominant pedagogy depends on a social assumption (or
“misrecognition”) of the “objective truth of pedagogic work”; to ensure its broader success,
dominant pedagogy cultivates systems of smaller, “subordinate educational ideologies” that
work to hide its real agenda (221). These educational ideologies underpinning the pedagogies
that we enact in our classroom—pedagogies that are deliberately and even stubbornly antioppressive, oppositional, post-oppositional, feminist, decentered, and often informed in direct
opposition to dominant pedagogical imperatives—are, ultimately, conceived within and by these
larger systems. Following the theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Worsham
suggests that these pedagogies “do not (and cannot) recognize the extent to which their authority
is based in dominant pedagogy and contributes to its legitimacy” (222). We can never get fully
outside or beyond the systems that have written us.
However, the primary imperative of dominant pedagogy, according to Worsham, extends
beyond the imposition of a specific framework of meanings, such as the domination of
capitalism and its tenets as a cultural and economic logic. Instead, the primary work of this
pedagogy is to “organize an emotional world, to inculcate patterns of feeling that support the
legitimacy of dominant interests, patterns that are especially appropriate to gender, race, and
class locations” (223). To this end, pedagogy not only locates individuals within hierarchies of
power relations, but also disciplines or “organizes their affective relations to that location, to
their own condition of subordination, and to others in that hierarchical structure” (223). As
individuals are bound to the social through “complex and often contradictory affective lives,” the
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work of this pedagogy remains invisible and misrecognized. Worsham argues that it is this
misrecognition that is dominant pedagogy’s most violent act; “Primary pedagogic work mystifies
emotion as a personal and private matter and conceals the fact that emotions are prevailing forms
of social life, that personal life always takes shape in social and cultural terms” (223).
In middle-class American society, Worsham argues, the dominant pedagogy holds
emotion in opposition to reason, and has “masked the fact that emotion is…fundamental to the
way we organize understanding and experience” (224). Reminiscent of modernist debates, this
pedagogy delegitimizes emotion and associates it with the “irrational, the physical, the particular,
the private, the feminine, and the nonwhite others” (224). In this move, emotion is bound to
negatively valued categories, thus securing the ideological subordination of women and
minorities (224). Catherine Lutz suggests this pedagogy teaches us to define and value emotion
in contradictory ways: negatively, as in opposition to reason and rationality, and positively, in
terms of its “opposition to estrangement and disengagement from the world” (55-59).
Worsham traces the relationship between emotion and contemporary “radical”
pedagogies, primarily postmodern and critical pedagogies, ultimately suggesting that while both
seek to change the emotional structure of the postmodern subject or to “produce…a democratic
citizen who participates fully in public life,” emotion “remains undertheorized and mystified in
many important respects” (233). Ultimately, both pedagogies still operate within the confines
and logic of the dominant. The precise danger of such radical pedagogies, Worsham argues, is in
their reimagination of the role of affect in education, one that “…finds the political imperative to
reconceive itself as a form of radical politics with goals that are formulated with a sense of
utmost urgency” (217). Key to Worsham’s critique is the dynamic role of the subject, which she
suggests responds and corresponds to changes in the world as a “consequence of the penetration
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of capital into …uncommodified areas—specifically, nature and the unconscious” (229). As a
result, this latest development of capitalism “creates an utterly alien and alienated object world in
which the subject cannot recognize the results of its own activity in the world and, as a
consequence, is unable to recognize the subjectivity of the other” (229). Thus, both critical and
postmodern pedagogies, in their attempts to “reclaim education as a terrain of struggle crucial to
the reconstruction of a public political culture,” perpetuate a dangerous—and ultimately
violent—version of selfhood as “revolutionary subject[s] capable of transforming the world”
(217).
Worsham offers Jessica Benjamin’s theory of intersubjectivity as a possible alternative or
perhaps an essential supplement to radical pedagogy, as a “fundamental revision in our
conception of subjectivity and of our affective relationship to the world” (240). Anything less,
Worsham argues, would fail the potential of pedagogy in constituting our emotional lives (240).
According to Benjamin, the inability to recognize the subjectivity of another is an outcome of
our inability to recognize our own (Like Subjects). Thus, subjectivity and agency are “denied to
the other at the same time they are denied to self” (Worsham 229). Worsham’s critique of
dominant pedagogy is deeply informed by Benjamin’s theory, fostering a revised concept of
individual identity based on the idea of intersubjectivity and the process of mutual recognition.
Finally, Worsham suggests that an intersubjective model offers recent pedagogical discourse an
alternative to recent “postmodern” or dominant pedagogies, particularly in their definition of
concepts such as agency and subjectivity. Worsham’s criticism is focused on various “radical”
pedagogies, a term that has various meanings according to different academic contexts.
Following the work of theorists such as Paolo Freire and Henry Giroux, radical pedagogies are
invested in the deeply politicized aspects of educational institutions and argue that education can
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and should be used as an agent toward social change. Some practitioners use the term “radical
pedagogy” to refer to cutting-edge developments in education, the latest theories, methods and
practices that promise to fundamentally reinvent the processes of teaching and learning. While
Worsham’s analysis of popular radical pedagogies, including postmodern, critical, feminist, and
oppositional, is essential in understanding the limitations and vulnerabilities of such approaches,
cultural theorist AnaLouise Keating offers an alternative vision of a pedagogy that is radical,
based on a different understanding of what that word can mean.
Keating, and her work on post-oppositional pedagogy, can further illuminate the
potentialities of a radical model based on interconnectivity as a framework for “identity
formation, theorizing, social change, and the possibility of planetary citizenship” (back cover).
Keating’s recent text Transformation Now! Toward a Post-Oppositional Politics of Change
explores her belief that radical progressive change—“on individual, collective, and planetary
levels”—is desperately needed, and even possible, although not necessarily easy to achieve.
Keating suggests alternatives to conventional oppositional thinking and scholarship in the form
of “threshold theories,” a title meant to underscore the “nonbinary, liminal, and potentially
transformative” nature of such alternatives (10). In Keating’s usage, the term “thresholds”
represents “complex interconnections among a variety of sometimes contradictory worlds—
points crossed by multiple intersecting possibilities, opportunities, and challenges” (10). As such,
threshold theories inspire practitioners to “be bold, to dream big, to affirm the possibility of
transformation, to envision radical change” (10). Grounded in interconnectivity, threshold
theories are relational, starting with the presumption “that we are intimately, inextricably linked
with all human and nonhuman existence” (11). Keating argues for a radical pedagogy, informed
by various threshold theories, as a catalyst for transformation.
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Both Keating’s and Worsham’s visions rely on a definition of pedagogy that is
intersubjective and interconnected, a perspective that I argue is indeed radical, if we consider
that word separate from its connection to the postmodern and critical pedagogies that Worsham
critiques. Radical is an adjective that can mean “very different from the usual or traditional” or
“advocating extreme measures for a change” (“Radical”). A pedagogy described as “radical”
could also be associated with the informal or slang use of the word that means “excellent or
cool.” However, the primary definition of radical that is lesser known and provides another way
of thinking about pedagogy is “of, relating to, or proceeding from a root” (“Radical”). This
definition of radical refers to something growing from the root of a plant (like a radical tuber) or
“from the base of a stem, from a rootlike stem, or from a stem that does not rise above the
ground” (“Radical”). In this usage, radical means “basic” or relating to or affecting the basic
nature or most important features of something. A pedagogy that is radical, then, is something
from which things grow—it is essential. This is the kind of pedagogy that relies on the powerful
work of not only our emotions but also our beliefs in reimagining our selves and our
relationships to others. Like Worsham imagines, this pedagogy demands that emotion play a
very different role in our lives; like Keating suggests, this pedagogy navigates the thresholds of
this contemporary moment, particularly between self and other, public and private.
The memoir, as theorized and practiced by Mary Karr, imagines a radical alternative to
dominant pedagogical discourse. As an expression of beliefs—both individual and cultural—
Karr’s memoirs distinguish themselves against the “grief, hatred, bitterness, anger, rage, terror,
and apathy as well as…pride, guilt, and shame…[that] form the core of the hidden curriculum
for the vast majority of people living and learning in a highly stratified capitalist society”
(Worsham 216). Thus, what Karr’s The Art of Memoir offers is not only a how-to manual for
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writing compelling stories but also a radical pedagogy of the possibilities of those stories to
transform our lives and our world. Karr’s beliefs, explored in The Liars’ Club, Cherry, Lit, and
finally The Art of Memoir, subvert dominant pedagogy, particularly in its reinscription of the
distinction between reason and emotion (knowledge and belief) and the attachment of affect to
specific groups of people. The intersubjectivity her memoirs support and even cultivate—as an
affective exchange of belief between reader and writer—resists cultural definitions of “self” and
“other.” Her unapologetic devotion to truth challenges our contemporary understanding of the
concept. In short, Karr does not subjugate her beliefs. Instead, through her stories, she
simultaneously interrogates and celebrates the ways they have defined her life. As she shifts her
focus from writing memoir to teaching it, she continues to demonstrate to her readers how our
beliefs are inextricably bound to the stories we tell.
The Art of Being Believed
In The Art of Memoir, Mary Karr teaches readers what to do in order to be believed.
Before I examine her explicit instructions to would-be memoirists, I want to return one more
time to Karr’s own beliefs. This dissertation has been an exploration of many of Karr’s beliefs—
about God, language, and identity—that are revealed in her stories. In this final section, I turn to
the beliefs that Karr holds about memoir itself, perhaps best captured in this passage:
Out of great suffering come great truths—not just intellectual concepts, but ideas
informed by feeling. The word passion comes from the Latin passio, which refers to
Jesus's suffering on the cross. Anytime you take a stranger's agony into your body,
you're changed by it, refined into a vessel better able to give and receive love, which
is the sole purpose of being alive. The best memoirs I've ever read deliver such
salvation.
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In this excerpt, from an article in O: The Oprah Magazine in 2015, Karr’s description of memoir
can be considered radical by any number of readers. Although appearing in a secular context, the
article’s use of words such as “truths,” “Jesus,” “cross,” “agony,” “love,” and “salvation,” clearly
distinguish it from other content. In this telling quotation, Karr firmly binds memoir to emotion,
particularly in her use of the words “passion,” “suffering,” and “love” to describe what is shared
in the giving and receiving of our stories. Comparing the reading of memoir to Jesus’s death on
the cross, Karr suggests that the suffering involved in taking a “stranger’s agony into your body”
changes us, refines us, and prepares us to “give and receive love”—the “sole purpose of being
alive.” This image powerfully encapsulates the spirit of Benjamin’s theory of intersubjectivity
and reflects Worsham’s vision of a radical pedagogy that could reimagine the role of emotion in
our lives. Whether the reader is moved by the image of Jesus’s suffering or by the suggestion of
a stranger’s agony, the result is the same—we are changed by it. In The Art of Memoir, Karr
builds on these initial ideas as she further develops her beliefs about memoir. While many of
these examples certainly reflect her religious beliefs (about God/about language), like the image
of Jesus’s suffering/stranger’s agony, they can be read separate from any specific belief system.
In other words, just like in her memoirs, Karr’s beliefs resonate with believers and nonbelievers
alike. In the second part of this chapter, I examine Karr’s beliefs about truth, carnality, and voice
in memoir, as an extension of her own beliefs, and as the foundation of a radical pedagogy
rooted in embodiment, affect, and intersubjectivity, capable of transforming our lives and the
stories we write about them.
Perhaps the belief that resonates loudest throughout her book is related to the crucial,
albeit problematic, relationship between truth and memoir. Karr believes that memoirists should
attempt to tell the truth, even as she admits the complications involved in such a task. As I’ve
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noted, Karr is an outspoken advocate on the topic and has offered a number of critiques to
practitioners who play “fast and loose” with the truth in their stories. Most notably, she calls out
James Frey’s infamous imposture in A Million Little Pieces and fake Holocaust survivor
Binjamin Wilkomirski’s Fragments; in fact, The Art of Memoir includes a chapter titled
“Hucksters, the Deluded, and Big Fat Liars” where she details such intentional scams. However,
she seems humbled by the “stiff pronouncements…demanding truth in memoir” she’s made
throughout her career and worries that she might sound like “a pious twit” (9). Balancing her
mutual concern for writers’ artistic freedom and the readers’ expectations for the genre, Karr
seems less interested in “busting” hoaxes and more in explaining how telling the truth helps a
reader’s experience. Karr briefly traces the development of our cultural definitions of truth and
attributes the recent surge in memoirs’ popularity as a response to those shifts. She explains, “As
we’ve lost faith in old authorities, our confidence in objective truth has likewise eroded…while
formerly sacred sources of truth like history and statistics have lost ground, the subjective tale
has garnered new territory” (16). The truth of memoir, then, isn’t an objective, capital-T truth but
the “speaker’s truth alone” (16). As such, the genre is constantly resisting the possibility of a
single, objective truth. And yet, Karr argues that while “Truth may have become a foggy, fuzzy
nether area…untruth is simple: making up events with the intent to deceive” (11).
For Karr, the truth of a memoir is intimately connected to the writer’s identity—her own
relationship to truth. To illustrate this point, Karr returns to the events in her own childhood,
defined by the lies that defined it: “‘I am not drunk’ (most always a lie) and ‘Oh, don’t worry;
everything’s fine,’ which was true just often enough to mess with my head” (The Art 21).
Discovering the “truth” became Karr’s obsession and certainly motivated the process of writing
The Liars’ Club. Karr acknowledges that memory reveals a different kind of truth, the “truth of
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memory…not of unbiased history” (11). And yet, memoir writers must access actual lived
experience lest “the more profound meanings will remain forever shrouded” (12). Without such
an attempt, we are never able to “unearth the more complex truths” (12). The inauthentic
memoirist cheats not only her readers but, perhaps more tragically, herself. These writers miss
the personal liberation, and the resulting transformation, that can come from the examined life—
one of the significant rewards of life writing.
The truth of a memoir responds to a reader’s expectations as well, making a “true”
memoir a shared production, or intersubjective experience, between writers and readers. Karr
reminds us, “We’re swept up in a tale we want to believe. Millions of perfectly bright readers get
drawn in and duped by bullshit stories” (The Art 84). This possibility exemplifies the risk of
reading memoir. And yet to deny this possibility robs the genre of its “true” potential. While
“truth is less set in stone now, more mutable,” Karr warns against denying “even the possibility
of truth” (85). She gives an example of a recent sexual harassment investigation on the Syracuse
campus where a department chair said, “There’s her version and his version—there is no truth”
(85). Karr disagrees. “Someone either assaulted the woman in question, or not. It [is] binary”
(85). Our ambivalence or “strange cynicism” about the possibility of truth has led us to accept
“all manner of bullshit on the page” (85). In her exploration of the complications of truth in life
writing, Karr offers a compelling commentary on how the recent increase in our attention to
autobiographical fraud reflects a larger, cultural response to contemporary attitudes about truth.
In order to tell a story in the “truest, most beautiful way,” Karr believes the writer must
“craft a voice exactly suited to telling [the] tale” (The Art xxii). This belief reflects one of the
main goals of The Art of Memoir, to help a “wannabe memoirist” discover The Story, “the only
one she can tell” (xxii). This belief is so essential to the truth of the story that Karr writes, “Each
186

great memoir lives or dies based 100 percent on voice”(35). Of the relationship of voice to truth,
Karr explains, “…the more memorable the voice, the truer a book sounds, because you never
lose sight of the narrator cobbling together his truth—not everybody’s agreed on version” (41).
Regardless of whether an authentic voice is either the cause or effect of our definition of a “true”
memoir, Karr suggests the two are inextricable. A reflection of the writer’s identity, voice
highlights an individual view of the world and thus distinguishes the narrator. In fact, Karr
reminds us, “We kind of think the voice is the narrator” (36), a phenomenon that troubles the
concept of subjectivity in memoir. An authentic voice grows from “a writer’s finding a tractor
beam of inner truth…to shine the way,” and while voice is rhetorically constructed, the writer
chooses its features because they are a “natural expression of character” (36). To illustrate how
the writer’s voice is a tool to “forge a self” or “the gift of self-awareness,” Karr traces notable
practitioners, such as Tobias Wolff, Hilary Mantel, and Richard Wright.
To further demonstrate her point, Karr uses the image of a stranger seated next to her on
an airplane, candidly telling a story spoken from a “profoundly felt experience…[including]
some parcels of radical suffering and joy” (The Art 43). She contrasts this narrator with a “chatty,
perfectly nice but duller-than-a-rubber-knife human being” whose conversation we avoid by
faking sleep. The difference in these two experiences is a result of voice. Karr explains,
“speaking from passionately felt events is risky. Emotional stakes make drama, which is a
conflict with feeling and danger mysteriously contained in a human body’s small space” (43).
Our connection to one another relies on this drama, as, Karr, argues, we are “hardwired in
moments of empathy to see ourselves in another” (45). In fact, hearing each other’s stories
actually increases our levels of oxytocin, according to Karr, and joins us with each other in
community (45). Translating these stories to the page requires a “special verbal device to unpack
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all that’s hidden in the writer’s heart so we can freshly relive it: a voice” (45). Voice is the
vehicle from self to other, allowing the writer the chance to “lodge” her own memories inside
someone else’s head. In some ways, Karr explains, “the narrator comes to exist as a stand-in for
the reader” (51). Not only can voice invite the reader into an intersubjective experience with the
writer, but it is also capable of negotiating the tricky issue of truth in memoir; “A believable
voice notes how the self may or may not be inventing reality, morphing one’s separate ‘truths’”
(49).
Another way that Karr teaches memoir writers how to be believable is through carnality,
a word she uses to illustrate the “show, don’t tell” concept that is central to narrative storytelling.
Carnality, according to Karr, is directly linked to sensory details, as “Every memoir should brim
over with the physical experiences that once streamed in—the smell of garlicky gumbo, your
hand in an animal’s fur, the ocean’s phosphor lighting up bodies underwater all acid green” (The
Art 71). Of all the strategies her book highlights, Karr insists that carnality is the most primary
and necessary, and also the easiest to master (71). As I briefly mentioned in Chapter Three,
carnality is essential to Karr’s Catholic beliefs, specifically the relationship between belief and
our bodies. In fact, the epigraph for the Karr’s chapter titled “Sacred Carnality” is from Anton
Chekhov—“My holy of holies is the human body” (71). Carnality means “to make into flesh,”
and refers to the Christian doctrine of Incarnation, or the belief that Jesus is both fully human and
divine—flesh and spirit. Karr uses carnality, or specific details that engage all of our senses, to
root belief deep in our bodies. She attributes this belief to her father Pete Karr, who introduced
her in early childhood to “the raconteur’s need for physical evidence” (71). According to her
father, the more specific details the storytelling could wield, the more convincing her tale.
Like her discussion of voice, Karr suggests the real power of carnal writing lies in its
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potential to impact the audience. She writes, “Getting sophisticated about carnal writing means
selecting sensual data—items, odors, sounds—to recount details based on their psychological
effect on a reader” (The Art 72). Details, like voice, work to fill in the space between self and
other. In this way, they also make writing believable, as “A great detail feels particular in a way
that argues for the truth. A reader can take it in” (72). However, while readers tend to “believe”
carnal details, Karr admits, “physical details, however convincing, actually prove zip in terms of
truth” (75). For example, in a scene where Karr remembers a junior high kissing game, she
recounts the smell of her long-time crush’s Juicy Fruit gum, his red T-shirt with a tiny sea horse
embroidered on front, the feel of herself inside his curved arms. These details carry us back in
time to the experience, asking us to smell, see, taste, and feel the kiss with Mary. Whether or not
the boy was chewing Juicy Fruit or Bazooka Joe or Dubble Bubble is irrelevant. Our memories
are flawed, but Karr suggests that readers will forgive such mistakes because the feelings carnal
writing evokes are truer than the details themselves. When choosing which scenes to feature in a
memoir, then, Karr suggests highlighting those that are remembered with sensory detail, as these
details offer an “intimate ‘truth’ that helps the reader enter the scene” (80).
Like voice and truth in memoir, Karr teaches us that carnality is ultimately a tool to invite
a reader into our individual experience, to revise or actually erase the boundaries between self
and other. She writes, “excellent carnal writing fashions…what feels like a breathing, tasting
avatar the reader can climb inside, thus wearing the writer’s hands and standing inside her shoes.
The reader gets zipped into your skin” (The Art 78). This image pushes beyond the typical
suggestion to “see through someone else’s eyes” or “walk in someone else’s shoes.” Getting
zipped into someone else’s skin requires a different level of intersubjectivity, one that Karr
argues is the very potential of memoir. This exchange demands participation from our bodies and
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promises to change and refine us (Karr, “People”).
Mary Karr believes that memoir can motivate such transformation—and not only change
us but actually save us. Thus, the final and most significant belief that I examine involves Karr’s
use of the word passion to denote the affective possibilities of reading and writing memoir. Like
the word “carnal,” passion carries important religious connotations that provide a rich context for
Karr’s beliefs. And although there is no chapter in The Art of Memoir dedicated to “passion,” nor
does Karr ever directly discuss its significance to the craft, I suggest that it is the defining feature
of her pedagogy of memoir. In her article “People on Paper,” Karr reminds us of the Latin origin
of the word passion—“passio, which refers to Jesus’s suffering on the cross.” Indeed, before the
word came to mean “strong emotion, desire,” passion denoted suffering, originally associated
with the suffering of Christ on the cross and later extended to the general suffering of martyrs. In
Christianity, the “Passion” refers to the short time between when Jesus made his final entrance
into Jerusalem until his crucifixion on Mount Calvary, and thus defines the central event of the
Christian doctrine of salvation. Salvation, in Christianity, is possible only because of
“atonement,” which refers to the forgiving of sin, particularly original sin, through the death and
resurrection of Jesus, thus enabling the reconciliation between God and his creation. While
different theories of atonement explain this phenomenon in various ways, the concept itself relies
on the intercession of Christ in the salvation process. In other words, Jesus’s suffering makes our
salvation possible. The suffering that Jesus endured, according to Christian believers, was not
only the physical pain of crucifixion, but also the spiritual pain of embodying the sins of the
world. Thus, it is only through this process—of another taking on our suffering—that we are
offered salvation. Passion, according to this definition and according to Karr’s usage, reimagines
the concept of intersubjectivity and reinscribes the roles of “writer” and “reader.” Comparing
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the reader of a memoir to Jesus on the cross is a bold move; the image asks us, as individuals, to
take on the agony and suffering of a stranger, to allow it to enter us, to dwell in it, to feel it. The
result, Karr promises, is transformative, changing us into people who are better able to love and
be loved. If the memoir is capable of such potential, it becomes a pedagogical tool with
implications far beyond individual experience, far beyond the walls of our classrooms.
Carnality, truth, voice—these are all tools that help our stories reach others. They are
strategies that memoir writers, like Mary Karr, use in order to convince others to believe. Belief
relies on others, as Graham Ward acknowledges: “belief… is both emotional and relational
before it is rational” (Unbelievable 55). The reading and writing of memoir, as theorized and
practiced by Karr, provokes an interdependent negotiation of subjectivity, a possibility of
experience beyond the limits of the individual. Passion, as imagined by Karr, is a shared
emotion, possible only through the experience of feeling another person’s suffering. Passion, in
Karr’s definition, seems to mirror empathy, an emotion that, while limited and often
misunderstood, holds incredible transformative potential. How can empathy, then, as a defining
practice of intersubjectivity, inform pedagogy? If the primary work of pedagogy in our lives is to
organize our affective responses, and if the goal of dominant pedagogy is, at the same time, to
“mystify” emotion as private, individual, and subjective experience, then emotions like passion
and empathy that rely on our ability to recognize another are radical indeed. To understand the
possibilities and limits of empathy, a brief look at the concept of empathy is useful, including an
examination of its common uses and frequent misuses in contemporary academic discourses.
Narrative and Empathy
When we refer to “empathy,” we are usually expressing a commonality of social feeling
or the ability to share the emotional experiences of others, to feel “at one” with their affective
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responses (Swanson 127). For some, the concept of empathy extends from an individual
relationship between humans and is extended to a compassionate relationship to the larger global
community—to an “animate world”—and is based on the continuity between human existence
and the fate of the biosphere. This kind of empathy is a driving force behind a number of ethical
and political causes including animal rights and environmental activism (127). Whether we are
conceptualizing empathy as an individual or global affective response, we are generally
reflecting on the ability to not only imagine and reconsider, but to feel for what exists beyond the
personal and the known. It is beyond the known that the realm of the “trans-individual” exists,
where we experience the feeling of being in touch with something beyond ourselves. According
to Gillian Swanson, empathy is a concept traditionally conceived as “a passage between minds,
the mental processes that allow us to imagine the states of others as the basis of a feeling which
is neither properly ours, nor empirically theirs, but borne from that connectivity” (128).
However, empathy, closely bound to the concept of sympathy, is one that is often misused and
misunderstood.
When we confuse or misuse the concept of “empathy” as simply another or more intense
version of “sympathy,” we are overlooking an essential difference and potentially cheating
ourselves out of the kind of powerful work that the reading and writing of memoir can do in
lives. Sympathizing with a character, a writer, or a colleague—feeling for or with them—is not
the same emotional experience as empathizing, or feeling into them. Sympathy essentially
implies a feeling of recognition of another's suffering while empathy is actually sharing another's
suffering, if only briefly. Sometimes, we’re left with little choice but to feel sympathetic because
we really can’t understand the plight or predicament of someone else. It takes imagination, work,
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or maybe even a similar experience to reach empathy. The idea of empathy suggests a more
active process. It is also less common, especially in academic settings.
Because the concept has a historically ambiguous past, the term is frequently used to
mean different phenomena. Diverse and competing interpretations have brought to our attention
the varied roles of affect, imagery, and embodiment on the emotion. Thus, the word has been
used to define multiple concepts reflecting psychological, ethical, aesthetic, and epistemological
interests (Rosan 117). For my purposes here, I am suggesting that the concept, emotion, or
phenomenon of empathy presupposes an intersubjective experience that forms the subject’s
connection to the other and the co-presence of worlds of meaning between self and other. The
“intersubjective experience” that Karr models in her book and teaches in The Art of Memoir is an
experience that can potentially lead us to a more empathetic “way of being” as readers and
writers. Perhaps even as people.
Here—in the conflation of the roles of “readers,” “writers,” and “people”—might be
where the differences between sympathy and empathy become most important. When we
sympathize with others, we are not substituting ourselves for them. We remain in the tidy roles
of “reader,” “writer,” “narrator,” and “character,” and our emotional response is one of feeling
for another. When we step outside of these individual roles and into the more collective and
shared role of “people,” the lines between us become a lot less distinct or even important. Karr’s
use of the word “passion” to describe the affective experience of memoir highlights the
differences between sympathy and empathy. Like Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, the suffering
required by feeling into a “stranger’s agony” offers salvation only through substitution. Likewise,
the image of “zipping” someone into our skin, asks writers and readers to engage in an active,
embodied, emotional experience of wearing someone else’s hands and body—a much more
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intimate and carnal interpretation of “walking in someone else’s shoes.”
Karr suggests—and I argue proves—that memoir is capable of giving us such an
experience, even as theorists such as Judith Butler, remind us of the limits of completely
“knowing” or recognizing another. Maybe belief works differently. Maybe the empathy
generated in and from our stories, the experience of “walking in someone’s shoes” or “zipping
someone into our skin,” does make it possible to believe in the truth of the other. Belief, as it
operates both similarly to and differently from knowledge, gives us a different (not lesser) path
into the lives of others. This certainly is what happened to me. From the first time I read Karr’s
first memoir, I believed her. Her writing—her idiosyncratic voice, distinguished by her eastern
Texas slang and self-deprecating humor, her attention to sensory, carnal details, her probing
inquiries into her own identity and experiences—provokes empathetic reactions from her
readers. The experience of dwelling in Karr’s stories, of walking in Mary’s shoes, asks us to
believe not only in the “truth” of her individual stories, but also, more importantly, in the
possibility of those stories to change us.
We have not traditionally been taught how to participate in the kind of intersubjective
experience that Karr is describing. Historically, the cultivation of empathy has been generally
absent in our educational systems (as microcosms of dominant systems and pedagogies) and
specifically absent in the way we have been trained (disciplined) as readers and writers. Almost
immediately after the concept of “empathy” had been defined and centrally situated within
Western aesthetic theory, it met up against high modernist theory, particularly New Criticism,
which taught students to avoid the “affective fallacy” of empathetic experience when reading
literature. This approach had a devastating impact on not only the interest but also the ability of
students to engage in the kinds of literary interpretation that considers the relationship, mediated
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by the text, between readers and writers. The movement, although never completely formalized
as such, was a reaction against the idea of “literary appreciation” as being too subjective and
emotional. Instead, New Critics considered the text as a self-contained, self-referential, and
aesthetic object, separate from—and unaffected by—the interpretation of the reader or intention
of the author. New Criticism dominated the literary landscape in our educational system until
challenged by theories such as feminism and structuralism in the 1970s. While the formal
practice of New Criticism has been mostly absent from the curriculum for decades, its influences
linger, unintentional and possibly even unrecognizable, in the pedagogies dominant in our
classrooms and in our world. It is in this “forgotten,” formalistic theory, with its prioritization of
more “objective” texts in contemporary reading and writing classrooms—that the Common Core
standards seem to be finding inspiration and importance. For instance, one of the core standards
for writing is to: “establish and maintain a formal style and objective tone while attending to the
norms and conventions of the discipline in which they are writing” (“English”). As students are
taught not to value the “affective” in their approach to reading and writing texts, they are
consequently taught not to practice it. For pedagogies shaped by affect and enacted through
intersubjectivity, this historical baggage—ours and students’—is worth consideration. Because
of our collective lack of experience encountering empathy as a pedagogical possibility, we may
be unprepared for its transformative effects.
The work of psychologist Peter Rosan can help further illustrate how empathy works in
intersubjective exchanges. According to Rosan, people come to understand one another “through
their use of a common language and on the basis of their engagements in particular situation and
shared traditions” (117). Both language and story are essential for this kind of empathetic
awareness. The other’s expressive life begins to resonate with the subject and causes a “turning195

toward” where the subject joins with the other’s expressions toward the discovery of the other’s
world (121). According to Rosan, turning-towards may be accomplished perceptually,
imaginatively, and/or narratologically. For example, if the situation that is causing the other’s
suffering is in the subject’s potential field of perception, she can turn directly with the other to
the particular experience. Or, if the subject in unable to directly relate to or perceive the
experience, she may imagine how the world appears to the other. Rosan argues that an
understanding of the other is bound to, or has its origins in, a communicative experience and is
dialogic in nature, arising from an interplay of multiple worlds of meaning:
The subject’s private reveries are intertwined with the spectacle of the other’s changing
expressions and/or disclosures. In turn, these reveries reciprocally illuminate…the
meaning of the other’s expressions, albeit from the subject’s own unique perspective…In
this sense, empathy as a form of being with the other leads to an illumination of the other.
(131)
Thus, to conceptualize empathy in the context of reading and writing memoir requires us to think
about how discourse—language, words, stories—works to facilitate the experience.
Narrative theorist Suzanne Keen seems to suggest that the recent interest in the cognitive
study of empathy—including the redefinition of the emotion as one that clearly involves both
thinking and feeling—might be at least partially responsible for a reimagining of how empathy
works in the study of narrative. In the relatively new field know as Cognitive Approaches to
Literary Studies, based heavily on the work of Joseph LeDoux and Antonio Damasio, matters of
affect are generally considered to “fall under the umbrella” of the term “cognitive” (213). Keen
argues that empathy, as a process, involves both cognition and affect; when texts invite readers
to feel, they also stimulate readers’ thinking (213). However, these responses—both affective
196

and cognitive—do not inevitably lead to empathizing, but “fiction does disarm readers of some
of the protective layers of cautious reasoning that may inhibit empathy in the real world” (213).
Of course this assertion would suggest that a clear distinction exists between a textual world and
the “real world” where, as readers and writers, our ideas and experiences can be isolated between
the real and the imagined. Rather than relegating experience into the distinct realms of “fiction”
or “reality,” Keen might be suggesting that fiction could provide a bridge between the two.
Although Keen’s work on narrative empathy is focused on the study of fiction, it can be
productively applied to the reading of nonfiction, particularly memoir. For instance, narrative
theorists have identified a number of techniques that perpetuate empathetic experiences, such as
the use of first-person narration and the interior representation of characters’ consciousness and
emotional states, that life writing shares with fiction. Life narratives are personal reflections but
also aesthetic constructions. In other words, life stories are ultimately stories—not the people
they represent. This belief, central to life writing studies, separates lives from texts in a way that
makes empathy not only a psychological experience (between subject and other) but also an
aesthetic one (between subject and object). If we believe that the constructed text is merely one
reflection of a represented self and not a representation of an actual self, then an empathetic
experience becomes much more complex.
In her work on narrative empathy in autobiography, Leah Anderst considers the different
affective responses involved in reading fiction and nonfiction. Although some theorists, like
Keen, suggest that nonfiction demands “suspicious reading,” requiring readers to engage in
continual “reality checks” and ultimately disrupting textual engagement, Anderst believes that
nonfiction narratives have as much potential for creating empathetic responses and arousing
strong emotions in readers (273). She attributes these possibilities to strategies such as self197

reflexivity, distinct voice, and multiple points of view and offers the memoirs of Doris Lessing
(Under My Skin) and Alison Bechdel (Fun Home) as examples of narratives capable of
generating intersubjective experiences, based on empathetic exchanges, between writers and
readers. Karr’s memoirs resemble those of Lessing’s and Bechdel’s, which “in their call to
intimacy and in their multiple and powerful instances of internal, embodied narrative empathy
school their readers” (287). Anderst continues, “They…lead readers down multiple paths toward
affective responses, toward empathy, paths already forseen and cleared by the writer’s own
narrative empathy with herself in the past and with her character-family members” (287). Karr,
in her characterization of her childhood (The Liars’ Club), her adolescence (Cherry), and finally
adulthood (Lit), offers her readers the chance to eavesdrop on a very personal conversation
between her present and past selves and, thus, calls them into an intimate and exclusive
relationship of shared growth and transformation. Of the difference between the empathetic
possibilities in fiction and nonfiction, Karr remarks:
As I turn a novel’s pages, a first-person narrator may seduce me, but the fact that it’s all
made up and not actually lived oddly keeps me from drawing courage outside the book’s
dream. The deep, mysterious sense of identification with a memoirist who’s confessed
her past just doesn’t translate to a novelist I love, no matter how deliciously written the
work. (The Art xvii)
However, “identifying” with an autobiographical someone, Karr admits, is naïve, as the writer is
ultimately “a peddler of pages who profits from my buying her act” (xvii). Like “the guy at a
strip club who thinks the dancers really fancy him,” readers must remember the limits of
identification, echoing Butler’s argument that “no matter how much we…desire recognition and
require it, we are not therefore the same as the other” (Giving 33).
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In “Entitlement and Empathy in Personal Narrative,” Amy Shuman further problematizes
the relationship between empathy and narrative with her argument that “empathy appropriates
the personal with the goal of greater understanding across experiential differences” (149). Her
work focuses on the limits of storytelling, especially when a particular narrative is used beyond
the context of the event it represents and when personal stories are used to represent collective
experience. She argues that making meaning out of other people’s stories can produce
sentimentality rather than empathy, in which an emotional response becomes a substitute for
understanding others. Shuman warns us that
…claiming a narrative as a way of understanding events is a political choice that enjoins
particular obligations upon tellers and listeners. Empathy is one kind of obligation,
sometimes creating a possibility for understanding across differences…sometimes
romanticizing tragedy as inspiration, but in any case deeply compromising the
relationship between tellers and listeners. (152)
Shuman draws on the work of Adam Zachary Newton who understands empathy as a part of a
continuum mediating between “identification or empathy on the one hand, and objective respect
at a distance on the other” (55). Finally, she leaves us with the sobering thought that although
storytelling offers us the possibility of empathy, and empathy offers the possibility of
understanding across space and time, it rarely changes the circumstances of those who suffer
(152). Shuman suggests that the biggest challenge to the study of personal experience narrative
continues to be to “avoid the conflation of experience and the personal with the authentic and the
real and at the same time to understand why this conflation is so compelling” (153). This is a
challenge that continues to face readers and writers of memoir.
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There are limits to knowing another person; there are boundaries that define the “other.”
Empathy without this acknowledgment is impossible. Rosan describes this as “the tentativeness
of knowing another person” while being empathetic. In other words, the subject is well aware
that any realizations or comprehension of the “other” will never exhaust the full meaning of the
other’s experience or selfhood. He calls this a “knowing naiveté,” or an awareness of limits can
potentially lead to a discovery of possibilities for the subject (127). Rosan argues that once
subjects recognize the limits of empathy, they are freed for an “existential epiphany” or an
awareness of the personal significance of the other’s experience for themselves. An existential
epiphany, according to Rosan, is signified by movement of the subject toward a possible future
with newly discovered meaning. When a subject is deeply moved by and for the other, when she
reflexively returns to self, she discovers that she has become other through the other, that she has
been changed by the other’s differences (127). My reading of Mary Karr, as this dissertation
demonstrates, has prompted existential epiphanies in my own life. In many ways, personally and
academically, she has zipped me up in her skin. This experience has demanded that I engage
with her work not only cognitively, as a compelling object of study, but also affectively. I’m
moved by Karr’s memoirs and changed because I’ve read them. From the horror of sexual abuse,
to the thrill of a first kiss, the wonder of motherhood, and the agony of addiction—all of Karr’s
experiences have extended to me the possibility of feeling with another.
The Schooling of Empathy
Empathy is messy, unbound, wild, and complicated just as pedagogies that rely on its
effects can be. Empathy, like any emotion, is organic, authentic, and in many ways, utterly out of
the control of even the most experienced or well-meaning practitioner. And yet, Karr’s work
seems to suggest the reading and writing of memoir at the heart of a pedagogy of
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intersubjectivity—possible only through the affective work of empathy—might be worth such
risks. In this role, pedagogy becomes a method of not only negotiating the world, but also of
reimagining it. What hope can such pedagogy have within educational and social systems that
seem, according to Nadine Dolby, to be moving us away from a culture that values, nurtures, and
practices empathy?
According to a recent study in Personality and Social Psychology Review, empathy is on
the decline (Stratman 25), and certain research suggests that while our students continue to
isolate themselves with technology—distancing themselves from others through social
networking and violent video gaming—their desire and even ability to connect with others
continues to decrease. While I am hesitant to engage broad and predictable claims about
generational behaviors as a valid reflection of the specific needs facing contemporary
classrooms, I offer these findings instead as a commentary on broader cultural shifts and their
effects on our individual lives. A 2011 meta-analysis of 72 studies conducted on college-age
students from 1972 – 2009 indicates a decline in empathy of 40 percent during that time period
(Dolby 62). In her winning entry for the New York Times Magazine college essay contest, Amy
Baugher highlights the decline of social action among her generational peers by suggesting that
the students’ fear of deviating from a lockstep path that will (perhaps) lead to a financially secure
future, keeps students from engaging in activities that foster empathy (62). Her reflections imply
that the declining economic security of the middle class has created a generation that is focused
inward on self, rather than outward, toward connections with others.
The researchers of the 2011 study were most concerned not with the general decline of
empathy, a phenomenon they contend doesn’t necessarily suggest that we have lost the “golden
age” of empathy, as American college students have always struggled to see life from other
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perspectives, but with the link between empathy and social skills. Critics of this generation of
college students argue that our students “compose one of the most self-concerned, competitive,
confident and individualistic cohorts in recent history” (Stratman 26). In the profiles for her 2011
book, Alone Together, Sherry Turkle discovered that students want to put distance between
themselves and others; they prefer texting to talking on the phone. They crave the sterility and
disconnection of the screen compared to the “messiness” that comes from interacting with
another human being. These are the students, Turkle argues, that are sitting in our classrooms,
obsessing over their Facebook profiles and “friends” “while slipping ever further into a
solipsistic and hermetically sealed world” (Dolby 64).
Despite the decline in measurable empathy, research on the biology of empathy is
thriving. Research from such various fields as neuroscience, primatology, social psychology, and
cognitive ethology (the study of animals under natural conditions) is demonstrating that while
competition is innate to animals, so is cooperation and empathy. What seems to matter to
humans is the culture that surrounds them; if that culture promotes competition, then our brains
become wired to anticipate and privilege competition. The same goes with cooperation and
empathy. According to this theory, humans are capable of creating a more humane, more
empathetic world than the one we currently have (Dolby 62).
This is a world where school and public shootings happen so regularly we can’t even
keep track of them. Where wars based on human differences rage across the globe. Where,
Gillian Swanson argues, “The perceived failures of social feeling identified in commentary on
street crime and riot at one end of the social scale, and financial corruption…at the other are no
longer painted into an epic canvas of evil and pathology but one scaled down to petty human
failures: greed, arrogance, selfishness” (126). According to Swanson, to fail to act in the
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“common interest” is a failure of ordinary emotion; it is a lack of the emotional connectivity
through which an individual subjugates personal motivation and self-interest in favor of the
public good. “Sociality,” then, is tied to an emotional behavior and occurs not only through a
recognition of a “common cause,” or mutually shared purposes or interests, but of being bound
to a “commonality of predicament, experience, and affective response” (127). This commonality
of feeling is typically referred to as the concept of empathy.
If, as the research suggests, this emotion can be nurtured in a culture, then one very
obvious place to start that process is school where students are first learning how to successfully
participate in a community of others. In many countries, such as the United States, Canada,
Australia, and Britain, students are taught empathy as part of emotional literacy in schools. In
2013, the Roots of Empathy program, established in Canada in 1996, was introduced in England
and Wales. Empathy training is also embedded in the common curriculum as part of a form of
relationship education and it at the center of nationwide anti-bullying campaigns. These
educational initiatives ask students not just to imagine and consider the other, but to feel for
them. Empathy is being offered as a cure—or maybe an antidote—for violence.
These initiatives seem to be working, or at least to be offering a glimmer of hope to an
educational system that is struggling to understand how to the meet the needs of the
contemporary student. And, schools are trying to address the problems before students arrive at
their doors by teaching parents to start incorporating explicit empathy awareness in their
parenting practices. It seems our culture is desperately attempting to understand and address our
social issues through a pedagogical lens of empathy. However, Worsham argues that in order to
understand the relationship between pedagogy and emotion, we have to look much more broadly
at how our society, not just our children, have been “schooled” to feel in certain ways. Before we
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presume that empathy can be neatly packaged into a curriculum or fostered in a classroom
practice, Worsham suggests that we first look at how pedagogy and violence have worked
together to shape the cultural narrative that we are attempting to disrupt.
Faced with an awareness of an increase in violence in our society, especially the kind of
violent acts like school shootings that feel so random and even unmotivated, Worsham argues
that “our most urgent political and pedagogical task remains the fundamental reeducation of
emotion” (216) The kind of education that Worsham is calling for involves “restructur[ing] a
mood that characterizes an age” (216). Worsham, drawing on a cognitivist view, argues that
emotion can be “educated, reeducated, and mis-educated” according to what the dominant
pedagogy has established or determined as desirable. This pedagogy, “in which the subject
cannot recognize the results of its own activity in the world and, as a consequence, is unable to
recognize the subjectivity of the other” (229), has created a world unable to empathize. A
pedagogy that relies on intersubjectivity and is firmly rooted in the cognitive process of
emotion—both the thinking and the feeling—is one way to begin to reimagine and redefine the
dominant ways we have been schooled to feel. When we read and write our life stories, as Karr
does and teaches us to do in The Art of Memoir, we are resisting, one page at a time.
The memoirs of Mary Karr, as well as her theory of autobiography, exemplify Wesley
Kort’s observation that narratives are “webs of belief” (51). Her beliefs about topics such as
religion, literature, language, childhood, memory, truth, love, and identity are woven throughout
her stories and her advice on how to write them. Each belief is a thread that connects, crosses,
dissects, and overlaps others, creating a pattern of intersections and interconnections for readers
to discover. Like the root system of a plant, a web can only grow through these rhizomatic
connections. A radical, root-like pedagogy relies on the same logic. For anything—an idea, an
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emotion, a pedagogy—to be radical, it must return to its fundamental nature to dig down, to
dwell at the root-level, at the origin. The very beginning. A pedagogy that is radical has the
potential to work at the deepest possible level, before and beneath the current, economic, and
individual interests and priorities celebrated in the dominant culture. Like the 1920s version of
the word “radical,” it is “unconventional.” It is also, like the surfers of the 1970s noticed, “at the
limits of control.” As readers, writers, and teachers of life writing, as purveyors of stories, we are
in an extraordinary position to interrupt the larger narratives that threaten to isolate us, to keep us
from the often messy and self-implicating practice of learning to listen to each other. Of learning
how to feel as well as how to know. Of becoming “better able to give and receive love,” which
Mary Karr reminds us, “is the sole purpose of being alive” (“People”).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
…It’s much more radical, much more daring, and much more dangerous to hope.
—Mary Karr
In 2005, Stanley Fish, in his article “One University Under God?”, examines the evolving
role of religion in contemporary culture and argues that in a post-9-11 world, it is increasingly
impossible to separate faith from public policy or of “keeping the old boundaries in place and of
quarantining the religious impulse in the safe houses of the church, the synagogue, and the
mosque.” In his compelling argument, Fish addresses the academy with a warning that the
usefulness of distinctions long assumed—between reason and faith, evidence and revelation,
obedience and inquiry, and truth and belief—has expired. Instead, “the geopolitical events of the
past decade and of the past three years especially have re-alerted us to the fact…that hundreds of
millions of people in the world do not observe the distinction between the private and the public
or between belief and knowledge, and that it is no longer possible for us to regard such persons
as quaintly pre-modern or as the needy recipients of our saving…wisdom.” The “persons” Fish is
describing are those who are both teaching and learning in higher education, a claim that
challenges many of our previously held expectations of religion’s current place in the university,
specifically in its tidy designation as an object of historical study. In other words, we have
courses that might examine the American Puritans as a fascinating study of an impulse that
we’ve moved beyond or study the Bible through various literary and critical lenses. This
approach fails to recognize the increasing cultural shifts that are producing students who come to
our classrooms “not only…seeking knowledge; they will be seeking guidance and inspiration,
and many of them will believe that religion—one religion, many religions, religion in general—
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will provide them.” Interestingly, one of the catalysts for Fish’s observations comes from the
2004 presidential election, during which candidates John Kerry and George W. Bush were
repeatedly compelled to profess, or “prove,” the validity of their faith.
How much more critical this issue proves, twelve years later, in the wake of the 2016
election! Texts are always rooted in a particular moment in time and space, and this dissertation
is no different. Written between 2016-2017, a period that I believe will mark a very pivotal
historical moment in our country and will continue to challenge and redefine the role of belief in
our lives, this project brings to my attention questions that feel more urgent now than when I
began. In Chapter One, I argued that in a culture increasingly described as “post-factual” or
“post-truth,” the contested definitions of truth, knowledge, reason, and fact—all of which are
intimately related to our beliefs—demand our attention now more than ever. These issues are so
prominent in the national imaginary that Oxford Dictionaries named “post-truth” its 2016 Word
of the Year, a designation awarded to the single word that captures the “ethos, mood, or
preoccupations” of that particular year. Post-truth, an adjective, is defined as: “Relating to or
denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (“Post-truth”). It is no coincidence, then,
that 2016, when the use of “post-truth” increased by 2000% from its usage in 2015,
simultaneously saw the birth of the term “fake news.” If, as President Barack Obama suggests,
we are living in a time when “everything is true and nothing is true,” a rhetorical understanding
of belief has never been more vital (Remnick).
In Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don’t, Graham Ward concludes, “We
are…living at a time when believing is reasserting its fundamental nature—and analysis of both
the believability of a belief and the making of a belief is crucial” (186). What makes a belief
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believable? To answer this question requires a rhetorical understanding of belief—a rhetoric of
belief—that demands a reconsideration not only of the meaning of the concepts “rhetoric” and
“belief,” but also a reimagination of their relationship to each other. Rhetoric, like belief, reaches
out and beyond, to an audience, to another; belief, too, as it requires an object, extends beyond
the boundaries of the individual and toward something or someone else. Both compel a moving
forward, in anticipation, and are driven by positive expectant emotions, such as desire and hope.
Of all the expectant emotions, the most important, “the most authentic emotion of longing and
thus of self, always remains in all of this—hope” (Bloch 75). And hope, according to Ward, is
“inseparable from belief and longing or desire” (152). Hope, in its projection toward something
beyond, “exceeds outside the finitudes of individual intending” and creates possibility. Narrative
is a practice that requires hope; as we read and write stories, we move through them with the
expectation of something that lies in the future, requiring us to simultaneously anticipate and
create—to believe. Ward calls this phenomenon “narrative hope,” characterized by an
engagement with both text and other that “not only embodies and operates through structures of
desire, expectation, and hope, but it also forms, re-forms and transforms our own structures of
believing” (155).
This experience extends beyond the individual reader, as Paul Ricoeur recognizes in his
examination of how imagination and belief are implicated in social praxis. In his landmark essay
“The Imagination in Discourse and Action,” Ricoeur argues that the imagination occupies a
central role in both the critique and transformation of the social. Action, according to Ricoeur, is
rooted in imaginative possibility, empowering us to “act for and engender alternative beliefpossibilities, variations on the conditional mood of ‘I can’” (Ward 151). A thorough
understanding of Ricoeur’s theory of imagination is impossible in a few concluding paragraphs;
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however, I mention it here as one possibility for future exploration of how to move from “a
theory constructed within the sphere of language…to the sphere of practice”—from text to action
(“Imagination” 168). Ricoeur explains, “Without imagination, there is no action…on the level of
projects, on the level of motivations, and on the level of the very power to act” (177). The
project, defined by Ricoeur, is the “thing to be done by me” or the action (177). It is through the
anticipatory imagination of acting that we “try out” different possible courses of action or “play”
with possibilities (177). Ricoeur locates this moment where pragmatic “play” intersects narrative
“play”—or when the text meets action. He explains, “The function of the project, turned toward
the future, and that of the narrative, turned toward the past, here exchange their schemata and
their grids, as the project borrows the narrative’s structuring power and the narrative receives the
project’s capacity for anticipating” (177). This interaction—between past and future, imagination
and practice, narrative and project, text and action—seems to hold, for me, the essence of my
argument in the previous chapters. I believe, as I’ve endeavored to illuminate in this dissertation,
that text, specifically the stories we tell about our lives, can motivate and inspire real changes in
the real world. This possibility lies within the affective power of our beliefs, both secular and
sacred, public and private, personal and communal, to move us to new spaces, new
considerations of what it means to live in this historical moment.
As I reflect on my analysis of Mary Karr’s memoirs, I cannot help but conclude that a
rhetoric of belief is unapologetically hopeful, in spite of, or perhaps because of a social and
political reality that threatens the opposite. When the value—or, perhaps, even the possibility—
of discourse is threatened, when our perception of language itself is rapidly and daily shifting to
accommodate every new headline, we need a rhetoric that not only acknowledges belief but
leverages it. As I explored in my first chapter, Sharon Crowley locates stories as possibly the
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only, or at least the most efficient, means of gaining attention in the contemporary civic
landscape (197). The stories Crowley imagines are born of ancient rhetorical tradition; they are
narratives rooted in pathos that serve as exemplary tales, both historical and fictional (198).
Stories of belief, epitomized by Mary Karr’s memoirs, proffer us an experience that not only
embodies and operates through our desires and hopes but also “forms, re-forms, and transforms
our own structures of believing” (Ward, Unbelievable 155). Such narratives reveal their power
on at least two levels. Individually, they invite us to reconsider the role of belief in our own lives.
Collectively, they hold the potential to reinscribe pervading cultural myths by acknowledging
how beliefs help create shared worlds. The last sentence of Karr’s The Art of Memoir reads:
“None of us can ever know the value of our lives or how our separate and silent scribbling may
add to the amenity of the world if only by how radically it changes us one and by one” (218).
This is the hope—the possibility—that stories offer us.
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